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This research seeks to understand the policy-making dynamics related to migrant 
smuggling within the European Union, focusing in particular on the Italian case and on 
the Sicilian sub-case, over the period 2014-2019. 
The study is based on an operational definition of migrant smuggling which goes 
beyond a merely legal understanding of it and considers smuggling in its persistent 
tension between security and human rights. To do so, the phenomenon is unpacked 
into its two main components – supply and demand, the latter being often neglected in 
policy practices. After that, such components are brought back together into a 
‘smuggling spectrum’, which becomes a key analytical tool: an area of complexity 
where the phenomenon is considered through six different layers, pointing to the 
existing contradictions both in empirical and policy terms. 
Building upon this approach, this interpretive case study, falling within the broad field 
of the EU studies, combines new institutionalist and multi-level governance 
approaches. This analytical perspective makes it possible to answer the main research 
question, aimed at understanding how and why agency, influenced by institutional 
constraints, moves within and across governance levels in the formulation of policies 
aimed at countering the smuggling of migrants in the EU, Italy and Sicily. To do so, 
multiple data are considered and analysed, including: 23 in-depth semi-structured 
interviews, realised with relevant actors on different governance levels; parliamentary 
proceedings from 1998 to 2019; judicial proceedings; documents from the European 
Commission, the European Parliament, the Council of the EU, national ministries, 
Europol, Eurojust, UNODC, UNHCR and NGOs, among others. 
The multi-level perspective is unfolded into three different levels – i.e. supranational 
(EU), national (Italy) and local (Sicily) – each of them being associated with a sub-
research question. Moreover, the elaboration of an analytical model makes it possible 
to apply the conceptual combination of new institutionalism and multi-level governance 
on the specific case at hand and on the three governance levels connected. 
Adopting a bottom-up perspective, the focus is firstly placed on local implementation 
patterns in Sicily, based on different arenas of agency. The consequences of these 
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practices on policy-making, as well as (sometimes unwanted) bottom-up dynamics in 
fighting migrant smuggling, influencing both national and European policies, are also 
discussed, disclosing the importance of certain actors in particular, such as judiciary, 
NGOs and intermediate bodies (institutions placed in-between governance levels), 
among others. 
The analysis of the national level explores policy-making in relation to migrant 
smuggling, in the light of vertical and horizontal dynamics. The former are based on 
the influence of the local and EU levels, where again intermediate bodies play a crucial 
role, alongside parliamentary committees and unwanted effects originating at EU level. 
As for the latter, they consider the way in which different policy areas and different 
institutional and non-institutional actors placed at national level interact in the 
elaboration of smuggling-related policies. Here the security-based framework, the 
unwanted consequences caused by NGOs and the executivisation of policies are all 
aspects that gain primary relevance. 
A very similar approach is proposed also at an EU level. In this case, vertical dynamics 
confirm the importance of intermediate bodies and parliamentary committees, in 
addition to field visits, whereas horizontal interactions help to disclose the relevance of 
other policy domains outside the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, the 
institutional consequences of that, the interaction between supranational and 
intergovernmental actors as well as the important (and yet contradictory) role of 
research and studies. 
Building upon this analysis and assessing the way in which each actor moves within 
and across the governance levels, influenced and limited by institutional constraints, 
this study makes it possible to understand (a) which actors lead the policy-making 
process in the field of anti-migrant smuggling in the EU, Italy and Sicily, and why this 
is the case; (b) what their approach to smuggling is; (c) what dynamics characterise 
the relationships between them; (d) how much room there is for processes of 
information and preference upload; (e) to what extent non-institutional actors contribute 
to the process of policy adoption. 
Namely, what emerges in these five dimensions is the strong executivisation of 
policies, with a prominent role of national governments and of the Council of the EU; 
the widespread tendency towards a more securitising approach to migrant smuggling; 
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the existence of pass-the-buck dynamics (especially between national and 
supranational levels); the difficulty in processes of information and preference upload 
(mostly depending on the content to be uploaded); and, lastly, the importance of non-
institutional actors in influencing the policy-making process through their practices. 
The conclusions that are reached, on the one side, allow for an in-depth understanding 
of the specific Italian/Sicilian case, which is significant, considering this as first 
systematic insight into a policy domain still to be explored. On the other side, through 
the conceptual combination proposed, they provide a definition of a model aiming to 


















Migratory movements have attracted growing interest and concern, over the last 
decade, in political debates, public opinion discourse, research and practitioners 
activity all across Europe. This has been particularly true in the case of European 
Mediterranean countries – such as Italy – especially from 2013-14 onwards, when the 
migratory waves coming from North Africa and the Middle East increased substantially, 
at least for a few years. 
Such a situation has polarised the debate within and across European countries, with 
the rise of xenophobic discourses and far right political parties, which have tried (in 
most cases successfully) to politically capitalise on the fears and concerns of the public 
opinion towards this issue. In such a context, the importance of deepening the 
research, in particular on certain aspects of the migratory process into Europe, has 
become crucial, in order not only to foster academic scholarship but also to provide 
facts and evidence for the public and political debate. 
Aspects connected to the smuggling of migrants have become central in this story, for 
two different reasons. On the one side, most forms of migration into Europe through 
the Mediterranean Sea routes appear to require, to different extents, the involvement 
of smugglers, as shall be more thoroughly discussed in chapter 1. On the other side, 
the very public debate has increasingly focused on smugglers. This, however, has not 
always implied a true and deep concern about smuggling itself: throughout the 
research it shall be made clear how often the narrative of smuggling has been used to 
disguise restrictive migration policy preferences. 
However, as a matter of fact, smuggling processes and smuggling-related narratives 
are crucial in order to better understand the patterns of the migration processes into 
Europe through the Mediterranean Sea. 
This research moves from the acknowledgement of such a premise and addresses the 
current debate in academia concerning migrant smuggling in the Mediterranean 
routes, with a view not only to exploring issues not fully considered in research yet, but 
also to providing some considerations in a policy-oriented perspective. To do so, it 
focuses on a case study, i.e. Italy, and to a connected sub-case, i.e. Sicily, analysing 
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the characteristics of political agency in the making and implementation of smuggling-
related policies across three different levels of governance – EU, national, local – in 
the period 2014-2019. 
In such perspective, this research appears important and topical, focusing on an issue 
which has been relatively neglected in academic and grey literature; however, its 
importance is rather crucial in terms of understanding the EU migration governance, 
both theoretically and empirically. Furthermore, the approach chosen offers important 
elements of innovation, by focusing specifically on the process of making policies and 
suggesting a paradigm to look at it which is based on an across-the-level new 
institutionalist analysis. 
The study consists of two main parts: Part 1 (chapters 1-3), which considers all the 
different theoretical, analytical and methodological aspects that gain relevance in the 
design of a research on the smuggling of migrants; Part 2 (chapters 4-7), where the 
approaches and models elaborated in the first three chapters are applied onto the case 
considered and the analysis stricto sensu is carried out. 
In more detail, chapter 1 offers an in-depth view of the concept of migrant smuggling, 
unpacking its different components and proposing an approach that makes it possible 
to reconcile the need for an acknowledgement of the empirical complexity of the 
phenomenon and a viable definition, operationally and analytically relevant. In this 
chapter the different characteristics of smuggling, smugglers and smuggled migrants 
are considered, along with the different ways in which academic and grey literature 
have addressed them, leading to the formulation of the operational definition of 
smuggling – the ‘smuggling spectrum’ – and of the research problem. 
Chapter 2 further elaborates on these aspects, offering a theoretical guidance to the 
research problem. It thereby calls for the combination of two different theoretical 
approaches – new institutionalism and multi-level governance – and, in so doing, 
narrowing down the research problem into a specific research question (and three 
connected sub-questions, one for each governance level). Based on this process, a 3-
layer (institution/agency, vertical and horizontal dynamics) analytical model is 
proposed, which enables the above-mentioned conceptual combination and its 
concrete application onto the specific case. The methodological aspects of the 
research – including the time frame, the case selection and the specific characteristics 
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of case and sub-case, the source selection and their heuristic relevance – are also 
addressed here. 
Chapter 3 briefly offers some background elements related to the applicable legislative 
framework, at an EU, national and local level, and the formal allocation of competences 
between them. 
Part 2 follows a bottom-up approach, starting with chapter 4, where the focus is placed 
on the implementation aspects at a local level, in Sicily, mainly read through the lenses 
of the first layer of the analytical model. In particular, an analysis is provided of how 
agency makes it possible to deviate from the letter of norms and how and to what 
extent this contributes to making policies, both directly (at a local level) or through 
shifting up processes of preference upload and unwanted consequences. 
Chapters 5 and 6 have very similar structures, based on layers 2 and 3 of the analytical 
model and considering the policy-making dynamics at the Italian and EU levels, 
respectively. In so doing, both vertical and horizontal dynamics are considered and, 
also through the consideration of the same phenomenon from multiple angles and 
perspectives, some preliminary analytical conclusions are offered in each chapter. 
Chapter 7 finally wraps up the analysis conducted in the other chapters of Part 2, 
bringing the 3-layer analytical model back to unity and considering the way in which 
political agency moves across the different governance levels. In so doing, also a 
specific focus on one policy is considered, in order to better clarify and underscore the 
complex interaction between agency and institutions, embedded in different 
governance levels.  
Lastly, in the Conclusions, a complete answer to the research question is provided, as 
well as some narrative updates and some general reflections on this specific study and 
on migration research more broadly. 
Through the above approach, this research thus aims to contribute to the general 
debate on migrant smuggling into the European Union and the policy framework to 
tackle it. The detailed exploration and analysis of a case study and the innovations 
brought forward by that, as well as the proposition of a new approach to address the 
phenomenon, are all elements that, besides bringing important theoretical 
contributions, can also open new research avenues for EU scholarship. 
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Two disclaimers conclude this introduction. 
Firstly, in such a topical and fast-changing issue, even a few months can be significant. 
In this perspective, the reader should keep in mind that the data collection ended in 
April 2019, as shall be further discussed in chapter 2. Even throughout the writing 
phase, in the months that immediately followed, several important facts took place, 
which would have definitely contributed to a better clarity, for example by giving more 
significant examples of some aspects, if they could have been included in the research. 
However, quite, intuitively, this would have entailed a never-ending process of data 
collection and update, which would eventually make this – and perhaps any – research 
impossible to conduct. Nevertheless, as was stated above, some narrative updates will 
be offered in the Conclusions, tracing some of the most recent events back to the 
patterns of policy-making emerged in the research. 
Secondly, a few terminological and style issues should also be addressed. And the 
first aspect has to do with the acknowledgement that in the migration field, even more 
so than in other ones, the choice of words is never neutral. Based on this notion, this 
research will define the migration process in breach of the migratory legislation and/or 
in the lack of the required documents as ‘undocumented’; the phrases ‘irregular 
migration’ or ‘illegal migration’ will be used exclusively when referring to legislative acts 
that so define unauthorised migration movements and in the context of the criminal law 
framework. Another terminological aspect, much less important in substantive terms 
but still crucial as for the understanding of the work, has to do with the reference to 
national institutions. Given the choice of Italy as case study within a broader EU-wide 
focus, the use of the adjective ‘Italian’ with reference to Italian national institutions (e.g. 
ministries, law enforcement agencies, etc.) will be eschewed. Otherwise, whenever a 
reference is made to national institutions of other countries, this will be explicitly stated. 
Lastly, as for the writing style, capital letters were used with parsimony in the case of 
institutions, as not to weigh on the writing process. That means that, besides quotes, 
where decisions were clearly made by the quoted authors, capital letters were 
employed only when referring to a specific institution (e.g. the Court of Cassation, the 
Conte Government) and not to the general institutional actor (e.g. the courts, the 
government). In the case of the word ‘parliament’, capitalisation was used as an 
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Chapter 1  
From impetus to research problem: conceptualisation and 
theoretical gap 
 
1.1. Impetus for the research: the smuggling of migrants and the European case 
The issue of the smuggling of migrants and, in particular, its implication within the EU 
polity, has been increasingly addressed over the last years, both in academic and grey 
literature (see Zhang, Sanchez and Achilli, 2018). Similarly, greater attention to the 
phenomenon has been devoted by media and public opinion in general, also in the 
light of the so-called ‘refugee crisis1’ and of the rise in the numbers of people crossing 
the Mediterranean Sea on makeshift vessels, in particular between 2014 and 2017, as 
well as because of the great emphasis placed by EU institutions and policy-makers on 
this issue (European Commission, 2015a and European Commission, 2015b).   
The understanding of the overall European approach to migrant smuggling constitutes 
the impetus for this research. 
In this framework, in order to refine the scope and objective of the research and to 
subsequently address the several connected analytical and methodological issues, a 
suitable starting point is the understanding of the characteristics of migrant smuggling. 
This shall be done through an unpacking process, aimed at conceptualising the 
phenomenon and providing an operational definition of it. Moreover, it will be important 
to understand how scholars have addressed smuggling with specific reference to the 
EU situation, in order to highlight the existing theoretical gaps. 
In the light of the twofold nature of this process, paragraph 1.2. will explore the 
phenomenon of the smuggling of migrants based on a review of the diverse literature 
dedicated to the phenomenon, disclosing the tension between human rights and 
security and its nature in-between migration and crime. It will also propose to look at it 
                                                          
1 The concept of ‘refugee crisis’ has been very widely used in the political discourse throughout Europe. 
In this research it is always referred to in terms of ‘so-called’ in consideration of the very arguable 
existence of a crisis, its duration, its connotation and the characteristic of the most affected people (with 




through its two main components, i.e. the ‘supply side’ and the ‘demand side’, 
reconciling them under the conceptual umbrella of the ‘smuggling spectrum’, to be 
used as the operational definition of the phenomenon.  
Paragraph 1.3. will then narrow the literature review down to the specific political space 
of the European Union, highlighting the way in which the EU approach to smuggling 
has been addressed so far. In so doing, the study of the policy-making patterns in 
relation to this specific phenomenon will emerge as the theoretical gap to address, 
constituting the research problem. 
 
1.2. Unpacking migrant smuggling  
It is important to notice from the very beginning how migrant smuggling (a) does not 
enjoy a common, shared definition and (b) it refers at the same time both to a 
phenomenon per se that exists in practice and, from a legal point of view, to an offence 
precisely defined in the corpus of national and international laws (see chapter 3). Such 
phenomenon has been the object of a number of studies published in the last years. 
And, given its twofold nature, in-between migration and crime, scholars have tended 
to address this issue from quite different analytical perspectives. 
Baird and van Liempt (2016) offer an interesting overview (though clearly not 
comprising the material that has been produced over the last three years) of the most 
notable studies and, in particular, of the different lenses used by scholars, from pure 
migration approaches to pure crime/security ones. More specifically, they distinguish 
between five different perspectives to look at smuggling, i.e. business, crime, networks, 
global political economy and human rights.  
But approaches tend to vary substantially also in terms of the focus chosen, from those 
studies starting from an analysis of the actors involved, which are often considering 
migration routes and smuggling patterns (such as Achilli, 2015; Collyer, 2016; Fargues 
and Bonfanti, 2014; Schapendonk, 2018; Shelley, 2014; Spener, 2004; Triandafyllidou, 
2018; van Liempt and Doomernik, 2006; Zhang et al., 2018), to those based on an 
analysis of existing legislation and policies, often from a criminal law perspective (see, 
among others, Carrera, Vosyliute, Smialowski, Allsopp and Sanchez, 2018b; Salt, 




human rights and ethical arguments (e.g. Aloyo and Cusumano, 2018; Crépeau, 2003; 
Gallagher and David, 2014; Hidalgo, 2016; Müller, 2018). 
Literature on migrant smuggling is relatively recent, mainly because of the late 
analytical conceptualisation of the phenomenon, which can be dated back only to the 
1990s, even though its first empirical manifestations are difficult to define accurately, 
since “borders have always led to smuggling” (Gallagher and David, 2014, p. 187. See 
also Guiraudon, 2008, p. 5). That is, one can identify specific historical and 
documented circumstances and places where clear waves of smuggling took place 
(such as China, South East Asia, Mexico/USA border, Europe, among others. See Salt 
and Stein, 1997, pp. 472–476), but it is hard if not impossible to determine a single 
moment when the smuggling of migrants as a phenomenon came into being. 
However, from an epistemological point of view, it is important to clarify the difference 
from the mere existence of a phenomenon and its conceptualisation, and in such 
perspective it is fair to say that over the 1990s both the academic community and 
practitioners increasingly elaborated and accepted the concept and made a wide use 
of it (Gallagher and David, 2014, p. 189). In order to understand the complexity of 
migrant smuggling, it seems suitable to start from the studies of this decade. 
In academia, a first milestone in migrant smuggling studies is represented by a paper 
of John Salt and Jeremy Stein – “Migration as a Business: The Case of Trafficking”: it 
was published in 1997 and it offered, for the first time, a comprehensive analysis of the 
smuggling of migrants. Based on the proposition of a business model of migration, 
smuggling (in a moment in which the distinction between smuggling and trafficking was 
still blurred and would be crystallised a few years later, as shown below2) plays a very 
important role. Their definition points at an “international business, involving the trading 
                                                          
2 As a preview, for the sake of clarity, some definitions can already be provided. Smuggling of migrants 
can be very generally understood as facilitation of undocumented migration, entailing some material 
gain (cf. the United Nations and other bodies’ definitions below), whilst trafficking in persons (or 
trafficking in human beings) is defined by article 3(a) of the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress 
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children (the Trafficking Protocol) as “the 
recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of threat or use of force 
or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of 
vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person 
having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a 
minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour 
or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal, manipulation or implantation 




and systematic movement of people as ‘commodities’ by various means and potentially 
involving a variety of agents, institutions and intermediaries”. Other relevant examples 
of important studies in these years include those of Gallagher (2002), Koser (1996 and 
1997), Morrison and Crosland (2001), Salt (2000), Singer and Massey (1998) and 
Widgren (1994). 
There is a  deep interconnection between the developments in academia and those in 
the policy framework, and in this perspective it is useful to recall some of the key steps 
undertaken in those years towards a comprehensive and coherent definition of the 
phenomenon: the International Maritime Organization Assembly in 1993, the United 
Nations General Assembly Resolution of 1993, the International Organization for 
Migration Seminar on Migration in 1994, the Expert Group of the Budapest Group and 
the Europol Convention (see Gallagher and David, 2014, pp. 190–191 and Salt and 
Stein, 1997). These examples clarify the “growing political concern” towards a 
phenomenon considered “to be undermining international collaborative efforts to 
produce ordered migration flows” (Salt and Stein, 1997, p. 467). In these years also 
the so-called ‘Vienna Process’ began, spearheaded by Austria in 1997 and soon joined 
and supported by Italy with a view to developing a legal tool to tackle transnational 
organised crime and the smuggling of migrants. This process resulted in the adoption, 
in the year 2000, of the Protocol against the smuggling of migrants by land, sea and 
air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime (the Smuggling Protocol) – the first international convention to acknowledge and 
define such phenomenon3 and to provide specific measures to ensure the cooperation 
of states (and which is comprised of 1494 states parties today), which will be followed 
by other regional initiatives. More national legislations started criminalising this activity 
(in accordance with article 6.1. of the Smuggling Protocol) and a number of academic 
works, even though limited if compared to other migration issues, were published, 
offering diverse angles upon the issue. 
Notably, also within Europe important steps were taken, with the provisions included 
in the 1990 Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement (the Schengen 
                                                          
3 This is the moment when migrant smuggling is definitely differentiated from the trafficking in persons, 
even though most authors suggest that the distinction between the two phenomena is actually blurred. 
For an overview see Buckland (2009). 




Convention), in the 2002 so-called ‘Facilitators Package’ (FP, the milestone of the EU 
anti-smuggling policy framework, composed of Directive 2002/90/EC and Framework 
Decision 2002/946/JHA) and with several criminal law acts passed in Member States 
(MSs) in those very years, were an approach aimed at criminalising the facilitation of 
undocumented migration, arguably part of the broader fight against migrant smuggling 
(in chapter 3 these aspects are considered in more detail). 
The recent nature of the concept and the fact that, from the very beginning, a sort of 
overlap occurred between legal and analytical definitions, with a clear prominence of 
the definition provided by the Smuggling Protocol (McAuliffe and Laczko, 2016, p. 4), 
ended up creating a policy-driven debate which focused on some specific elements of 
smuggling whilst neglecting others. 
Given that a universal definition of migrant smuggling does not exist, however, it is 
useful, for the purpose of this study, to use the Smuggling Protocol definition as a 
starting point, as it provides a minimum standard of criminalisation recognised by the 
149 states parties to the Protocol itself. Article 3(a) of the Protocol defines migrant 
smuggling as “the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or 
other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the 
person is not a national or a permanent resident.”  
In a comparative perspective, one element of this definition remains quite undisputed: 
the nature of this process as the facilitation of an undocumented migration movement. 
A second element is more controversial, and is related to the material benefit of the 
facilitator, which is indeed not required by all legislations. A clear example of this is the 
Facilitators Package, where such a material gain is not necessary for migrant 
smuggling: this is a very long-standing controversial point, which indeed leads to also 
take into consideration under the umbrella of smuggling activities of humanitarian 
assistance (especially in the absence of a mandatory exemption from criminalisation 
of these activities), and whose overcoming was recently advocated also by the 
European Commission (2015b, p. 3). Allssopp and Manieri (2016), Carrera, Allsopp 
and Vosyliute (2018a), Carrera et al. (2018b), Nicot and Kopp (2018), among others, 
exhaustively address this point, which will actually become central in several parts of 




A third element leads to the shift in focus from states to migrants, i.e. migrant consent, 
which is assumed, even though not explicitly stated, in this definition (as opposed to 
trafficking, where human movement is coercive, see Doomernik, 2013, p. 120). From 
this interpretation at least two main consequences arise: (a) the possibility for states 
to criminalise not only the smuggling of migrants, but also the undocumented entry of 
migrants into their territories; (b) the focus on the repression of smugglers rather than 
on the assistance and protection of smuggled migrants. It is notable, however, how 
concerns in this respect were expressed throughout the drafting process, but a general 
consensus was eventually secured that “smuggled migrants are not ‘victims’ in the 
same way that this term can be applied to those who have been trafficked” (Gallagher 
2015, pp. 196–197), considering that normally smuggled migrants voluntarily decided 
to be smuggled in order to reach their destination.  
On the contrary, trafficking in persons (TIP) involves the coercive recruitment, 
movement or harbouring of someone for the purpose of exploitation (see article 3(a) 
of the Trafficking Protocol and footnote 2 above). Even though clear-cut definitions do 
not always correspond to the reality and evidence shows that overlapping between 
smuggling and TIP often takes place (see section 1.2.2. below), the perception of the 
phenomena seems still to significantly diverge.    
François Crépeau, former United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights of 
migrants, drew the attention to the “striking [...] difference” between the Smuggling 
Protocol and the Trafficking Protocol: in the former “refugee-receiving countries are 
trying to strengthen their strategy of migration containment” and “[t]he protection and 
the assistance of the victims was not the first objective, except where it can contribute 
to the main objective”; in the latter, on the contrary, there are “numerous clauses 
dedicated to protection issues” (Crépeau, 2003, pp. 175-176).  
In fact, the substantive elements of the Smuggling Protocol definition are not very 
different from those identified a few years earlier, in 1994, by the IOM in its first study 
on the topic: (a) the involvement of a smuggler; (b) his/her material gain; (c) the “illegal” 
nature of this migration movement; (d) migrant’s consent (Salt and Stein, 1997, p. 471).  
Similarly, these aspects can be detected, explicitly or implicitly, in most smuggling legal 
definitions on a global level (taking into account the several differences on the material 




rights’ one. Therefore, the importance of the UN definition is crucial, not only for being 
the most vastly agreed upon on a global level, but also because states have built or 
amended their legislations upon this definition, though with minor differences, following 
the provisions of article 6. 
Over the years, however, the limitations of a mere security-based approach have 
emerged, given the complex nature of the smuggling of migrants. As mentioned earlier, 
smuggling involves two main and strictly interconnected dimensions: on the one side, 
undocumented migration, i.e. the dimension of the smuggled migrants, often 
associated (not necessarily correctly, though, as will be shown in the next paragraphs) 
in policies with a passive attitude (see van Liempt and Doomernik, 2006). On the other 
side, crime, i.e. the dimension of the smuggler, which is very often the focus of 
legislative approaches, as in the Smuggling Protocol and the Facilitators Package (see 
Gallagher, 2002; Koser, 2005 and Shelley, 2014. See also, for some critical views: 
Achilli, 2015; Spena, 2016; Triandafyllidou, 2018 and Zhang et al., 2018). 
By focusing on both the elements, and the connected dimensions, that characterise 
smuggling becomes then possible to go beyond a mere security-based approach to 
this phenomenon  (as suggested by Castles, 2004; Düvell, 2006; Triandafyllidou, 2018 
and van Liempt and Sersli, 2013 among others).  
This, in turn, means to go beyond (but definitely not against) legal definitions of migrant 
smuggling, which tend to privilege said security perspective, as was recalled above. 
Legal definitions clearly matter, and in this research the Smuggling Protocol and the 
Facilitators Package definitions of smuggling (and their differences, especially related 
to the material gain and to the exemption clause for humanitarian assistance) will be 
central. The former definition is indeed the one most vastly agreed upon at an 
international level, as was explained above; the latter is the one elaborated and 
applicable within the EU (see chapter 3 and the analysis on the Facilitators Package 
in chapter 6). But, especially in works framed outside legal studies (such this one, as 
it is further explained in the next paragraph and in chapter 2), it is important to focus 
on the phenomenon per se and on the various social and political aspects, as well as 
policy frameworks, that this involves. It is by doing so that one can go beyond the way 




such definitions, as the case would be if one underestimated their importance or 
proposed new ones.  
An abundant scholarship has followed this approach. Alpes (2016), Betts (2010), 
Gallagher (2002 and 2014), Koser (2005), Kyle and Koslowski (2013), Morrison and 
Crosland (2001), Nadig (2002), Shelley (2014), Triandafyllidou (2018), Zhang et al. 
(2018) offer alternative starting points, where the focus is placed on the actors involved 
in the process of smuggling and which, in some cases, lead to the definition of a quasi-
trade-off between state security and human security of smuggled people, being the 
former often preferred over the latter by states (Koser, 2005, p. 13. See also Achilli, 
2015 and Fargues, 2015). 
Some scholars also considered how the flows of smuggled migrants are inversely 
related to the level of border openness and to legal migration opportunities (Koser, 
2005, p. 15. See also Castels, 2004, p. 205; Kyle and Dale, 2013 and Spener, 2006, 
pp. 296–297) and even how some policies aimed at preventing migration have 
unwanted opposite consequences (Düvell, 2011). These approaches are particularly 
important when it comes to framing anti-smuggling policies within the broader 
migration policy field, and, in particular, its aspects connected with border control and 
undocumented migration. 
Among the restrictive approaches, extraterritorial policies represent an extraordinarily 
heavy measure (see Morrison and Crosland, 2001, p. 31 and Väyrynen, 2003): an 
example is provided by the Carriers Liability regime5, introduced in the EU with the 
Schengen Convention and considered by some authors as “contrary to the nature of 
international human rights law” (Basaran, 2008, p. 163). Other examples which have 
been widely considered in literature include the so-called ‘shifting out’ policies 
(Lavenex, 2006), where borders are de facto moved further and the control of 
undocumented migration is delegated to origin or transit countries (see Strik, 2019). 
This latter pattern of outsourcing is very common in contemporary Europe, as shall be 
discussed throughout the research. 
                                                          
5 This policy provides that “carriers must ensure that non-EU nationals who intend to enter the territories 
of EU countries possess the necessary travel documents and, where appropriate, visas. (…) EU 
countries must impose dissuasive, effective and proportionate financial penalties against carriers in 
breach of their obligations. (…) EU countries may in addition adopt penalties of a different type, such as 




Keeping a focus on the EU, several studies have addressed the incomplete integration 
within and/or the limited effectiveness of undocumented migration and smuggling 
policies, as well as the different stances of MSs in this regard. It is useful to recall, 
among others, Achilli (2015), Carrera and Guild (2016), Collett (2015), partly Dennison 
and Janning (2016), Düvell (2011), Fargues (2015), Fargues and Bonfanti (2014), 
Nováky (2018), Shelley (2014), Toaldo (2015) and van Liempt (2016). More recently, 
in particular since the beginning of the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ in 2015, a number of 
works have focused specifically on the smuggling dynamics in the Mediterranean Sea 
(Cusumano, 2019; Cusumano and Gombeer, 2018), the connection and implication of 
search and rescue (SAR) activities and humanitarian assistance (Carrera et al., 
2018a), shifting out policies (Strik, 2019). And all these issues shall be extensively 
considered in the next chapters. 
This overview already shows the vast heterogeneity of approaches to smuggling, in 
turn stressing different aspects of the phenomenon and therefore suggesting different 
responses. The next two sections will focus more specifically on the various 
characteristics that come out from the process of unpacking migrant smuggling, 
through an agency-based, inductive approach, following a critical reflection on the state 
of the art on this phenomenon.  
 
1.2.1. The supply side: who is the smuggler? 
It seems appropriate to start unpacking the phenomenon of the smuggling of migrants 
by focusing on one of its protagonists: smugglers.  
Numerous academic and grey literature works (for a review, see McAuliffe and Laczko, 
2016, p. 8) point to the multifaceted nature of smugglers and stress the unproductivity 
of treating them as a unified and homogenous group. On the contrary, smugglers differ 
from one another in their organisation, in their connections with organised and other 
forms of serious crime, in the routes they choose, in the means of transportation, in 
their relationship with smuggled migrants, etc. (McAuliffe and Laczko, 2016, p. 8 and 
van Liempt and Doomernik, 2006). Differently to what is often thought among the 
general public – and sometimes, as we shall see, also among policy-makers – there is 




In spite of this, policies (and sometimes even academic literature) do not always seem 
aware of that (see Crépeau, 2003 and Zhang et al., 2018) and tend to take certain 
dynamics and characteristics that are far from being real for granted. On the contrary, 
some studies, such as that of Pastore, Monzini and Sciortino (2006) or the more recent 
special issue of The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 
(2018), edited by Luigi Achilli, Gabriella Sanchez and Seldon Zhang, are particularly 
useful, as they are specifically aimed at critically discussing and debunking alleged 
myths concerning smugglers’ (and more generally smuggling) characteristics, with a 
view to giving an evidence-based framework of the issue. 
The way in which smugglers are depicted, as Baird and van Liempt (2016) notice, 
privileging some aspects over others, arises also from the different analytical 
approaches that are chosen, based in turn on the existence of different models to study 
migrant smuggling (see above).  
And so, from one extreme to another, there are works that treat smugglers primarily 
from business-oriented point of view, such as the one by Salt and Stein (1997) or grey 
literature such as Europol reports, which all tend to privilege a perspective which 
facilitates the emergence of the well-structured organisation and profit-driven activity 
of smugglers. On the other side, alternative perspectives such as those offered by 
Collyer (2016), Khosravi (2010) and Watson (2015) tend to highlight the humanitarian 
and/or political nature of smugglers. Similar conclusions could be drawn for any of the 
different angles used to study the characteristics of smugglers: different analytical 
approaches tend to depict different types of smugglers and to make different 
characteristics more visible, enriching the whole knowledge of the phenomenon 
(insofar as one does not assume that a specific approach is the only valid one). 
Exploring evidence-based studies on smugglers is therefore a useful operation in order 
not to challenge one or another view, but rather to acknowledge such complexity and 
to make it analytically fruitful in order to understand the phenomenon. 
A critical reading of the relevant literature offers at least five different aspects that can 
shape the nature of smugglers, related to: (a) the dimension and internal organisation 
of the smuggling group; (b) the connection with other criminal activities; (c) the routes 




Firstly, smugglers can be very different from one another depending on the dimension 
and the internal organisation and hierarchy of the smuggling group. Smugglers can be 
facilitators, such as coyotes or passeurs, i.e. individuals or members of small 
organisations working on a minor scale. But smugglers can also be members of cartels, 
networks and organised crime gangs. Evidence supports both cases, and in fact the 
adherence to one of the two models (or something in-between) is not only a matter of 
perspective but also, of course, a matter of substantial differences that take place in 
reality. So, for example, the border between Mexico and the United States tended to 
be characterised by coyotes in the past, as the very name suggests (Guiraudon, 2008 
and Spener, 2004), even though there was a radical change in the last years, also due 
to the sharpening of US border control policies (for a more in-depth view, see Sanchez 
and Zhang 2018). And if other areas of smuggling are more often associated with 
criminal networks and organised crime (e.g. the Mediterranean Routes, see Bühler, 
Koelbl, Mattioli and Mayr, 2016 and Toaldo, 2015), there is also evidence of smuggling 
taking place even with organisations led by groups of friends or groups characterised 
by very low organisational level, confirming what Salt and Stein had already noticed in 
their first work, and namely the very existence of a variety of organisational models 
(Salt and Stein, 1997, pp. 476–477. For an overview: Baird and van Liempt, 2016, pp. 
407–408). 
The use of different analytical frameworks can play a role in the emergence of these 
differences, but evidence clearly shows that in fact both types exist. Nevertheless, the 
narrative of smuggling as organised crime is particularly widespread in policy 
documents and in official reports of law enforcement authorities (e.g. European 
Commission, 2015a, European Commission, 2015b, Europol, 2016b, 2017 and 2018). 
This appears very notable as policy choices are heavily influenced by these analyses, 
and if only one perspective is taken into consideration, this jeopardises the 
effectiveness of the policies chosen, as has been critically discussed by several 
authors, who have pointed to the “international understanding that [migrant smuggling 
is] part of organized crime” (Shelley, 2014, p. 3). 
Secondly, there is a variable degree of connection with the perpetration of other crimes. 
Such connection between the smuggling of migrants and other crimes is present in 




widespread in grey literature (see Europol 2016b, 2017 and 2018, among others), 
whereas other evidence-based studies, in particular those based on judicial 
proceedings, come to other conclusions. Monzini (2004), citing an IOM report of 2003, 
pointed at the absence of a connection between smugglers and other trafficking and 
illegal activities (on this point see also, for example, Pastore et al., 2006 and Sanchez 
and Zhang, 2018). On the other hand, the link with those criminal activities which are 
ancillary to migrant smuggling itself, such as corruption or passport and visa forgery, 
is clearly quite common and widespread (McAuliffe and Laczko, 2016, pp. 7–9).    
Thirdly, routes can also be very different, as smugglers operate on short, medium and 
long routes and migrants often need to use several different routes to reach their 
destination. Each route has its own characteristics and smugglers operate also very 
differently depending on the route.  De Bruycker, Di Bartolomeo and Fargues (2013, 
pp. 3–7), for example, considered the Mediterranean sea routes and highlight their 
structural nature and their connection to larger routes and other forms of smuggling, 
coming from sub-Saharan Africa. But if some have connected maritime routes with a 
higher level of internal organisation, Pastore et al. (2006, p. 108) pointed out that is 
arguable and quite speculative, as there is no definitive evidence in that regard. Just 
by way of another example, in other areas we find quite different situations, such as in 
East Africa, where migration movements happen both in a long and in a short distance, 
by land, air and sea and involve a number of different types of smugglers. There are 
chief smugglers as well as a lot of different types of middlemen, including transporters 
such as taxi and bus drivers as well as brokers, facilitators, recruiters and travel agents, 
in organisations that can be informal and independent (Majidi and Oucho, 2016, pp. 
62–63). Connecting this dimension with others, small routes tend to be associated with 
coyotes, whereas networks and criminal organisations tend to come into play in longer 
routes (Väyrynen, 2003, pp. 15–16. See also Andersson, 2016 and Triandafyllidou, 
2018 on the ‘professionalisation’ of smuggling). 
A fourth dimension which deserves attention for its implication in terms of human rights 
is coercion and it is strictly related to the relationship between smugglers and smuggled 
migrants. For such reason, this has to do both with the characteristics of the smugglers 
and with those of the migrants, which will be further explored in the following section 




side, smuggling being a relational process between smugglers and smuggled 
migrants). What is important to highlight here is how evidence reveals the existence of 
different degrees of coercion, from a very low level, associated with ‘helpful smugglers’ 
to high level of exploitation and disregard for migrants’ lives (MEDU, 2015 and van 
Liempt and Doomernik, 2006). The latter is particularly relevant in those cases where 
the drawing of a line between smuggling and trafficking proves particularly difficult 
(Dimitriadi, 2016).  
Remarkably, the strength of border control also appears to be significant in the 
coercion dimension: areas where higher control by border guards and restrictive 
policies are in place seem to experience not only a higher level of organisation on the 
side of smugglers (Doomernik, 2013, p. 121; Guiraudon, 2008, p. 5 and McAuliffe and 
Laczko, 2016, p. 7. See also Brachet, 2018 and above), but also more violent 
smuggling processes, which could be one of the unintended consequences of 
restrictive migration policies highlighted by Düvell (2011. On this whole point see 
Triandafyllidou, 2018). 
A fifth and last element of difference is related to the way in which smugglers are 
depicted and considered. Whether a smuggler is a criminal, on one end of the 
continuum, or a saviour, on the other end, very much depends on the combination of 
the elements descripted above (on the twofold nature of smugglers, see Crépeau, 
2003, p. 181). The existence of “altruistic smugglers”, close to the saviour profile, is 
acknowledged for example by McAuliffe and Laczko (2016, p. 5, including also 
references to other authors) as well as by “humanitarian smuggling” scholars (Watson, 
2015), as briefly hinted above, and represents the cornerstone of the ‘moral argument’ 
made by Aloyo and Cusumano (2018). This perspective privileges the aspects of a 
smuggler who helps those in danger or who find it difficult to escape and to reach safe 
places (this is particularly evident in the refugee-based studies, cf. Crépeau, 2003; 
Fargues, 2015 and Morrison and Crosland, 2001). Smugglers have also been depicted 
positively when acting for political motives (Khosravi, 2010), whereas a complicated 
situation is that of smuggled migrants who might turn into smugglers themselves (this 





Issues connected to the positive view of smugglers are very complex and controversial, 
considering that those lines distinguishing, in legislation and in the political debate, 
what is humanitarian/altruistic/small scale smuggling from what is the pure 
criminalisation of humanitarian actors have proven to be very thin, as will be discussed 
throughout the study (see also Carrera et al., 2018a and Cusumano and Gombeer, 
2018).  
On the other side, though, smugglers are depicted as evil individuals who take 
advantage of difficult situations and desperate needs of the would-be smuggled 
migrants, and making money out of that, also putting their lives further in danger 
(Bühler et al., 2016 and Europol, 2016b). 
 
1.2.2. The demand side: who is the smuggled migrant? 
The agency of smuggled migrants represents most probably one of the crucial issues 
to address when reading the smuggling process through the lenses of the smuggled 
migrants. Most literature, especially when it comes to official reports issued by 
international organisations (IOs), governments and law enforcement agencies, tends 
to view migrants as just another item which can be smuggled from a place to another, 
denying, ignoring or anyway minimising the proactive role that they can and actually 
do assume in the smuggling process (Doomernik, 2013, p. 121; Schapendonk, 2018; 
van Liempt and Doomernik, 2006 and Watson, 2015, p. 46). 
On the contrary, however, some studies, particularly those adopting a sociological or 
geographical qualitative perspective and making use of migrant interviews, draw a 
quite different picture, where migrants assume an important and active role, from the 
beginning of the process, i.e. the decision to make use of smuggling services and 
which smuggler to contact, until the end, i.e. how to proceed further through the journey 
and what final destination country to choose (Martínez, Slack and Martínez-Schuldt, 
2018; McAuliffe and Laczko, 2016, p. 8; Schapendonk, 2018 and van Liempt and 
Doomernik, 2006). 
Acknowledging the agency of smuggled migrants (and of would-be ones) means also 
understanding the existence of a demand side in the smuggling process: there is a 




(a) the structural nature of mobility and migration (Collyer, 2016, p. 21 among others) 
and (b) the progressive protection of borders on the side of national states, with the 
implementation of measures aimed at controlling transnational mobility (Andersson, 
2016; Baird, 2013 and Triandafyllidou, 2018). This point turns central as it implies that 
policies aimed at countering smuggling exclusively addressing the supply side, i.e. 
targeting smugglers and enhancing border controls, are unlikely to be the solution and, 
on the contrary, entail the risk of a counterproductive effect (Düvell, 2011). But 
acknowledging the agency of smuggled migrants, on the other side, poses some 
questions and problems with regards to at least two other issues: (a) their relationship 
with smugglers and the role of coercion in the smuggling process (as anticipated from 
the perspective of smugglers); (b) their status of ‘victims’. 
Coercion and victimisation are, in fact, the two main dimensions that mark the agency 
of migrants in shaping the different possible patterns of smuggling (and clearly from 
here other differences arise, such as in terms of repression vs. protection in destination 
countries, etc.). 
The relationship between smugglers and migrants – and namely the degree of 
coercion – can be very different, depending on the specific circumstances, as already 
outlined in the previous section. Evidence tells us of cases of extreme violence and 
deaths, such as in the Mediterranean Sea, as well as of cases of more peaceful and 
safer smuggling, such as from Mexico to the US in a certain historical period (Spener, 
2004, p. 311; see also ICHRP, 2010, p. 20 and Sanchez and Zhang, 2018) and these 
conditions often vary throughout the same journey. As was mentioned above, this 
depends very much on the characteristics of the smugglers. But in this perspective, 
accounts of migrants and their points of view are also clearly important and those few 
studies specifically focused on their stories confirm that they normally refer to 
smugglers as “agents or helpers” (Doomernik, 2013, p. 124). Going even further, 
Watson (2015, p. 40) suggests that “[c]riminalising smuggling, which is often the sole 
means of escape for those facing violence and endemic poverty, justifies numerous 
‘equally injurious acts’ against vulnerable populations and those who assist them.” In 
this way, the very criminalisation of migrant smuggling is challenged. However, even 
though such an approach positively brings in several elements ignored in state policies, 




smuggling processes can have for migrants, the abuses and mistreatments that, 
though more limited than one could imagine, do actually exist.  
At the end of the day, even if one wants to assume the perspective that smuggling 
exists because states close their borders and that the criminalisation approach is 
intentionally used by states to control and reduce migration flows (both analyses seem 
correct, though not fully exhaustive), this does not mean that smugglers are 
necessarily the good ones in this story (see, among others, the section on torture and 
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment in MEDU, 2015). Much depends, also in 
this case, from the specific situation and, as it seems at odds with evidence to depict 
smugglers as the evil members of Mafia-type organisations, in the same way it seems 
quite incorrect to assume the idea of the Good Samaritan at any cost (see also Aloyo 
and Cusumano, 2018, p. 13 on the Libyan case, for example). 
Coercion can indeed be a distinctive characteristic of the relationship between 
smugglers and migrants, as mentioned above, and this can particularly happen in 
those cases in-between smuggling and trafficking (which will be further explored 
below). The simple fact that the smuggling process begins with a voluntary choice of 
the would-be migrant does not exclude that s/he could eventually suffer violence and 
abuses from smugglers, put his or her life at risk, etc. 
This brings us to the second dimension, i.e. victimisation. Here the starting question is 
whether a smuggled migrant is a de facto victim, or, better yet, whether someone who 
deliberately decided to use some illegal services can actually be regarded as a victim 
(see Baird and van Liempt, 2016, p. 404). Despite the tendency of states not to (fully) 
grant this status to smuggled migrants (Crépeau, 2003, pp. 175–176), the answer 
seems to be positive, considering that in some circumstances migrants could actually 
ignore what would eventually happen to them or could, however, be aware of that and 
accept the risk because this is the only option they have to escape a situation of danger 
and distress (UNHCR, 2000; cf. also Baird and van Liempt, 2016, p. 410).  
This is particularly noticeable in the case of refugees, who sometimes have limited or 
no access to protection in their states of origin and need to resort to smugglers in order 
to escape to safety. A point that, in turn, opens a whole debate on the effectiveness of 
the asylum system in Western countries, in particular with reference to the possibility 




resettlement mechanisms and humanitarian corridors (all of these issues will be 
discussed in more detail throughout the research).  
In the victimisation of smuggled migrants, furthermore, the boundary between 
smuggling and trafficking becomes crucial. Smuggled migrants can turn into victims of 
trafficking both “en route or on arrival” (Dimitriadi, 2016, p. 64), and this, yet again, 
highlights the limits of a rigid separation of smuggling and trafficking, pointing, on the 
contrary, at the existence of a continuum with a space for overlapping (ICHRP, 2010, 
p. 29; see also McAuliffe and Laczko, 2016, p.7). Applying a continuum is perhaps 
more complicated from a legal point of view (where strict definitions are preferred as 
they create pure categories), but seems to better capture the very nature of these two 
processes. 
It should be clear, however, that even acknowledging the status of victim (or, at least, 
of potential victim) to smuggled migrants, in the criminalisation of smuggling the main 
protected asset seems not to be the safety and security of migrants. In fact, there is a 
certain agreement in the literature in considering state security and border protection 
as the goods that are defended through such a criminal law approach whereas 
migrants seem to be protected only in a residual way (Crépeau, 2003, pp. 180–181; 
Doomernik, 2013, p. 120). Here the difference between the anti-smuggling and the 
anti-trafficking approach becomes striking, supporting the idea of those who consider 
the Trafficking Protocol an important instrument for the protection of human rights and, 
conversely, the Smuggling Protocol a pure criminal law one with a repressive aim 
(Crépeau, 2003, p. 182; Doomernik, 2013, p. 120). Some, however, go even further 
and point out that both of them are “instruments to aid states in the fight against 
organized crime” rather than “human rights instruments” (Baird and van Liempt, 2016, 
p. 410). 
 
1.2.3. Conveying the complexity: the ‘smuggling spectrum’ 
Several aspects characterising the smuggling of migrants emerged in this analysis, 
reinforcing the assumption that no one-size-fits-all definition of smuggling exists and 
that the vast complexity that is actually observable in reality is often not fully perceived 




An analytical approach which does not intend to deny such complexity but, rather, to 
make sense of it, now requires a last step where all the different characteristics of the 
smuggling of migrants are brought together and used to make such complexity 
analytically manageable. 
Such step consists in the establishment of an operational definition (i.e. “the 
descriptions of the use of a given term based on an empirical check”, Morlino, 2005, 
p. 67), which, far from being in opposition to any existing and applicable legal definition, 
rather provides the necessary elements to convey the complexity, above recalled, of 
the phenomenon as it manifests itself and not as it is meant to be tackled in criminal 
law frameworks. 
Two different pieces of grey literature, from the House of Lords (2015, p. 16) and 
UNODC (2017, p. 65), as well as McAuliffe and Laczko (2016, p. 7), speak of the 
existence of a ‘smuggling spectrum’. By borrowing such term from them – it being an 
expression which seems particularly significant and appropriate – the aspects 
considered above can be assumed as the analytical dimensions of an area of 
complexity, where migrant smuggling can be seen and characterised in very different 
ways and where those very dimensions can be combined through, yet again, an 
evidence- and logic-based operation.  
On such bases, the different continua constituting the smuggling spectrum do not 
appear to be randomly distributed, but rather associated with one another. 
The smuggling spectrum can then be conceived as a multi-layered continuum where, 
on the one side, one finds loosely coupled smuggling organisations with low hierarchy, 
not perpetrating other crimes and definitely far from any implication in TIP. Such 
organisations are mainly working on small distances, with a relatively low level of 
coercion (depending also on the characteristics of border control) and the absence of 
any victimisation of smuggled migrants, which would lead to the idea of some kind of 
‘humanitarian’ smuggler.  
On the other side, conversely, one can place those organisations that are structured 
and hierarchical, active also in other crime areas and particularly in trafficking in 
persons, where covered distances are larger, coercion is higher (depending, again, 
also on border control) and so the victimisation of migrants, and therefore smugglers 




Figure 1.1. – The smuggling spectrum6 
 
Source: Elaborated by the author 
 
The operational definition of migrant smuggling adopted in this study – far from being 
a catch-all one – acknowledges the existence of this area of complexity, due to the 
multifaceted nature of smuggling, whatever the applicable legal definition is. Building 
upon the smuggling spectrum, it is assumed that each individual smuggling event can 
be placed on a specific point within the spectrum itself7.  
The analytical consequences of such an operational definition lead (a) to look beyond 
those policies that are merely aimed at the criminalisation of smuggling/facilitation of 
undocumented migration offence (or anti-smuggling policies stricto sensu) and (b) to 
                                                          
6 It should be noted that one of these dimensions – namely, coercion – was mentioned both in the 
analysis of smugglers and in that of smuggled migrants, but it was not double counted. For this very 
reason the five dimensions of smugglers and the two of smuggled migrants give a total sum of six and 
not, as one would arithmetically prima facie expect, seven.  
7 The smuggling spectrum is framed as an analytical tool to unpack and understand the complexity of 
the phenomenon and of its different empirical manifestations. Hence, it does not aim to establish what 
is smuggling and what is not, going beyond (but not against, as explained above) such legal dichotomy 
and rather providing some resources to navigate the empirical complexity. In such perspective, the 
spectrum is not meant to give a legal contribution to the definition of those controversial situations that 
are considered as smuggling by certain pieces of legislation, even if they are (or might be) not, such as 
the criminalisation of humanitarian assistance. However, this crucial aspect will be extensively 




take into account, in such analysis, the importance of migrant agency and the demand 
side for smuggling (cf. Achilli, 2015).  
In a policy perspective, acknowledging that people want to move and that will resort to 
illegal ways if they cannot do it legally, means that there is a need to include also 
demand-related policies in the overall migrant smuggling framework. Among such 
policies, those connected to labour migration and other documented ways of access 
are clearly relevant. But a comprehensive approach to migrant smuggling needs to 
include also the asylum policy framework, since the situation of people in danger and 
distress – such as asylum seekers – implies that they will probably use illegal services 
if they are not granted access to international protection.  
Consistently, this research shall consider as smuggling-related policies also border, 
migration and asylum policies, limitedly to those cases in which they have direct or 
indirect effects on migrant smuggling. Furthermore, this very approach also implies the 
possibility of looking at the substantive content of policies, when deemed necessary, 
in a more structured way, with a view to detecting whether and to what extent policies 
in this field are actually informed by the paradigm of the smuggling spectrum and of 
the demand side for smuggling. 
 
1.3. The EU fight against migrant smuggling: different approaches and 
theoretical gaps  
The second aspect of this preliminary understanding of migrant smuggling has to do, 
as mentioned, with the review of how the EU approach to the issue at hand has been 
studied so far. In so doing, it clearly emerges how these are essentially studies 
analysing the legislative acts approved over the years in the EU, mainly from the 1990s 
onwards, regarding smuggling, documented and undocumented migration, borders, 
asylum (see chapter 3), as well as more grounded studies that include geographical, 
sociological and criminological approaches.  
This latter group of studies tend to offer an insight into the substantive aspects of the 
relevant pieces of legislation, based on the evidence coming from on-the-ground  




2016; De Bruycker et al., 2016; Dennison and Janning, 2016; Fargues, 2015; Fargues 
and Bonfanti, 2014; Toaldo, 2015 and van Liempt, 2016).  
In more detail, some of them focus on (a) the concrete application of specific policies 
(such as Cusumano, 2019 and Cusumano and Gombeer, 2018 on the Italian EU-
backed ‘closing harbour’ policies and Nováky, 2018 on Operation Sophia); (b) the side 
effects and consequences of general policy approaches, such as the whole policing 
humanitarianism argument, coming among others from Allsopp and Manieri (2016) and 
Carrera et al. (2016, 2018a and 2018b) or the general analysis conducted by Shelley 
(2014), through an understanding of the overall effects of EU anti-smuggling policies; 
(c) a more actor-centred perspective, addressing the relationship between the overall 
EU and MSs frameworks and individual agencies, such as Achilli (2015), Perkowski 
and Squire (2019) or Schapendonk (2018). 
Notwithstanding the wide difference among these studies, in terms of specific focus, 
approach and objectives, the common element lies, as recalled, in their interest 
towards substantive aspects of the policies in themselves and of their implementation 
on the ground. 
Quite remarkably, though, there seems to be an evident gap in studies focused on how 
the EU policies governing migrant smuggling are actually approved, i.e. policy-making 
studies. Indeed, notwithstanding the overall migration framework offers several 
relevant examples in such perspective (Bonjour and Vink, 2013; Guiraudon, 2018; 
Huber, 2015; Lavenex, 2006; Zaun, 2017a, among others. For an overview see also 
Bonjour, Ripoll Servent and Thielemann, 2018 and consider also the more specifically 
compliance-oriented review undertaken by Dörrenbächer, 2018, pp. 15–23), there 
seems to be a marked scarcity of studies focused on the anti-smuggling EU policy-
making, with the few exceptions of those overlaps between studies focusing on 
broader migration policy-making and smuggling aspects, even indirectly (e.g. 
Guiraudon, 2018 and Maricut, 2016), as well as policy-making aspects in more 
substantive policy-oriented studies on smuggling (e.g. Carrera et al., 2016 and 2018b 
or Rasche, 2018). 
Such gap is even more remarkable in the light of the growing interest in the policy-




area which includes migration and criminal policies8 – following in particular the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty, with a new role for the European Parliament and new 
patterns to be observed. 
Lavenex (2015) and Trauner and Ripoll Servent (2016 and 2017) offered, among 
others, a detailed account of the progressive expansion of the AFSJ and of the 
research connected to it (in particular, Trauner and Ripoll Servent, 2017, explored the 
relevant state of the art very thoroughly). However, to gain a better understanding of 
those aspects that seem to reveal the existence of a gap in the existing studies, it 
seems useful to deepen the exploration of how the policy-making patterns in the AFSJ 
have been studied so far. 
 
1.3.1. Studying policy-making in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
AFSJ policy-making scholarship has explored a number of diverse factors contributing 
to shaping (or determining) the policy-making and the policy outcomes, such as the 
role of EU agencies (Scipioni, 2018a), that of non-political actors (Caponio, 2005, p. 
15) or even that of high level officials in the Council of the EU (the Council) preference 
formation (Zaun, 2017a, p. 10). However, a key focus in the study of the AFSJ has 
been, particularly in the last decade, after the Lisbon Treaty, intergovernmentalism vs. 
community method dynamics9, or, more broadly, the communitarisation of the AFSJ 
(Trauner and Ripoll Servent, 2016, p. 1418).  
Several studies have therefore considered the roles of and relationship between the 
European Parliament (EP, the Parliament) and the Council of the EU in this policy area, 
given the prominent role assigned to them by the after-Lisbon ordinary legislative 
procedure (formerly co-decision), considering in particular: (a) the way which their 
relationship has been changing throughout the progressive communitarisation of this 
policy field, and (b) whether and how this has influenced the shape of policy outputs.  
                                                          
8 The comprehensive operational definition of smuggling that this research is based upon views migrant 
smuggling as a cross-cutting phenomenon that moves across the whole areas of asylum, migration and 
criminal law, making these specific policies even more significant. 
9 Put in simple words, whether policies in the AFSJ were exclusively the result of the bargaining process 
between states within the Council of the EU or they were also influenced and informed by the stances 




Huber (2015, p. 421), for example, argued that “[b]order policies adopted under the 
codecision procedure by the Parliament and the Council look very different than they 
would if they had been adopted by the Council alone”. In this perspective, he argued, 
the Schengen Border Code, the first policy approved by co-decision (even though the 
process started as consultation) seems particularly interesting10, as it would show a 
clear impact of the EP on the policy output, “in particular with regard to the rights of 
third country nationals and free movement within the Schengen area” (Huber, 2015, p. 
425), in line with a view of the EP as “prominent fundamental rights advocate in the 
EU” (Maricut, 2016, p. 551). 
But, on the other side, other authors focused on different characteristics of this 
institutional change, and in particular on how, in spite of a much more significant role 
on paper, some ‘soft’ attitudes from the European Parliament and structural factors 
have limited the scope of such change.  
The first set of factors, some argued, has to do with the way in which the “EP has 
altered its positions after communitarization and/or has had limited impact in triggering 
change” (Trauner and Ripoll Servent, 2016, p. 1419, reporting also previous examples 
in literature). For example, if “the European Parliament does not have the possibility to 
go to the ‘second reading’ because of its own incapacity or fear of consequences in 
the Council, then the co-decision process cannot be considered as a fair procedure 
among equal institutions” (Acosta, 2009, p. 39, cited in Trauner and Ripoll Servent, 
2016, p. 1424).  
Ripoll Servent (2017, p. 389) further developed this argument, explaining how the 
introduction of co-decision in the AFSJ and other institutional arrangements connected 
to the legislative process have contributed to the change of the parliamentary attitude 
in this policy domain, towards more goal-oriented stances. 
These different explanations have proven to be central in the AFSJ debate, depending 
also on where emphasis is placed: 
                                                          
10 It is equally remarkable to note that the proposal was put forward by the Commission in 2004, the 
latter still being a young actor in the field, since before the Amsterdam Treaty it did not have the power 




Some have argued that Parliament, having obtained real powers under codecision, has 
taken different, generally less liberal positions than previously. Lopatin (2013), for 
instance, argues that the EP’s voting record on irregular migration and asylum proposals 
became more restrictive. Ripoll Servent (2012) also discusses behavioural changes in 
LIBE towards “more centripetal outcomes”. What should be stressed in this respect is that, 
under a consultation procedure, Parliament was “free” to state its “ideal position”, while 
under a codecision procedure, in order to have legislation adopted, it needs to agree on a 
compromise with Council (Huber, 2015, p. 433). 
Secondly, as held again by Trauner and Ripoll Servent (2016) among others, structural 
factors contribute to explaining the limited impact of the new dynamics of governance 
in the field on policy outcomes: “the Council has remained de facto an advantaged 
policy entrepreneur in the AFSJ regardless of the de jure empowerment of the EU’s 
supranational institutions”, since “[n]on-agreement has automatically implied the 
maintenance of policies largely defined by the Council under consultation” (Trauner 
and Ripoll Servent 2016, p. 1420. See also Tsebelis 1995 on the relationship between 
policy stability and veto players). They further argued that the Council can increase 
this policy stability through “the co-optation of certain EP actors, mostly from the centre-
right and conservative groups” (Trauner and Ripoll Servent, 2016, p. 1423) and 
benefitting from “the nature of the field [which] demands the coordination of national 
resources (e.g. border guards, police or prosecutor)” (Maricut, 2016, p. 543), making 
this policies field “remain intrinsically intergovernmental” (Ucarer, 2013, p. 293, cited 
in Maricut, 2016, p. 543). 
Elaborating on the concept of “integration without supranationalisation” suggested by 
Fabbrini and Puetter (2016), the post-Lisbon governance of the AFSJ has therefore 
been depicted as ‘integration [both] with and without supranationalisation’”, where, 
“despite the gradual supranationalisation of JHA [Justice and Home Affairs], the 
institutional framework maintains a strong new intergovernmentalist character” 
(Maricut, 2016, pp. 542–552).  
Lastly on the roles of the main actors of the legislative process, three further 
considerations can be drawn looking at the overall literature in this policy area:  
1. The European Parliament can increase its influence in AFSJ policy-making also 




to gain influence in a process where it would have less (Huber, 2015, pp. 429–
430. See also the concept of ‘nested games’ in Tsebelis, 1990, and that of 
‘arena linkages’, explored in chapter 2); 
2. Some changes intervened in the very functioning of the Council, with an 
increasing use of the qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Committee of 
Permanent Representatives (COREPER), in comparison to the very first years 
after Lisbon and with the increasing importance of lower levels national officers 
(JHA counsellors in particular) as ministers tend to rely on their work, behind 
the scene, rather than actually negotiate themselves: JHA counsellors have 
become “the ‘problem-solving body’” and “are in charge of finding compromise 
agreements among member states on ‘outstanding issues’” (Maricut, 2016, p. 
548);  
3. The very ordinary legislative process (and therefore the role of the EP) has been 
jeopardised in the last years by the Council’s use of an emergency logic, relying 
on provisions falling outside AFSJ, “without parliamentary and judicial 
oversight”, which did not bring any innovation but rather signalled “a reversal to 
pre-Lisbon intergovernmental deals”, such as naval operations, two Frontex-led 
and one under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP); the 
emergency relocation plan and the creation of hotspots, both adopted through 
Council decisions “justified by ‘an emergency situation’”; and the EU-Turkey 
Agreement (Guiraudon, 2018, pp. 157–158. See also Carrera and Lannoo, 
2018, p. 4 and, on the growing role of EU agencies in this area, Santos Vara, 
2017). 
Moving past the two co-legislators, Maricut (2016, pp. 545–546) also considered the 
changing role of the European Council, which has experienced a reduction of its 
involvement, as before the communitarisation of AFSJ was in charge of the exclusive 
right of legislative initiative in this area. Nowadays, it is formally involved in the 
governance of the area under article 68 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU), establishing that “[t]he European Council shall define the 
strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning within the area of freedom, 
security and justice”. However, its strongest role is not formally under article 68 of the 




institutions”, providing inputs of “tremendous political pressure” but only in clear “times 
of crisis” (for a more detailed overview of the literature on the role of Council and 
European Council in the AFSJ, see Roos, 2017).  
It is also particularly interesting to look at how the role of the European Commission 
has been considered (for an overview, see Zaun 2017b): the resulting picture is that of 
a body whose influence and power has grown, but not as much as it would have liked 
to, because of the resistance still existing in MSs, which limited the attempts of 
increasing the power of the Commission: “[t]he Council’s attitude towards many of 
these early efforts by the Commission is perhaps best summarized by former German 
Chancellor Schroeder in stating ‘[t]he Commission’s fantasies have been rationalised’” 
(Scipioni, 2018b, p. 1362).  
These limitations on the Commission’s competences, relating in particular to its power 
of monitoring, sanctioning and dealing with emergency situations, are considered the 
result of the MSs dilemma 
of choosing to either provide more powers to an independent actor that would 
effectively monitor and sanction them in relation to common policies, or they could 
carry on with a cosmetic exercise that did not expose their own deficiencies but left 
them open to negative consequences arising from gaps in the Union’s external 
borders […] Former Director General for Home Affairs Manservisi reportedly dubbed 
the Schengen Evaluation Mechanisms ‘little more than a faceless peer review’, 
referring also to the need for a ‘Community Method’ to be introduced into the 
governance of Schengen (Scipioni, 2018b, pp. 1363–1365). 
Furthermore, some studies also considered the (limited) role of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (Carrera ad Lannoo, 2018; Herlin-Karnell, 2017; Huber, 2015 and 
Trauner and Ripoll Servent, 2016), whereas others pointed to a few more general 
trends in this policy area that are particularly significant: 
1. The ‘failing forward’ argument: besides incompleteness, ambiguity or 
uncertainty (Caporaso, 2007, p. 393, cited in Scipioni, 2018b, p. 1359), there 
are other aspects that “could have been included in adopted policies as debates 
alerted politicians that in their absence the resulting implementation was likely 




bargaining between states with diverging preferences and spillovers arising 
from incomplete agreements” lead to frequent shortcomings in EU migration 
policies (Jones et al., 2016, cited in Scipioni, 2018b, pp. 1357–1360); 
2. The aforementioned shifting out dynamics, i.e. the external dimension of EU 
migration policies, which have been a distinctive characteristic of them since the 
very beginning (Lavenex, 2006 and 2016, p. 5. See also Strik, 2019). This 
entails a progressive externalisation of EU borders and an involvement of 
international organisations as key partners of this approach, then becoming 
main actors in the EU migration governance. With substantial differences 
among them, since, for example, if it is true that both “the IOM and UNHCR 
have become key partners in the implementation of EU programmes in third 
countries”, only UNHCR was able to maintain greater autonomy, acting 
sometimes “as a counterweight to EU actions” in particular for the protection of 
human rights of refugees (Lavenex, 2016, p. 15); 
3. The continuity/inertia in EU policies, even after the 2015 so-called ‘refugee 
crisis’, essentially due to the fact that the very crisis originated from the way in 
which the border system of Europe was designed through the 1990 Schengen 
Convention, when “[l]aw and order civil servants were able to devise the policy 
instruments that still today are meant to prevent unwanted foreigners to arrive 
on European soil outside of parliamentary and judicial scrutiny” (Guiraudon, 
2018, p. 15511). All this, in more recent times, “forced those fleeing conflict just 
as other migrants to resort to smugglers if they wanted to reach Europe. The 
EU Commission and Council of Ministers reversed this causal chain when they 
called for ‘a war against people smugglers’ as they did again recently in 2015” 
(Guiraudon, 2018, p. 155). This explains why, after the crisis, policies continued 
to be very similar to the previous ones, and even those which seem to be prima 
facie more innovative and progressive, such as humanitarian interventions, 
actually fit within a pattern of restrictive policies, through a technocratic 
approach of ‘border management’ where the EU political approach is not 
                                                          
11 All states that wanted to join the Schengen Convention had to comply with these policies (Guiraudon, 
2018, p. 155), and this was actually what happened, as showed in the Italian example with the adoption 




questioned (on the contrary, depoliticised), often also taking advantage of the 
involvement of NGOs (Cuttitta, 2018, in particular pp. 634–636). 
From the above AFSJ policy-making overview emerges, on the one side, the growing 
analytical and theoretical interest of research in this area, given not only the topicality 
and political leading position of the concerned phenomena, but also the substantial 
institutional developments experienced in this very area. On the other side, though, it 
appears striking the theoretical gap deriving from the marginal role of the anti-
smuggling policy-making research in this broader field, and even more if considering 
the comprehensive approach to smuggling that this research proposes and its cross-
cutting nature within the whole AFSJ. And this is precisely the research problem that 
this study aims to address, in so doing also partially responding to the calls, among 
others, of Bonjour et al. (2018) and Rhinard (2017): 
[W]e need to ascertain when, how and why different actors exert different degrees of 
influence in migration policymaking processes. We need to pay more attention to the 
institutional conditions under which policies are (re-) formulated and how this happens 
(that is, which actors and mechanisms drive or hinder policy emergence and change) 
(Bonjour et al., 2018, p. 415). 
A number of studies of individual EU institutions’ roles in policy-making post-Lisbon 
have emerged, as described above, but few researchers systematically measure the 
nature of the current mode of governance now underway (cf. Trauner and Ripoll 
Servent 2015). The question beckoning is whether it is truly communautarized or 
whether some sort of modified ‘intergovernmental-plus’ arrangement (akin to the 
classic definition of ‘intensive transgovernmentalism’ by Wallace 2000) is now 
operating. Some studies have touched upon this question, and Caviedes (2016) has 
made some important inroads, but more work is needed to systematically assess the 
extent of what is also called the ‘normalization’ of JHA policy-making (Rhinard, 2017, 
p. 51). 
The next chapter will then consider all the different analytical and methodological 







How to look into the EU policy-making? Research questions, 
analytical framework and methodology 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The definition of the research problem constituted a first element in establishing the 
objective and the scope of the research. The second step, which will be undertaken in 
this chapter, consists in the process of narrowing the scope down to the specification 
of the theoretical and analytical lenses that will be used, allowing for the transition from 
a general research problem to the concrete research questions that shall be 
addressed.  
In this perspective, this chapter will firstly critically explore, in paragraph 2.2., the 
different approaches to the study of the EU policy-making, with particular emphasis on 
the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ).  
Paragraph 2.3. will build upon this and formulate the research question and sub-
questions, also defining the analytical model that will be used to answer them.  
Paragraph 2.4. will delineate the methodological framework in terms of case selection 
as well as some background information and an explanation of the Italian migration 
policy-making. 
On the basis of this process, paragraph 2.5. will finally address remaining 
methodological components, including source selection, data collection and analysis. 
 
2.2. Theoretical approaches to the EU policy-making 
The theoretical lenses that will be used in this research fall within the broad context of 
the ‘EU studies’, so defined by Bourne and Cini (2006, p. 3) as  
to distance ourselves from the term ‘European Studies’, which we understand to 
encompass a much broader range of subject matter than our own focus on the EU. 




disciplinarity and interdisciplinarity, which we believe to be important. Third, […] we 
refer to the EU, and not to European integration or the EC12/EU.  
In such perspective and based on what has already been considered in chapter 1, this 
study falls within the stream of works focused on the EU as a political system, rather 
than as a mere geographical space or as a historical product, characterised by a 
multidisciplinary approach in the wide and rich political research line (see Bourne and 
Cini, 2006, p. 6), going beyond the traditional distinction between international relations 
and comparative politics (Pollack, 2009, pp. 141–142). 
EU studies are traditionally informed by two competing paradigms, i.e. neo-
functionalism (Haas, 1958 and 1964) and intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik, 1993). 
Where the former is associated with a one-level, supranational game, the latter 
includes a two-level national/EU game. However, they both tend not to address, also 
for the historical reasons connected to the moment of their rise, to the EU as a full 
political system, rather merely reading it through the lenses of the integration process 
(cf. Awesti, 2007, pp. 2, 5–7). Pollack (2015), among others, provided an overview of 
these theories and of the most relevant scholarships, as well as of the historical 
evolution of the debate, also including the other major theoretical lines – for the sake 
of brevity they will not be recalled here.  
It is interesting to note how in AFSJ and, particularly, in migration policy-making 
research, the intergovernmental vs. supranational approach tends to take place in 
terms of intergovernmentalist ‘venue shopping’ – where “the EU serves as a venue to 
which member states with restrictive policy preferences can ‘escape’ to circumvent 
domestic constraints” – and supranational ‘liberal constraints’ approach – where 
“institutions such as the Court of Justice of the European Union (the Court), the 
European Commission (the Commission) and the European Parliament (EP) are able 
to impose ‘liberal constraints’ on national governments” (Bonjour et al., 2018, pp. 409–
410). 
This research, though, operates from the notion that these two approaches – on their 
own – do not seem to fully grasp the entire picture of the EU policy-making in this 
subject matter. This calls for different perspectives that might be able to shed light on 
                                                          




those areas still to be explored – such as, among others, preferences, power and policy 
outcomes (Bonjour et al., 2018).  
To such an extent, the exploration of theories connected to the study of the EU and of 
its policy-making, as opposed to merely looking at the integration process (cf. Pollack, 
2015) seems particularly fruitful. Among such theories, new institutionalism (March and 
Olsen, 1984) offers the opportunity to analyse how and to what extent a great variety 
of institutions enables a great variety of actors to make decisions, de facto reconciling 
two opposite perspectives – political agency and institutional constraints – under the 
same pattern of institutional agency (Olsson, 2016, pp. 21–22).  
The new institutionalist perspective adopted here is broadly intended as a “general 
approach to the study of political institutions, a set of theoretical ideas and hypotheses 
concerning the relations between institutional characteristics and political agency, 
performance, and change” (March and Olsen, 2011, p. 160). This makes it possible to 
disclose the patterns of decision-making in the EU and the relationship between the 
different organs (Pollack, 2009), incorporating the variety of political actors involved in 
the EU policy process, in line with the aspects considered above and in the previous 
chapter. In so doing, political agency is then considered as the way in which – and the 
reasons why – actors behave within a given institutional context (cf. Olsson, 2016). 
Furthermore, this theoretical framework takes into account the need for a cross-cutting 
public policy approach in the AFSJ, exploring the interactions of institutions, actors and 
ideas, which have proved particularly relevant in the after-Lisbon communitarised 
AFSJ (Rhinard, 2007).  
Within such broadly intended new institutionalist framework, a concept which has 
acquired high relevance is that of governance – defined as “co-production mode of 
decision making among different types of actors” (Bartolini, 2011, p. 11. On the whole 
point, see March and Olsen, 1984).  
Considering the comprehensive approach to the smuggling of migrants of the 
operational definition provided in chapter 1 through the smuggling spectrum and the 
connected plurality of actors, situated at different levels, involved in the governance of 
this complex policy domain, the understanding of another, even more recent, 
theoretical approach to the EU policy-making appears potentially very useful: the multi-




MLG came out in 1992 in an article by Gary Marks “to capture developments in EU 
structural policy following its major reform in 1988. Subsequently, Marks and others 
developed the concept of multi-level governance to apply more broadly to EU decision 
making” (Bache and Flinders, 2004b, p. 1). This study does not aim to discuss the 
multiple possible definitions in detail, neither does it intend to explore the variable 
nature of MLG (for an in-depth view of this theoretical debate see Piattoni, 2010), but 
for the sake of clarity it seems important to establish how this concept will be used.  
As suggested by Caponio (2017, p. 3) a good start can be Mark’s definition, which 
seems to have rallied a certain degree of consensus in the literature: 
[MLG is] a system of continuous negotiations among nested governments at several 
territorial tiers – supranational, national, regional and local – as a result of broad 
processes of institutional creation and decisional re-allocation that has pulled some 
previously centralized functions of the state up to the supranational level and some 
down to the local/regional level (Marks, 1993, p. 392). 
Authors have made large use of the concept in the analysis of the European Union 
governance: from Marks onwards, MLG perspective seems indeed to “capture the 
nature of the EU as a unique set of multi-level, non-hierarchical and regulatory 
institutions, and a hybrid mix of state and non-state actors” (Hix, 1998, p. 39, cited in 
Börzel, 2012, p. 613).  
Bevir and Philips (2017, p. 689) critically discussed the way in which scholars have 
explained the rise of MLG patterns in EU politics, taking the opportunity to provide their 
own account and analysis:  
[Member States] came to share domestic interest representation and policy influence 
with supranational and subnational public actors.  
Research on MLG has addressed the influence of supranational and subnational 
groups in policy-making and the breadth as well as the depth of integration, including 
variation across policy areas. Debates in the study of MLG include the changing role 
of the state, the extent to which non-public actors are involved in decision-making, the 
importance of networks rather than hierarchy in relations between actors, the extent 
to which authority across governance levels is fragmented versus interlocking and the 




and Marks, 2008). One prominent offshoot of MLG is the study of ‘‘Europeanization’’ 
or the interactions between the EU and member states as well as third countries. Top-
down perspectives on Europeanization address the impact of European integration 
on national institutions, policies and politics. Alternatively, bottom-up perspectives 
address to what extent and through what processes domestic actors upload their 
preferences over EU policies, processes and institutions (Kohler-Koch, 1999; 
Jachtenfuchs, 2001: 250–251; Kohler-Koch and Rittberger, 2006: 38; Graziano and 
Vink, 2007; Ladrech, 2010; Börzel and Panke, 2013). 
Focusing more specifically on the policy domain considered in this research, MLG has 
also played a major role in the analysis of EU migration policies, even though its 
application in this specific area has started only recently (Caponio and Jones-Correa, 
2017, p. 1; Spencer, 2018. For a review, see also Scholten and Penninx, 2016 and, 
more generally on MLG-led analyses on migration, Panizzon and van Riemsdijk, 
2019), giving rise to the two strands which seems “to underlie current studies and 
debates on the MLG of migration policies: policy analysis and studies on federalism 
and minority nations13” (Caponio and Jones-Correa, 2017, p. 6).  
Among these works, some of those included in the first strand focus specifically on the 
local level, on the vertical relationship with the EU and the national government and 
the horizontal relationship with the society, taking on an actor-centred perspective 
(Caponio, 2017, among others), much like part of this research attempts to.  
On the basis of what has been considered so far in terms of (a) operational definition, 
(b) research problem, (c) overview of the new institutionalism framework and (d) 
overview of the MLG framework, the approach here proposed seeks to establish a 
productive dialogue between new institutionalism and MLG (cf. Awesti, 2007) through 
a conceptual combination aimed at disclosing the patterns of agency in smuggling-
related policy-making across different levels of EU governance, as shall be further 
explained in the next paragraph. 
It will then be possible to make the most of the “analytical relevance” of MLG, looking 
at it “as an inductively generated, empirical concept” and taking into account the 
                                                          
13 These two strands also encompass migration MLG in North America, another political space which is 




caveats related to its limited theoretical power (Caponio and Jones-Correa, 2017, p. 4. 
See also Piattoni, 2010), which can be overcome by the connection explored above. 
Furthermore, such conceptual combination provide several interesting instruments that 
can be used in order to understand the governance of this political space. Three of 
them seem particularly useful to the purpose of the present research.  
Firstly, the ‘principal-agent model’, which is “a heuristic tool that helps to identify the 
key factors for understanding and explaining the politics of delegation and discretion. 
It allows scholars to understand why, how and with which consequences certain actors 
delegate the authority to execute a particular task to other actors” (Tallberg, 2002, cited 
in Delreux and Adriaensen, 2017, p. 3. See also Bonjour et al., 2018). Given the very 
nature of EU politics, this is a model that has experienced great success, since its first 
applications within the EU (Pollack, 2003). Delreux and Adriaensen (2017) offer un up-
to-date analysis of the principal-agent model in EU studies, opening up interesting 
reflections that also deal with both macro and micro delegation, with the “patterns and 
politics of delegation” and with the “politics of discretion” (Pollack, 2017). 
This concept plays a crucial role not only in relation to the supranational arena, but 
also for the understanding of implementation dynamics (hence in particular at a local 
level), associated with the ‘street-level bureaucrats’ (Lipsky, 1980) and their 
importance in bottom-up approaches (for some general considerations, see Howlett 
and Ramesh, 1995).  
Secondly, the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ (Scharpf, 1994. See also, among others, the 
contributions of Zürn, Börzel and Levi-Faur in Levi-Faur, 2012), intended as the way in 
which the action of “steer[ing] democratic governmental action at the national and 
European level (Scharpf 1997)” can be achieved through “legislative threat or 
inducements” (Héritier and Lehmkuhl, 2008, p. 2). In EU governance studies, this 
concept has turned particularly relevant in connection with a principal-agent model 
based on the assumption of a bounded, limited rationality: 
Given an incomplete contract and the opportunism of the contracting partners, rules 
are drawn up between the contracting parties that establish a governance 
arrangement (Brousseau and Fares 2000; Koenig-Archibugi 2006) providing for the 




application of the incomplete contract and for ensuring compliance with the contract 
(Héritier and Lehmkuhl, 2008, p. 4). 
In such context, “[p]rincipal-agent theory offers a number of hypothetical answers to 
the question of whether a looming shadow of hierarchy is conducive to better policy 
perform” (Héritier and Lehmkuhl, 2008, p. 6). The shadow of hierarchy is then 
considered as the marking element of the EU governance (or the EU governance mix, 
according to Börzel, 2012), leading to a potential “dilemma of European governance[, 
which] may be that ‘soft’ forms appear to require a shadow of supranational hierarchy 
to address policy problems, which the member states refuse to make subject to ‘hard’ 
supranational forms of governance in the first place” (Börzel, 2012, p. 13).  
Thirdly, the ‘arena linkages’, i.e. how “in a context of linked decision-making arenas, 
the threat of veto by an actor may allow to exert influence in another linked arena in 
which the actor does not have a formal voice. […] In other words, it [holds] one arena 
hostage to obtain influence in another arena” (Héritier and Moury, 2012, p. 653. See 
also the ‘nested games’ of Tsebelis in chapter 1). This is important in new 
institutionalist multi-level governance, since 
it is assumed that actors interact in a given institutional context, in this particular case 
in a multilevel institutional context and a multi-arena context at the same level. […] 
Moreover, the dynamics of multilevel governance are compounded by the fact, as 
Benz has elaborated in his work, that at one and the same level various actors’ 
decisions need to be coordinated, before interacting with other actors at the higher 
level. This leads to a complex web of sequential interactions between actors across 
levels, but also at the same level that needs to be accommodated in order to come to 
a decision (Héritier, 2019, pp. 352–353). 
The three instruments presented above are helpful to understand the reasons why 
such approach has been chosen and to provide those elements for the stipulation of 







2.3. Navigating the anti-smuggling policy-making within the EU: the research 
questions and the analytical model  
The main research question (RQ) that this study intends to address, based on the 
interaction between the comprehensive operational definition of migrant smuggling14, 
the research gaps and problem and the conceptual combinational between new 
institutionalism and multi-level governance, can be formulated as follows: 
What are the patterns of the smuggling-related policy-making across 
different levels of EU governance and which institutional and agency 
dynamics can explain them? 
Such RQ is aimed, therefore, at disclosing the policy-making patterns against migrant 
smuggling within the EU, considering, on the one side, the relationship between 
institutions and agency and, on the other side, the multi-level governance dynamics, 
both in a vertical and horizontal perspective (for a schematic view of the theoretical 
approach toolbox and the connection between the different elements, see Figure 2.1.). 
This shall bring a theoretical contribution to the overall academic debate, deriving, in 
the first place, from the explorative nature of this comprehensive study in this policy 
field and therefore allowing for a first understanding of the specific case of the 
smuggling of migrants within AFSJ policy-making studies.  
Furthermore, the approach chosen, which combines elements of new institutionalism 
and MLG, has not been widely applied in AFSJ studies and this research shall 
therefore also be important in assessing the heuristic and explanatory power of a multi-
level understanding of institutional agency in this field (as opposed to a merely one-
level analysis), also with a view to offering new possibilities for understanding policy-
making patterns in other migration-related areas. In this regard, the epistemological 
model is innovative, as it is applied through different phases and levels of policy 
adoption, since the specificity of the phenomenon poses pressures on the existing 
theoretical frames, functionally taking place throughout boundaries. 
 
                                                          
14 It should be recalled that such a definition entails the consideration of a broader set of policies as part 
of the anti-smuggling-related framework (see the smuggling spectrum and the operational definition in 




Figure 2.1. – The research theoretical toolbox 
 
Source: Elaborated by the author  
Notes: Dotted lines connect the theoretical perspectives with the main analytical components 
that will be used for each of them 
 
In turn, this RQ entails some research sub-questions (SQs), embedded in the different 
analytical levels. In particular, in line with the MLG approach, at least three levels of 
policy-making oriented agency can be identified – i.e. local15, national and 
supranational levels – with a view to understanding the interaction between institutions 
and agency not only within each of these levels, but also across them (see also Table 
2.1.). The definition of such levels and connected SQs, in the proposed order, follows 
a bottom-up perspective that can underscore the impact of ‘lower’ governance levels 
on ‘upper’ ones. The three research sub-questions can be formulated as follows: 
SQ1 – How does the response to migrant smuggling function on the 
ground and how does this contribute to policy-making in this field? This 
SQ deals with the local level, with a view to disclosing the patterns of agency 
on the ground and how local practices contribute to policy-making. In order to 
                                                          
15 The international level was not included based on the rationale of focusing exclusively on the political 
space within the EU (even though several references to the international level and its importance in 
empirical and analytical terms will be made throughout the research). Likewise, the local level was not 
split into ‘regional’ and ‘local’ (cf. the definition of Marks, 1993), since the peculiarity of the AFSJ, which 
mostly entrusts implementation-related responsibilities on a local level, seemed to make such division 




do so, besides the institutions/agency pattern, it shall also focus on the 
subjective interpretation that actors on the ground give to their actions. 
SQ2 – What factors and dynamics are relevant to the formulation of 
policies against migrant smuggling on a national level? This SQ focuses 
on the national level, in order to understand policy-making patterns in relation 
with what happens on the ground and at supranational level and based on the 
general theoretical approach.  
SQ3 – What factors and dynamics are relevant to the formulation of 
policies against migrant smuggling on a supranational level? The last SQ 
moves on to the supranational level, replicating the analytical operation 
conducted at the national one. 
The establishment of the research question and sub-questions enables a further 
narrowing down of the approach, leading to the explanation of how the new 
institutionalist MLG framework will be concretely applied. This can be done through the 
elaboration of the last step of the theoretical framework, i.e. an analytical model, which 
will make it possible to consider under the same umbrella the three distinctive elements 
of this conceptual combination: institutions/agency continuum, interaction between 
different governance levels, interaction between different arenas. This is in turn 
reflected into the three different layers of the model, as follows. 
Firstly the institutions/agency layer, where the way in which policy-making (and 
implementation) processes happen within a given institutional framework will be 
considered, highlighting the institutional (structural) constraints that actually exist. This 
will mainly allow us to understand the impact of institutional arrangements or resource 
allocations, among other things, in policy-making and policy implementation (for 
instance in those cases where norms as they are simply cannot be followed16). 
 
 
                                                          
16 Several policy implementation studies address this point, such as Falkner, Hartlapp, Leiber and Treib 
(2004), which offer an analysis of EU law implementation and the role of opposition, administrative 




Table 2.1. – Research question and sub-questions 
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Source: Elaborated by the author 
 
However, in line with such framework, it will also be maintained that actors can and do 
exert their political agency (see the previous paragraph and Olsson, 2016). It will be 
then explored the way in which they move and contribute to the final outcomes, using 
which resources and facing which institutional limitations, and explaining the reasons 
and logics that govern these very processes. In this perspective, both dominant 




logic of consequence and the logic of appropriateness, considering them as 
complementary to one another (cf. March and Olsen, 2006, p. 9)17. 
This means that actors’ agency is explained, on the one side, on the basis of a 
“rationality assumption” and of the research of “optimal choices”, also considering the 
existence of a plurality of (potentially overlapping) arenas, which give rise to “nested 
games”, i.e. those situations where “an actor is involved in a whole network of games” 
(Tsebelis, 1990, pp. 6–7). On the other side, the concept of appropriateness is also 
important, starting from the very idea that “political institutions are collections of 
interrelated rules and routines that define appropriate actions in terms of relations 
between roles and situations. The process involves determining what the situation is, 
what role is being fulfilled, and what the obligation of that role in that situation is” (March 
and Olsen, 1989, p. 160). 
Both these perspectives offer explanations as to the reasoning and related incentives 
that in the given institutional framework actors have in order to make specific decisions, 
and sometimes even to move away from what they would expect to act like. So “rational 
action [can be conceptualised] in terms of a more realistic goal orientation, open to 
other sources of action than pure self-interest; bounded by the specific conditions of 
the actor and the situation; and extended to include both calculation and intuition. This 
down-to-earth view of goal orientation is more open and flexible and works well with a 
sociological and political understanding of action” (Olsson, 2016, p. 31).  
Lastly on this aspect, also the way in which “institutional choices taken in the past can 
persist” (Pollack, 2009, p. 127) shall be considered, as an integrative perspective and 
not as a separate approach (the ‘historical institutionalism’), in line with Pollack (2009). 
Here the concept of path dependency becomes central (Olsson, 2016 and Pollack, 
2009. See also Bonjour et al., 2018, p. 416; Maricut, 2016; Ripoll Servent, 2017 and 
                                                          
17 This combination also applies to the choice of policy instruments: “As a rule, decision-making theories 
have distinguished and categorised them into two different categories of logic: the logic of consequence 
(effectiveness-seeking) and the logic of appropriateness (sense-seeking). The logic of consequence 
drives decision makers to choose their policy instruments according to the principle of instrumentality, 
and thus to select instruments that are in keeping with the policy-makers’ pursued goals. The logic of 
appropriateness encourages decision makers to choose according to the principle of legitimacy, and 
thus to select instruments that possess a value ‘shared’ by other actors and environments. Thus, by 
drawing from different stream of literature, this essay proposes a conceptual framework by which to 
order and analyse the choice of instruments by assuming that in the real world, decision makers are 




Zincone and Caponio, 2006) to understand how certain policy outcomes and patterns 
of today can be actually read and made sense of in light of decisions (and institutional 
arrangements) of the past. In this very framework, also unintended (or unwanted) 
consequences become important, as side effects of previous decisions or practices 
that shape the institutional environment, constrain agency or produce nevertheless 
specific unexpected results (see again Pollack, 2009. Cf. also Bonjour and Vink, 2013, 
addressing aspects of the unintended consequences within a migration framework). 
The second layer is based on the interaction between different governance levels, i.e. 
“the centre-periphery or vertical dimension, regarding interdependence between 
governments at different territorial levels18, that is, the ‘multi-level’ aspect of the 
concept” (Caponio, 2017, p. 2055, citing Bache and Flinders, 2004a). Here the 
perspective adopted is both top-down and bottom-up in terms of influence on the 
policy-making process, but it also takes notice of the “shifting down” and “shifting up” 
of responsibilities to different levels: in this respect, it should be noted that the shifting 
up tends to be far less studied in the literature (Caponio and Jones-Correa, 2017, p. 
8). The combination of these two perspectives, however, is traditionally not very 
common in MLG studies on migration (Zincone and Caponio, 2006, p. 276), but it is 
crucial in order to understand the whole complexity of the phenomenon at hand. In this 
specific case, consistently with the adopted formulation, the interaction between local, 
national and supranational levels will be considered19. 
The third layer elaborates on the “state-society or horizontal dimension, emphasising 
the growing interdependence between public and non-public actors (Agranoff, 2014), 
that is, the ‘governance’ aspect of the concept” (Caponio, 2017, p. 2055, citing Bache 
and Flinders, 2004a). In so doing, it broadens the meaning of the ‘horizontal’ – or 
‘governance’ – aspect of MLG, as to go beyond mere state-society or institutional-
informal relationships (cf. Zincone and Caponio, 2006, pp. 274–275), which mostly 
                                                          
18 It should be stressed that the focus is not placed on the allocation of different competences among 
levels provided by EU treaties and national legislations, but rather on the policy-making dynamics taking 
place across these very levels. The various competence allocation (i.e. the specific tasks and 
responsibilities borne by each governance level) is outlined in chapter 3 and taken for granted in the 
overall analysis). 
19 Such interaction will be analysed, in this layer, exclusively in terms of inter-institutional connections, 
since institutional/informal interactions, such as those between NGOs and policy-makers, fall within a 




consider the effects of non-institutional agency on the policy-making process. It also 
includes, indeed, within-the-institution dynamics, essentially placing the focus both on 
the interaction between different policy areas and between different institutions.  
As already stated, the understanding of the reasons and rationales for such processes 
will also be crucial, clearly following the path indicated by Caponio and Jones-Correa 
(2017, p. 12), stating that “research has to move beyond the description of MLG […] 
and to finally address ‘why’ questions”. 
Recalling the three instruments of the new institutionalist MLG toolbox above explored, 
one can appreciate how the first two (principal-agent model and shadow of hierarchy) 
are going to be mainly used in this research to essentially inform the analysis of the 
multi-level aspect, whereas the third one (arena linkages) for the governance aspect. 
Table 2.2. provides a schematic summary of this whole argument, highlighting the 
three layers of analysis and associating to each of them those specific elements arising 
from the operational definition and from the nature of the EU governance in this field(s), 
as well as some of those theoretical tools that shall inform the analysis. 
In more concrete terms, this analytical model shall be applied in the different levels of 
analysis (local, national and supranational), each of them corresponding to one chapter 
of Part 2 of this study, as follows.  
At the local level (chapter 4), in the light of the non-strictly policy-making nature of the 
analysis, the focus will mainly be on the institutions/agency layer (layer 1), considering 
how the analysis is aimed at disclosing the implementation dynamics and the effects 
of them on the formulation of policies. 
At the national and supranational levels (chapters 5 and 6) the analytical model will be 
applied privileging a MLG-based narrative (layers 2 and 3), highlighting both top-down 
and bottom-up dynamics, as well as horizontal relations. In such perspective, given the 
constant overlapping of levels, the decision on where to place and consider different 
examples shall be based on the point of view adopted (e.g. how a local dynamic 






Table 2.2. – The three-layer analytical model for the study of anti-smuggling policy-
making 
1 Institutional constraints Political agency  
(logics of agency, path dependency, unintended consequences) 
Different institutions involved, also at different levels, with different history and 
patterns (national governments, national and EU parliaments, ministries and EU 
agencies, judiciary, local government, law enforcement, etc.) 






Interaction btw. different governance levels (the ‘multi-level’ aspect) 
(shadow of hierarchy, principal-agent, street-level bureaucracy, shifting up & down) 
Local level National level Supranational level    
Policies concern different levels, based on the treaties and on the principle of 
subsidiarity (asylum, migration, Facilitators Package, cooperation in criminal matters, 
etc.) 
3 Interaction between different arenas (the ‘governance’ aspect) 
(arena linkages, new governance, horizontal shifts) 
Different policy areas    Informal-to-institutional 
dynamics     
Between-the-institution 
interaction 
Criminal justice policies, the 
demand side and the 
overall migration 
framework, asylum policies, 
externalisation policies, etc. 




ministries and EU 
agencies, judiciary 
Source: Elaborated by the author 
 
Evidently, the division into different layers is essentially analytical: the very same issue, 
actually, can be (and is) spread across different dimensions (e.g. a case of policy 
adoption can be read both in terms of ‘different policy areas’ and ‘between-the-
institution’). Here lies the very heuristic and analytical relevance of the model, which is 
able to isolate (and stress) particular characteristics and patterns of the same issue, 
based on the different layers of analysis. 
Finally, the model will be applied in its entirety in the last analytical chapter (7), where 




analysis, i.e. how political agency, constrained by institutions, produces effects on and 
across the three different levels. 
 
2.4. The methodological approach and the case selection: Italy and Sicily 
This is a case study research and it aims to answer the research question through an 
in-depth analysis of a specific case of multi-level policy-making in the field of migrant 
smuggling within the EU. In particular, given the unexplored nature of this policy area 
and the innovative characteristics of the approach (see chapter 1 and above), the 
choice of a case-based strategy seems particularly suitable, with the opportunity to 
“collect detailed information using a variety of data collection procedures over a 
sustained period of time” (Creswell, 2003, p. 15; see also Stake, 1995 and, on the 
theoretical relevance of the approach, Eckstein, 1975. On the application of case study 
analysis in a similar doctoral research, see van der Giessen, 2014, pp. 17–19).  
The research follows, therefore, the logic of an “interpretive” case study (Morlino, 2005, 
p. 106; see also Eckstein, 1975; Lijphart, 1971 and Sartori, 1991), essentially entailing: 
(a) the consideration of “existing hypotheses and theories”, albeit “non-systematic” and 
in an “applied science” perspective (Morlino, 2005, p. 106) and (b) the exploration and 
interpretation of a specific case, with the possibility of generating hypotheses through 
an inductive perspective, which prioritise internal validity (Creswell, 2007, pp. 38–39; 
Gerring, 2009, pp. 8 –9. See also Dörrenbächer, 2018, pp. 33–34). 
This means that the phenomenon addressed in the research question – i.e. policy-
making patterns in smuggling related issues across the EU, through the consideration 
of the interaction between different levels and actors – will be explained by focusing 
on a specific case of national and local systems, within the EU, interacting with the 
supranational level. In such perspective, Italy and, on a more grounded level, Sicily, 
represent a very suitable case (or a case and a sub-case at different governance 
levels20) for an in-depth analysis of these dynamics. This has to do mainly with (a) 
geopolitical reasons connected to their position as southern border of the EU, (b) the 
rise of undocumented migration waves coming in particular from Libya from 2011 
                                                          
20 The characterisation of Sicily as a sub-case does not diminish its importance nor analytically 
subordinates it to Italy: it rather comes from its very nature of a case within the case, deriving from 




onwards and the subsequent confluence of a number of different policy measures and 
operations – both from the EU and the Italian government – in the Mediterranean area 
and in Sicily and (c) the relevance that Italy acquires within the EU from a political and 
institutional point of view, as founding member and being the fourth country by 
population and GDP. 
Case selection, given the primary exploratory nature of the research, is based (a) on 
the salience and significance of the specific case and sub-case per se and (b) on the 
particular relevance of the cases considered in order to disclose patterns within the 
broader EU level. Rather than relying on randomised choices, therefore, it is more in 
line with the type of the “extreme case” as defined by Gerring (2008), in a research 
which is therefore strongly “case-oriented”, borrowing such a concept from a work of 
Della Porta (2008) on comparative analysis.  
Through the interaction between the Sicilian implementation dynamics and the Italian 
and EU policy adoption patterns, it will then be possible not only to disclose the anti-
smuggling policy-making dynamics referred to the Italian/Sicilian case, but also to 
consider these findings insightful, given the very nature of the case considered, for the 
governance within the EU as a whole. In other words, the RQ the explanandum (see 
Table 2.1. above) and so the expected results are to be read, firstly, in relation to the 
dynamics taking place between EU, Italy and Sicily and, secondly, in connection with 
a first explorative understanding of the patterns of policy-making in this domain within 
the broader dimension of the European Union. 
The time frame over which the Italian case and the Sicilian sub-case are considered 
essentially covers the eighth legislature of the European Parliament, going from 2014 
to April 2019. The last days of the legislature, i.e. May 2019, were not included for a 
methodological reason, connected to the approaching European elections and, 
therefore, making that de facto part of a new political cycle.  
The reason why this time frame was considered essentially has to do with the high 
significance it has in the understanding of the evolving patterns of EU policy-making in 
this field, because of the dramatic rise of the migration flows towards Europe, the 
launch of search and rescue (SAR) operations in the Mediterranean Sea (Mare 
Nostrum in October 2013, Triton in November 2014, Sophia in June 2015) and the 




and smuggling in the public debate, also in the light of the commitment of EU 
institutions towards a review of the overall migration and asylum framework (see the 
European Agenda on Migration for all). 
However, such time frame was not considered in absolute and strict terms: the 
background research, indeed, also included data referring to an earlier period, in 
particular from 1998 onwards and specifically in the case of parliamentary debates of 
the Italian parliament and, to a lesser extent, of the European Parliament. This choice 
was made with a view to providing a wider context to the substantive policy processes 
analysed over the 2014-2019 period, understanding patterns on a larger time frame 
and observing the evolution of political debates and priorities, also considering how, 
between 1998 and 2008 in particular, a number of important pieces of legislations 
concerning undocumented migration were passed in Italy. However, for the sake of 
methodological accuracy, it must be stressed that such 1998-2013 analysis had the 
sole purpose of integrating the framework, whereas the answers to the research 
questions and the overall analysis conducted in chapter 7 and in the Conclusions are 
exclusively based on the time frame considered (see also Figure 2.2.). 
 
Figure 2.2. – Time frame of the research 
 








2.4.1. Understanding the Italian migration policy-making   
Before moving on to the last methodological aspects, and owing to the fact that Italy 
has been selected in this case study, it is necessary to take a step back and devote a 
few lines to the analysis of some of the characteristics of the policy-making dynamics 
in the broad migration field21, as they constitute the basis of some of the patterns that 
will be observed. In particular, four aspects seem to be particularly relevant: (a) the 
impact of EU legislation; (b) the shifting out (or, better, ‘shifting south’) characterisation 
of such policies; (c) the distance between policies and (expected) results; (d) the 
convergence of parties and coalitions. 
Firstly, the progressive involvement of the European Union in matters of migration, 
borders and security (see chapter 3) led not only to the obligation for Member States 
to conform to the EU legislation, but also to some direct effects on their very policy 
formulation. In the case of Italy, this was particularly relevant as it was one of the main 
reasons for the progressive adoption of a securitising approach (Castelli Gattinara, 
2017, p. 320), the first evident case being the so-called ‘Martelli Law’, following Italy’s 
signing of the 1990 Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement (the Schengen 
Convention. Finotelli and Sciortino, 2009, p. 123 and Abbondanza, 2017, p. 79). As 
Finotelli and Sciortino further argued, it can be right this pressure “to adopt the non-
immigration dogma of other EU member states”, in contradiction with the structural 
needs of the country which would foster the demand for foreign workers, to explain the 
Italian difficulties in migration policies, and not, as assumed by others, some sort of 
state weakness. In other words, “unsatisfactory outcomes of Italian migration policy 
are rooted in the lack of an adequate choice of the goals that migration policy should 
pursue” (Finotelli and Sciortino, 2009, pp. 121, 127).  
A second element, still pertaining to the external projection of the national policy-
making, has to do with the progressive shifting out (Lavenex, 2006) of migration 
policies or, even more appropriate to this context, to their ‘shifting south’: over the 
years, migration policy-making has entered a space of overlapping with foreign policy-
making, particularly through the instrument of the agreement with third countries. Such 
                                                          
21 The legislative framework will not be mentioned in this chapter, seeing as it will be widely explored in 





approach, which is also widely used by other EU countries and by the EU itself (cf. 
Abbondanza, 2017, p. 84), seems particularly interesting insofar as the policies to fight 
smuggling in the Mediterranean Sea are concerned. This has taken the form of 
different agreements, in particular,  
with Tunisia (2003 and 2009) and Libya (in 2000, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2008), to 
strengthen the capacity of those countries to patrol their coasts and, in the case of 
Tunisia, to collaborate with Italy in the identification and re-admission of 
undocumented Tunisian citizens. In 2008, the Bengasi Treaty with Muammar Gaddafi 
stipulated that Libya would have to accept all migrants leaving its coasts and expelled 
from Italy, allowing direct return from international waters (Caponio and Cappiali, 
2018, p. 118; see also Cuttitta, 2018).  
This last aspect, in particular, raised several human rights concerns (Abbondanza, 
2017, p. 84), leading also to the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights in the 
case Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, whereby Italy was found liable of several 
violations for conducting interceptions at sea. A very similar approach is contained in 
the new treaty Italy signed with Libya in 2017 (Caponio and Cappiali, 2018, p. 119). 
This last agreement is noteworthy as it confirms the efforts of Italy (and of the EU more 
generally, see Strik, 2019) to target undocumented migration through this ‘shifting 
south’ of policies and borders, indicating the strengthening of Libyan coast guard – 
with a view to preventing crossings and facilitate forced returns – and the establishment 
of a Libyan SAR zone as two powerful components of this strategy (Cuttitta, 2018, pp. 
649, 653). And the installation of the new Libyan government has very much facilitated 
this scenario (cf. Cuttitta, 2018, p. 648). 
Thirdly, the distance between policies and (expected) results should also be 
mentioned. This has been a characteristic of the Italian approach to (undocumented) 
migration and smuggling since the very beginning, and arguably the inadequacy of the 
approach led to an increase of undocumented migration, in the years in which Italy 
was moving from being an emigration to an immigration country (Abbondanza, 2017, 
pp. 77–78). “According to migrations scholars, migration policies in democratic 
countries are characterised by a structural gap between stated goals and their 
outcomes” (Caponio and Cappiali, 2018, p. 115): it is not surprising, then, to find the 




negative feedback from past policies is a recurrent factor motivating policy reforms in 
the field of immigration control and integration. We could call into question the very 
possibility of fully successful integration strategies and fully successful policies aimed 
at controlling the inflows. A sort of inevitable negative feedback would explain the 
unending process of policy reforms in this field – not only in Italy (Zincone, 2011, p. 
263). 
Such a gap is increased by the wide discretion in policy implementation (see chapter 
4), and this could be considered as part of a broader “structural gap between formally 
restrictive measures and lenient implementation, especially vis-à-vis undocumented 
migrants” (Caponio and Cappiali, 2018, p. 116), created by the convergence of 
economic “client politics” (focused on the need of the labour system) and the liberal 
“powerful lobby of the weak”, a “strange alliance” of employers’ organisations, catholic 
NGOs and trade unions (Zincone, 2011, cited by Caponio and Cappiali, 2018, pp. 116–
117).  
The fourth and last characteristic of the law-making process concerning migration and 
smuggling has to do with a feature of the broader Italian policy process: 
consensualism. Notably, though, it could be surprising to find such an attitude also in 
an issue which has proven to be very divisive in public opinion and also in the very 
political debate. The work of Zincone (2011) definitely is a cornerstone in the historical 
analysis of this policy sector, even if slightly dated. According to the author,  
there emerges a first important feature in Italian decision-making: an inevitable partial 
convergence between centre-right and centre-left policies due to policymaking 
persistently being pulled in two directions. Decision makers in Italy have had to find a 
middle ground, striking a balance between the public demand for control over illegal 
immigration and reduced inflows, on the one hand, and employers’ pressure to 
regularise undocumented immigrants and open the borders to immigrant labour, on 
the other. Different inputs produce these contradictory outputs (Zincone, 2011, p. 249; 
see also Finotelli and Sciortino, 2009, p. 136).   
The reduction of potential divergences between centre-right and centre-left coalitions 
is attributable to “the presence of the same social actors and lobbies, the ubiquitous 




similar problems”, even if confrontational attitudes are observable in Parliament (cf. 
Giuliani, 2008 and Zincone, 2011, p. 257 among others).  
However, this convergence, which leads also to very similar zigzagging policies, never 
leads to an overlapping of centre-right and centre-left: differences exist in their policy-
making processes and are related, among other things, to the role attributed to experts, 
civil servants, informal actors and to the dependence on electoral panics. The relatively 
small differences in policy outcomes, rather, have been partially eroded over time by 
rulings of the Constitutional Court and by practical problems (Zincone, 2011, pp. 258–
261 and 271–272). 
In the lack of more recent studies on this specific issue, it can be noted that in-depth 
analyses such as those of Abbondanza (2017), Caponio and Cappiali (2018) and 
Castelli Gattinara (2017) do not seem to challenge this view, even though this should 
not be taken as conclusive, since the different main focus of those very studies.  
However, it should also be noted that both Caponio and Cappiali (2018), Castelli 
Gattinara (2017) and Zincone (2011) stressed the peculiarity of the Lega Nord (LN), 
within the Italian party system, for its strong stance opposing over the years (especially 
undocumented) migration. Verbeek and Zaslove (2015) further considered the critical 
role of the LN in the shape and adoption of migration policies in the Berlusconi 
Governments and how “[h]olding a key ministry (Maroni at Interior) added to the LN’s 
structural capacity to influence policy in this area” (Verbeek and Zaslove, 2015, p. 539).    
As was noticed by Caponio and Cappiali (2018, 127), the role and importance of the 
Lega Nord in migration policy-making has been exacerbated, more recently, by its new 
leader Matteo Salvini (Minister of Interior, as in the case of Roberto Maroni), in a 
context in which “a deterioration in attitudes towards migrants open the political space 
to a more straightforward politicisation of the issue” and where “the political strategies 
of the LN and the Five Star Movement (M5S, see also Tronconi 2018) are clear cases 
in this point”.  
In a political system that is characterised by the existence of a number of partisan veto 
players (Tsebelis, 1995, p. 316), consensualism has been the result of a policy process 
that need to rely on several consultations, even with opposition MPs, in order to ensure 
that the government itself survives and which entails the risk that only ‘fragile’ policies 




certain importance (see Giuliani, 2008, pp. 78–80). Interestingly, a veto-player 
approach to the Italian policy-making suggests, under certain conditions, policy stability 
– which can degenerate in immobilism – and a more independent bureaucracy 
(Tsebelis, 1995, pp. 314, 324). 
In concluding this focus, some last reflections can be drawn on another general 
characteristic, alongside consensualism, of the Italian policy-making, i.e. the ‘ruling by 
decree’. 
Italian government has traditionally been considered as marked by instability (Zincone, 
2011, p. 257), a characteristic which persists also in present times, even if the political 
system considerably changed in 1992-94 with the transition to the so-called ‘second 
republic’. Parliamentary majorities – and therefore governments – are not more 
cohesive, even if there is party alternation (Giuliani, 2008, p. 62) nor do governments 
enjoy a better relation with their political majority in Parliament, even if in the last 
decades a presidentialisation process took place in Italy (Musella, 2014). Today 
governments are stronger, in the light of the presidentialisation occurred, but quite 
paradoxically they do not enjoy a more stable (and loyal) relation with their 
parliamentary majority (Musella, 2014, p. 6). All this matters insofar as it has led to 
(and/or it is confirmed by) the maintenance of a policy style coming from the mid-1970s 
where “a sort of ‘permanent use of decrees’ seems to be a common feature in the 
Italian republican history, due to the necessity to find a political solution to the difficult 
executive/legislative relations” (Musella, 2014, p. 7). Notably, also in the case of 
legislation by decree there is room for consensualism, as is also the case in delegated 
legislation (Giuliani, 2008, pp. 71–74), widely used to transpose EU acts (see Musella, 
2014, pp. 10–11) and approve migration policies. 
This short ad hoc analysis, far from being an exhaustive state of the art review of the 
Italian policy-making patterns, highlighted some interesting aspects that will emerge 
again in the next chapters, in conjunction with the other overall analytical component. 
 
2.5. Sources, data and analysis  
The last component of the analytical and methodological framework concerns the 




case analysis is conducted by using qualitative methods, which allow for the 
explanation of complex phenomena, in-depth analyses, contextualised comparisons, 
interpretive inquiry and a holistic account (see Creswell, 2003, p. 15 and 2007, pp. 40–
41; Gerring, 2009 and Mahoney, 2007, pp. 122–127).  
Within such approach, a plurality of sources was used in data collection, in order “to 
seek convergence and corroboration through the use of different data sources” 
(Bowen, 2009, p. 28): (a) documentary sources, (b) semi-structured interviews and (c) 
desk research. 
Documentary sources were used in order to unpack and understand the basic patterns 
of policy-making and implementation referred to migrant smuggling at EU, Italian and 
Sicilian level. This process involved the collection and analysis of several types of 
documents, either publicly available or with restricted access, mainly consisting of (a) 
official documents of local, national and supranational authorities, e.g. ministerial 
documents or European Council conclusions; (b) reports of institutional bodies, 
international organisations (IOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), e.g. the 
European Migrant Smuggling Centre (EMSC) or United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC) reports; (c) judicial proceedings, e.g. cases related to the ‘facilitation 
offence’ in Sicilian courts; (d) formal and informal notes and correspondence, as a 
residual category, e.g. a letter sent by Italian authorities to the German Ambassador 
concerning the involvement of Germany in the activities of an NGO. 
A peculiar type of documents, mostly based on the transcription of institutional 
discourses, is represented by parliamentary sources, which were extensively used, 
also beyond the time scope of the research (see the time frame above), both at national 
and EU level. At an Italian level, the data collection of parliamentary proceedings was 
based on two different, complementary techniques: on the one side the parliamentary 
debates concerning the discussion and vote of the most important smuggling and 
migration-related laws from 1998 to 2018, including also the works of the standing 
committees, where available; on the other side, also parliamentary questions, motions 
and general debates were considered, from 1998 to 2018, through a keyword research 
and with a specific focus on the issue-based work of special and standing committee 
(see Table 2.3.). 




concerning undocumented migration and smuggling, over the period 2014-2019, 
through a keyword research (see Table 2.4. The rationale for these two different 
approaches towards parliamentary sources will be addressed below in this paragraph). 
 







migrant smuggling, closing 
harbours, Libya externalisation 
policies – Parliamentary 
questions, motions, debates 
1998/2019 Chamber, Senate 
(P/C)  
Search with keywords (in 
Italian): “migrant / 
smuggling / harbours, 
facilitation / immigration / 
clandestino” 
Law n. 106/2002 2002 Chamber, Senate 
(P) 
 
Law n. 189/2002 2001/02 Chamber, Senate 
(P/C) 
 
Law n. 271/2004 2004 Chamber, Senate 
(P) 
 
Law n. 125/2008 2008 Chamber, Senate 
(P/C) 
 
Law n. 94/2009 2008/09 Chamber, Senate 
(P/C) 
 
Special Committees hearings 
and proceedings 
2013/18 Chamber, Senate 
(C) 
Search for topic: NGOs 
SAR activities 
Law n. 46/2017 2017 Chamber, Senate 
(P/C) 
 
Law n. 98/2018 2018 Chamber, Senate 
(P) 
 
Law n. 132/2018 2018 Chamber, Senate 
(P) 
 







Table 2.4. – EU parliamentary sources 
Topic/Law Year (Plenary/Committee) Note 
Undocumented migration, 
migrant smuggling – 
Parliamentary debates 




Source: Elaborated by the author 
 
The second type of source used for data collection is semi-structured interviews, with 
a view to understanding “how subjective factors influence political decision-making, the 
motivations of those involved, and the role of agency in events of interest” (Rathbun, 
2008, p. 2). They were realised between 26 September 2018 and 28 May 2019, for a 
total of twenty in-depth semi-structured interviews, plus three informal 
interviews/conversations. They essentially considered practitioners holding a 
significant experience in the subject matter and/or with a primary role either on the 
ground or in the policy-making process. 
Interviewees included (a) high-level officers and decision-makers of the European 
Union and of Italian institutions; (b) officers of IOs and NGOs; (c) members of the 
judiciary; (d) (former) members of local governments; (e) law enforcement officers and 
(f) lawyers. Practitioners acting on the ground were concentrated in the metropolitan 
areas of Palermo and Messina, but also more widely in Eastern Sicily and in the rest 
of the island. All the interviewees are listed in Table 2.5., where some general 
background elements are provided, in order to offer some context but without 
jeopardising the anonymity of the sources22. They are cited in the research according 
to seven different codes: NGO_X for NGO officers, JUD_X for members of the 
judiciary, operating either at local or national level, LAW_X for law enforcement 
officers, SIC_X, ITA_X, EUR_X, INT_X for practitioners not belonging to any of the 
previous categories such as politicians, lawyers, private and public sector officers (IOs, 
EU, ministries among others), etc., according to the principal level of agency, i.e. Sicily, 
Italy, European Union or international respectively.   
                                                          
22 For the same very sake of anonymity, interviewees are referred to in a gender-neutral language (e.g. 




It should also be noted that interviewees were not selected as representative of any 
statistical sample, but rather on the basis of a discretional evaluation of their knowledge 
of the phenomenon and of their potential contribution for an in-depth analysis of it. 
The interviews were conducted on the basis of an interview guide (except the informal 
interviews/conversations), which was in turn based on the overall framing of the 
phenomenon and of the preliminary results of documentary analysis and desk 
research, logically placing the interview phase after the completion of data collection 
and preliminary analysis of the specific issue addressed (see Berry, 2002, p. 680). This 
also helped to avoid the risks of misleading reconstructions from the interviewees 
themselves23, ensuring that they were “balanced by other forms of evidence” (Bache, 
2008, p. 17, citing a point made by Dowding, 2004. This very aspect was expressly 
considered also in another similar doctoral research, see van der Giessen, 2014, p. 
18).  
 




Position/institutional affiliation Date and type of interview 
1 SIC_1 Lawyer, Messina 26 September 2018, phone 
2 JUD_1 Judge, Messina 28 September 2018, in person 
3 LAW_1 High-rank Law Enforcement Officer, 
Messina 
1 October 2018, in person 
4 LAW_2 High-rank Law Enforcement Officer, 
Messina 
1 October 2018, in person 
5 NGO_1 NGO Officer, Eastern Sicily  4 October 2018, Skype 
6 SIC_2 Former Deputy Mayor for Migration 
Policies, Messina 
6 October 2018, phone 
7 NGO_2 NGO Officer, Eastern Sicily 10 October 2018, Skype 
8 JUD_2 Judge, Messina 17 October 2018, informal 
conversation, in person  
                                                          
23 In order to minimise this risk, in particular in cases of potentially extremely biased actors, such as 
members of local governments and MEPs, interviews were mainly focusing on procedural and 





9 SIC_3 Lawyer, Catania and Ragusa 17 October 2018, phone 
10 SIC_4 Former Deputy Mayor for Migration 
Policies, Palermo 
19 October 2018, phone 
11 NGO_3 NGO Officer, Sicily 22 October 2018, Skype 
12 NGO_4 NGO Project Manager, Sicily 23 October 2018, Skype 
13 LAW_3 High-rank Law Enforcement Officer, 
Palermo 
15 November 2018, phone 
14 INT_1 UNODC, Officer 15 March 2019, Skype 
15 EUR_1  Governmental officer acting at EU 
level 
27 March 2019, phone 
16 ITA_1 ANCI, Officer 29 March 2019, phone 
17 JUD_3 National Deputy Anti-Mafia 
Prosecutor 
17 April 2019, in person 
18 ITA_2 Ministry of Interior, Department for 
Civic Liberties and Immigration, 
Former top-level Officer 
17 April 2019, in person 
19 INT_2 UNODC, Officer 25 April 2019, Skype 
20 EUR_2 Italian MEP 2 May 2019, Skype 
21 ITA_3 Ministry of Justice, Department for 
Justice Affairs, Directorate-General 
Criminal Justice, Judge in charge 
14 May 2019, informal 
conversation, phone 
22 NGO_5 NGO Officer, Mediterranean Sea 22 May 2019, Skype 
23 EUR_3 European Commission, DG HOME, 
Officer 
28 May 2019, informal 
conversation, phone 
Source: Elaborated by the author 
 
Two different versions of the interview guide were used, one for the local level (mostly 
focused on implementation aspects) and one for the national/supranational level 
(mostly focused on policy-making aspects). According to the expertise of the 
interviewee, one of the two was chosen and, in certain cases, slightly adapted to the 
context and to the characteristics of the expert/practitioner. 
At a local level, the standard interview guide was composed of five sections: (a) 




on the basis of the smuggling spectrum and on the supply/demand approach (see 
chapter 1); (b) implementation and between-the-levels interactions, with a view to 
consider difference between theory and practice and the existence of bottom-up 
dynamics; (c) agency, in order to explore the role of actors on the ground and their 
process of interaction with the institutional environment; (d) recommendations, which 
helped to understand the points of view of the respondents (also in order to highlight 
and take into account potential biases) and to understand aspects related to the 
process of preference upload, if any; (e) final questions.  
At a national/supranational level, instead, the guide was structured around four 
different points, connected to substantive policy fields: (a) facilitation of irregular 
migration, with a specific focus on the humanitarian exemption and on the financial or 
other material benefit (see chapter 4); (b) closing harbours and SAR operations; (c) 
asylum policies, also exploring the connection with the overall anti-smuggling policies; 
(d) general issues, related to the point of view of the respondent. For the first three 
layers, the objective was to disclose aspects of the policy-making process, the 
information upload and communication between different levels, the role of agency and 
substantive aspects of these policies. Remarkably, the decision to focus, among other 
things, on humanitarian exemption, harbour closures and SAR was exactly the result 
of preliminary conclusions related to document analysis and desk research, where the 
importance of these issues clearly emerged. 
Lastly on the interviews, they proved particularly useful also in order to get information 
on and/or access to some documents, which were afterwards included in the overall 
data. Notably, though, in case of documents with restricted access, its direct use was 
not authorised, rather being limited to providing some context. Similarly, certain parts 
of the interviews and informal conversations were made objects of an explicit request 
by interviewees not to be cited/quoted. 
A third type of source used is desk research, as in integrative tool aiming to facilitate 
the delineation of the background and the interpretation of the primary sources. In this 
perspective, legal and policy analyses (such as those related to SAR operations in the 
Mediterranean or the humanitarian repercussions of the anti-smuggling framework) 




other secondary sources addressing policy-making patterns and parliamentary voting 
behaviour. 
As for the linguistic issues, sources in English, Italian, French, Spanish and Portuguese 
were used. When non-English sources are quoted in the text (including those 
interviews conducted in Italian), the English translation was provided by the author to 
the best of his ability, unless otherwise stated.  
While what has been said so far explains the rationale behind the overall decision to 
combine these three types of sources for data collection purposes, something still 
needs to be said concerning the source selection strategy at the different levels of 
analysis. This has to do with the different heuristic validity of sources, according to the 
level of analysis and on the sub-research question. 
At a local level, where the main objective was to understand the characteristics of the 
agency on the ground, the relationship with the institutional and normative framework, 
the influence on policy-making and on the rise of bottom-up dynamics, the main source 
used, by and large, was interviews. They appeared particularly suitable for the 
determination not only of existing patterns that are hardly detectable by merely looking 
at documentary sources, but also of the logics that inspire such behaviours, whether 
these are self-reflected or related to other actors. Furthermore, judicial proceedings 
proved to be particularly interesting, considering judicial activism on the ground as one 
of the most significant examples of agency, producing effects on the making of policies 
and of the rise of bottom-up dynamics. Also, this is an official and documentary source, 
which is not subject to the interpretation of any respondent: this made it possible to 
ensure a balancing of any potential bias in the data collected through semi-structured 
interviews (see the recommendations of Bache, 2008, in this regard, discussed above 
in this paragraph). In the same perspective and in ancillary way, other type of 
documents were also considered, such as NGO reports, desk research and newspaper 
articles.    
At a national and supranational level, instead, where the main objective was to 
understand the policy-making patterns and the impact that information coming from 
the ground and the communication between levels has on it, documentary sources 
were privileged. They particularly consist of: (a) parliamentary proceedings, a 




in order to understand the issues at stake, how they were framed, and what impact 
factors coming from other levels have. Remarkably, they were less used at a 
supranational level, because their heuristic strength was somehow limited by the 
different role that the EP has in the legislative process as such and in the construction 
of the public debate, compared to the role that national parliaments have; (b) official 
documents and reports, widely used especially at an EU level, where they offer direct 
and in-depth insights into the issues considered, from multiple perspectives (consider, 
among others, documents of European Commission, Council of the EU, European 
Parliament, Eurojust, Europol, Frontex). They were used, though to a lesser extent, 
also at a national level, and in this case they were essentially documents from the 
Ministry of Interior, the National Anti-Mafia and Anti-terrorism Prosecutor’s Office 
(DNA, from the Italian Direzione Nazionale Antimafia e Antiterrorismo), UNODC, 
UNHCR and judicial proceedings. Interviews were used as a complementary tool, 
mostly in order to gain some more specific knowledge about certain issues and the 
connected procedures, as they actually take place. So, again, even if used in a much 
more limited way than at a local level, interviews were important to delineate the 
characteristics of agency and to counterbalance the potential challenges due to the 
official nature of the other primary sources used. In this sense, it was often considered 
particularly significant to report the exact words used by the interviewees, which 
explains why in chapters 5 and 6 the reader will find more quotes than in chapter 4. 
Lastly, also newspaper articles and desk research were residually used at both levels. 
Table 2.6. offers a schematic view of the different sources used and their heuristic 
validity at different levels. 
Some last considerations should be drawn on how data were analysed, on the basis 
of an inductive approach. Documentary sources (and, when the case was, also desk 
research sources) were analysed using a document analysis technique, which 
“combines elements of content analysis and thematic analysis” (Bowen, 2009, p. 32). 
That is, for each piece of data originated by primary and secondary sources, the main 
elements affecting the policy-making process, including the roles played and the 
stances taken by different institutional actors, were highlighted and isolated.  
Insofar as interviews are concerned, instead, they were recorded (except for four of 




basis of an inductive qualitative content analysis (Cho and Lee 2014; Mayring, 2000 
and Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). 
 





Main sources used Heuristic strengths 
Local 
Agency on the 
ground, influence 
on policy-making 




Exploration of areas lacking 
documentary sources, 
reconstruction of agency and 
logics 
Judicial proceedings 
In-depth understanding, official 
source, centrality of judicial 
activism on the ground  













Official source, discursive part of 
the policy-making, show what 
factors shape the debate and/or 
policies.  
N.B.: Less important at EU level, 
for different role of EP in 




Official source, in-depth and 
multiple perspectives 
Interviews 
Contribute to the explanation 
and framing of documentary 
sources 
Newspaper articles 
and desk research 
(ancillary sources) 







A legislative overview: EU and Italian norms addressing 
migration and smuggling 
 
3.1. Introduction 
The operational definition of migrant smuggling, based on the smuggling spectrum and 
provided in chapter 1, entails a clear and direct consequence in terms of assessment 
of the relevant legislative framework. In other words, approaching smuggling as a 
multifaceted, cross-cutting phenomenon requires that the relevant laws to be 
considered go beyond mere provisions of smuggling criminalisation (the ‘facilitation’ 
offences, see below) and include, at very least, also the documented and 
undocumented migration legislation, as well as the asylum framework, in order to 
ensure due consistency between the analytical and the legislative dimension in terms 
of comprehensiveness.  
This short chapter therefore aims to provide the following: (a) the very distribution of 
competences among levels, depending on the subject matter (which in turn reinforces 
the very suitability of a multi-level governance approach); (b) a basic overview of the 
applicable legislative framework, introducing the main acts that shall be discussed in 
terms of policy-making in Part 2 of the research; (c) the procedural differences 
depending on the type of legislative acts. 
 
3.2. A legislative operationalisation of the smuggling spectrum 
Starting with the competence distribution among the different governance levels, the 
first aspect to be considered is that relevant policies aimed at combatting migrant 
smuggling, in the comprehensive approach of this research, are placed, according to 
the EU and national legislations, at different levels of governance, roughly on the basis 
of the following rationale (see Baroni, Di Agosta, Paciullo and Pintus, 2017; Ministry of 




1. The European Union, according to the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU), “shall frame a common policy on asylum, immigration 
and external border control, based on solidarity between Member States, which 
is fair towards third-country nationals” (Article 67(2) TFEU), with an emphasis 
on “ensuring, at all stages, the efficient management of migration flows, fair 
treatment of third-country nationals residing legally in Member States, and the 
prevention of, and enhanced measures to combat, illegal immigration and 
trafficking in human beings” (Article 79(1) TFEU). The degree to which this has 
actually happened vary substantially between the specific different policy areas; 
2. The national level, within the framework elaborated at the EU level, regulates 
migration, asylum and anti-smuggling and anti-trafficking policies. Whereas its 
room for manoeuvre is more restricted, compared to that of the EU, in asylum 
policies and border control, it enjoys wider discretion in terms of migration 
policies and criminalisation of smuggling and trafficking; 
3. The regional and local levels are mostly delegated with the implementation of 
the applicable framework: (a) administrative authorities hold responsibilities for 
the integration of migrants and asylum seekers, also through voluntary and 
advanced systems of protection and integration, such as the Sistema di 
Protezione per Richiedenti Asilo e Rifugiati (SPRAR), and support the central 
government on the ground agencies for undocumented migrant reception; (b) 
the Prefettura, as decentralised office of the central government, is in charge of 
the overall management of migrants’ arrival and for that of reception centres; (c) 
law enforcement agencies act as boarder guard, investigate the facilitation of 
irregular migration and conduct undocumented migrants to detention and 
expulsion; (d) the judiciary holds responsibilities for the prosecution and 
adjudication of migration-related offences (such as the facilitation of irregular 
migration) and acts, through its Specialised Migration Sections, for granting 
international protection and for the enforcement of the legislation on migration 
and the respect of individual rights of migrants. 
Based on the very principle of subsidiarity, there is an overlap of competences between 
governance levels. Although it is not the goal of this chapter to fully address them, it is 




framework and the need to consider all of these different governance layers. Just to 
provide one example of such complexity, it is significant to consider how the general 
penal anti-smuggling framework is set at an EU level, as it will be considered below, 
but the room left to Member States (MSs) discretion is actually so wide in relation to 
some crucial issues (cf. Carrera et al., 2016) that the national level could even be 
considered as the one most prominently involved.  
A last element that should be stressed is the impact of the local level, and in particular 
the lack of any direct legislative competence. However, its role shall be considered not 
only in terms of testing the actual implementation of policies, but also to understand 
whether and how, in the lack of a specific legislative competence, such a level is able 
to influence the overall policy-making in this field (see chapter 2 and the way in which 
the analytical model shall be applied on the local level). 
 
3.3. The many forms (and contents) of the legislative acts 
Once the centrality of both supranational and national levels of governance in the 
overall elaboration of policies aimed at targeting migrant smuggling has been 
acknowledged, it then becomes important to provide a clear understanding of (a) the 
types of acts where these policies are substantiated and (b) the relevant corresponding 
policies themselves. 
 
3.3.1. Main types of legislative acts at an EU and national level 
The EU binding legislative acts, after the deep changes brought by the Lisbon Treaty, 
are listed in article 288 of the TFEU: 
1. Regulations, “which shall have general application [and] shall be binding in 
[their] entirety and [be] directly applicable in all Member States;” 
2. Directives, which “shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each 
Member State to which [they are] addressed, but shall leave to the national 
authorities the choice of form and methods;” 
3. Decisions, which “shall be binding in [their] entirety. A decision which specifies 




Two legislative acts of the past are equally relevant to the current Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice (AFSJ). These are joint actions and framework decisions, based 
on the intergovernmental method (they were adopted by the Council) and binding for 
Member States. Framework decisions, like directives, left it up to MSs to choose which 
means to resort to in order to achieve the established goals (this is particularly 
important, among other things, insofar as the anti-smuggling penal framework is 
concerned, being a framework decision one of the two components of the Facilitators 
Package, see section 3.3.2.). 
As for the way in which legislative acts can be adopted, the TFEU currently provides 
for the following legislative procedures: 
1. The ordinary legislative procedure shall consist in the joint adoption by the 
European Parliament and the Council of a regulation, directive or decision on a 
proposal from the Commission. This procedure is defined in Article 294.  
2. In the specific cases provided for by the Treaties, the adoption of a regulation, 
directive or decision by the European Parliament with the participation of the Council, 
or by the latter with the participation of the European Parliament, shall constitute a 
special legislative procedure (Article 289(1)(2) TFEU). 
In particular, the ordinary legislative procedure (formerly known as co-decision), as set 
out under article 294 TFEU, is the main legislative procedure and requires the approval 
of the same legislative draft by the European Parliament (EP, the Parliament) and the 
Council of the EU (the Council), upon the European Commission’s (EC, the 
Commission) proposal. Informal meetings (the ‘trilogues’) among EP, Council and 
Commission facilitate the achievement of an agreement, when necessary. 
Before exploring the EU legislation related to smuggling, undocumented and 
documented migration, asylum and border management, the historical evolutions of 
the law-making surrounding these subject matters should be presented, as well as 
some remarks that can be made regarding the contemporaneity (for a general 
historical overview, see Olivi and Santaniello, 2015).  
The formalisation of a clear interest and commitment by the European Union to 
migration and border policies dates back to the Maastricht Treaty, which replaced the 




that would actually be included in the second and third pillar: Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). JHA included several 
policy areas and relied exclusively on an intergovernmental method; however, it was a 
few years later, in 1999, with the European Council of Tampere and the Amsterdam 
Treaty, that migration, border and asylum became core policies of the EU, were moved 
to the first pillar, and when the Schengen acquis was incorporated into the EU (being 
the third pillar renamed Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters, PJCCM). 
In the study of EU policy-making in this subject matter, the Amsterdam Treaty is to be 
considered a crucial benchmark, as it opened to co-decision, providing that, “after a 
transition period of five years, ‘the Council, acting unanimously after consulting the 
European Parliament, shall take a decision with a view to providing for all or parts of 
the areas covered by this Title to be governed by the procedure referred to in Article 
251’, i.e. the co-decision procedure. This Council decision (Council 2004) was taken 
after considerable political pressure had been exercised by the EP”. A “full involvement 
of the EP in border policies”  then became possible “through the activation of a so-
called passerelle clause provided for in Article 67(2) TEC [Treaty establishing the 
European Community, now TFEU], as in fact amended by the Amsterdam Treaty” 
(Huber, 2015, p. 422). 
A few years later, the overcome of the whole pillar structure brought about by the 
Lisbon Treaty would eventually lead to bringing “all policies related to the creation of 
an area of freedom, security, and justice into one chapter of the new treaty” (Huber, 
2015, p. 422).  
Remarkably, however, CFSP (and the connected Common Security and Defence 
Policy, CSDP) remained out of the area where the EU exercise legislative powers and 
this led to clear consequences in terms of procedures and actors involved: 
The common foreign and security policy is subject to specific rules and procedures. It 
shall be defined and implemented by the European Council and the Council acting 
unanimously, except where the Treaties provide otherwise. The adoption of legislative 
acts shall be excluded. The common foreign and security policy shall be put into effect 
by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and 
by Member States, in accordance with the Treaties. The specific role of the European 




of Justice of the European Union shall not have jurisdiction with respect to these 
provisions, with the exception of its jurisdiction to monitor compliance with Article 40 
of this Treaty and to review the legality of certain decisions as provided for by the 
second paragraph of Article 275 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (Article 24(1) TEU). 
Certain themes that become important in this analysis herein as a part of the response 
to smuggling, as further discussed below in chapter 6, rely on these aforementioned 
instruments.  
Moving to the national level, here legislative acts can take the form of laws, decrees-
law or legislative decrees, as disciplined by articles 70–82 of the Italian Constitution. 
The main characteristics and differences that are worth to be recalled in this context 
are the following: 
1. Laws are passed by the two chambers of the Parliament, which enjoy the same 
powers and prerogatives in the legislative process. Ordinary laws may also be 
approved by the standing committees, rather than by the plenary; 
2. Decrees-law have the force of law and are issued by the Government, 
exclusively “in extraordinary cases of necessity and urgency” (Article 77 of the 
Italian Constitution). They must be converted into law by the Parliament within 
60 days, otherwise they lose effect ex tunc; 
3. Legislative decrees also have the force of law and are issued by the 
Government. They are delegated legislation, issued upon a formal delegating 
law concerning a specific object, passed by the Parliament and containing 
“principles and directive criteria” to be followed by the Government (Article 76 
of the Italian Constitution). 
The distinction between these three different sources of law is important, since the 
choice of which tool to use can be significant in terms of the bargaining process and 
prevailing decision-making arena. In particular, this can affect the role of government, 
its relationship with the parliament and the cohesion of the very parliamentary majority. 
Furthermore, in the institutional arena, a vertical relationship also holds certain 
importance. Besides the way in which practices, requests, recommendations uploads 




EU levels up to the national one, which will be further considered in chapter 5, the 
design itself of the EU has a clear impact on the national level. This is connected with 
the delegation of power that the integration process entails, requesting that EU 
legislation be transposed, as in the case of EU directives. The transposition of these 
acts normally take place with legislative decrees (Presidency of the Council of 
Ministers, nd). 
Lastly, one should consider the way in which unconventional acts have been used in 
these fields to set policies, both at a national and at an EU level, in these last years. 
The overall policy-making aimed at regulating (or targeting, depending on the stance 
chosen) the action of NGOs operating in the Mediterranean Sea, for example, took the 
form of acts with ambiguous legal status (such as the Code of conduct issued by the 
Ministry of Interior in 2017, see Ministry of Interior, 2017a) or non-legislative acts (such 
as the directives issued by the Minister of Interior in 2019, see Minister of Interior, 
2019a, 2019b and 2019c). Similarly, the Italy-Libya Deal of 2017 did not take the official 
shape of an international agreement, likewise the EU-Turkey Deal of 2016, which was 
indeed called ‘statement’, although producing effects and obligations.  
These issues fall within the concept of ‘new governance’, with the use of extra-
legislative “tools” and “instruments”, often falling outside judicial scrutiny, as pointed 
out by Cardwell (2018, p. 69) and shall be given due consideration in chapters 5, 6 and 
7, understanding also the possible explanations for such choices. 
 
3.3.2. The relevant substantive law 
Since the Maastricht Treaty, the Amsterdam Treaty and the European Council of 
Tampere, the EU has adopted over the years several pieces of legislation with the goal 
of having a common visa and migration policy (particularly in the Schengen Area), 
related to the entry and stay of non-EU nationals into the EU, according to their 
situation (short stay, family reunification, labour migration and asylum). The 
approaches chosen and the results achieved by the EU in these sectors are deeply 
different depending on the specific nature of the considered policy, which can be 
summarily subsumed into asylum, labour migration, undocumented migration and 
border control. In addition, the legal bases that bestow competence to the EU in these 




The asylum field is one of those where progress towards a common EU approach has 
manifest the most, through the establishment of a Common European Asylum System 
(CEAS), which sets common standards and cooperation requirements. It is based on 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the 1951 Geneva Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol and is composed by a number 
of directives and regulations, which have been recast over the years:  
- Regulation (EU) 439/2010, establishing the European Asylum Support Office 
(EASO); 
- Directive 2001/55/EC on the temporary protection in the event of a mass influx 
(Temporary Protection Directive, notably never applied, not even during the so-
called 2015 ‘refugee crisis’, see European Parliament, 2018c, p. 6); 
- Directive 2011/95/EU (recast) for the definition of refugee status and 
beneficiaries of subsidiary protection (Qualification Directive); 
- Regulation (EU) 603/2013 (recast) for the establishment of the Eurodac system 
(Eurodac Reguation); 
- Regulation (EU) 604/2013 (recast) for the determination of the Member State 
responsible for examining an asylum application (Dublin III Regulation);  
- Directive 2013/32/EU (recast) for the procedures for granting and withdrawing 
refugee status and subsidiary protection (Asylum Procedures Directive); 
- Directive 2013/33/EU (recast) on the reception of asylum seekers (Reception 
Conditions Directive); 
- Regulation (EU) 2016/1624, replacing Frontex with the European Border and 
Coast Guard Agency (EBCGA). 
In the light of the aforementioned legislation, MSs must guarantee to each person 
reaching its territory the right to claim protection, while simultaneously being attended 
by appropriate personnel. The Dublin III Regulation determines the criteria to establish 
which MS is responsible for the protection claim (an issue which has become very 
contentious in these last years, as first entry MSs consider it as imposing an excessive 
burden on them). A number of other provisions determine the eligibility criteria for 




the need for MSs to take fingerprints of applicants, to be registered in the Eurodac 
system), the possibility of temporary protection in cases of the arrival of a large number 
of displaced persons and the procedures for return and resettlements. These 
provisions apply to adults, while the situation of minors and unaccompanied minors 
differs slightly. 
With the launch of the Commission European Agenda on Migration in 2015, an overall 
reform of the CEAS was set out, privileging also the replacement of directives with 
regulations and focusing on: 
- Measures to simplify, clarify and shorten asylum procedures, ensure common 
guarantees for asylum seekers and ensure stricter rules to combat abuse, 
including a common list of safe countries of origin, which was originally proposed 
as a separate regulation; 
- Who can qualify for international protection (the so-called ‘Qualification Directive‘), 
to achieve greater convergence of recognition rates and forms of protection, 
including more restrictive provisions sanctioning applicants’ secondary 
movements and compulsory status reviews even for recognised refugees; 
- Reception conditions […]; 
- Reform of the Dublin Regulation, which lays down criteria for determining the 
Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection 
(in principle the first country of entry). The proposal preserves the current criteria 
in the Dublin system, while supplementing them with a corrective allocation 
mechanism to relieve Member States under disproportionate pressure […]; 
- A revision of the Eurodac asylum fingerprint database […]; 
- Transforming the EASO from a supporting EU agency into a fully-fledged EU 
Agency for Asylum, which would be responsible for facilitating the functioning of 
the CEAS, ensuring convergence in the assessment of asylum applications 
across the EU and monitoring the operational and technical application of Union 
law, including assisting Member States with the training of national experts; 
- A Union Resettlement Framework, which would provide for common EU rules on 
the admission of third-country nationals, including financial support for Member 
States’ resettlement efforts, thus complementing the current ad hoc multilateral 
and national resettlement programmes (European Parliament, 2018c, pp. 5–6). 
Such reform has not been successful so far (with the remarkable case of Dublin III 




In the overall documented and undocumented migration management, EU legislation 
mainly sets out standards and general provisions, whereas implementation can (and 
actually does) vary among MSs, specifically in labour migration issues. In this field, 
very few relevant acts were passed as EU law (although the Lisbon Treaty explicitly 
provided for a shared competence between EU and MSs), being the most relevant:  
- Directive 2009/50/EC on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country 
nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment (Blue Card Directive);  
- Directive 2014/36/EU on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country 
nationals for the purpose of employment as seasonal workers;  
- Directive (EU) 2016/801 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-
country nationals for the purposes of research, studies, training, voluntary 
service, pupil exchange schemes or educational projects and au pairing. 
Efforts on the side of undocumented migration, instead, were made, for a common 
approach aimed at tackling such phenomenon, focusing in particular on the fight 
against migrant smuggling (see European Commission, nd), against trafficking in 
persons and on return policies (European Parliament, 2018c, pp. 13–14). 
In such framework, the ‘facilitation offence’, i.e. the legal provision criminalising the 
smuggling of migrants, is the core piece of legislation. The milestone of such an 
approach is, as already recalled, the Facilitators Package (FP), composed of Directive 
2002/90/EC, which defines the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence,  
and Framework Decision 2002/946/JHA, with a view to strengthening the penal 
framework to prevent the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence.   
The Facilitators Package poses an obligation on MSs to criminalise the facilitation of 
unauthorised entry, setting also some minimum standards and a common definition. 
An open question, particularly relevant in the light of the debate in literature and among 
policy-makers and practitioners (see chapters 1, 6 and 7. See also UNODC, 2017, pp. 
7–15) is connected to the lack of necessity of a material gain for the offence to take 
place and to the lack of a mandatory exemption for humanitarian assistance, an issue 
which has become central in these last years and which led the European Commission 
itself to express an appeal to overcome such an approach (European Commission, 




facilitation of unauthorised entry also in the lack of a financial or other material benefit, 
as well as it does not mandatorily provides for the exemption from punishment for those 
acting on humanitarian grounds. Furthermore, substantive differences in the 
transposition into national laws by MSs are also considered a challenging aspect of 
the current legislation (Allssopp and Manieri, 2016). 
In the very years when the FP was approved, a wider move towards addressing 
migrant smuggling was taking place at a global level (see chapter 1), in particular with 
the 2000 Protocol against the smuggling of migrants by land, sea and air, 
supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
(the Smuggling Protocol), which would then be concluded also by the EU through 
Council Decisions 2006/616/EC and 2016/617/EC. 
Notably, furthermore, the foundations of such legislation had already been laid in the 
1990 Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement (the Schengen Convention), 
which states in Article 27: “The Contracting Parties undertake to impose appropriate 
penalties on any person who, for financial gain, assists or tries to assist an alien to 
enter or reside within the territory of one of the Contracting Parties in breach of that 
Contracting Party's laws on the entry and residence of aliens.” Consistently with this 
border protection approach, it should be recalled that it was the very Schengen 
Convention that introduced the ‘carriers’ liability regime’ in Europe (see chapter 1). 
More recently, in 2015, within the framework outlined in the European Agenda on 
Migration and in the European Agenda on Security, the European Commission 
launched the EU Action Plan against migrant smuggling (the EU Action Plan). The EU 
Action Plan sets out a number of specific actions to undertake within 2020 through a 
comprehensive approach, based on a dialogue between migration and security 
policies. In this perspective, it is worth recalling that clear (even if quite limited and 
marginal in the overall document) attention has been paid to the demand side, stating 
that “[s]muggling networks can be weakened if fewer people seek their services. 
Therefore, it is important to open more safe, legal ways into the EU” (European 
Commission, 2015b, p. 2). Also, several actions are foreseen in order to support MSs 
in their capacity to address the phenomenon. 
The management of undocumented migration and the fight against smuggling is 




essentially based on surveillance and information sharing systems at the external 
borders and on a regulatory approach that provided for visa-waivers only for a limited 
list of countries of origin and exclusively for short stays (see European Parliament, 
2018c, pp. 16–19). 
Some final remarks can be made on the external dimension of migration (besides the 
de facto externalisation migration control policies, which will be referred to throughout 
the research, see also Lavenex, 2006), which is mainly included in the Commission’s 
2011 Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM), i.e. the overall framework of 
the EU relationship with third countries in the field of migration (see Strik, 2017). 
Lastly, it should be recalled how to face the recent so-called ‘refugee crisis’, the EU 
has further developed some instruments (see European Commission 2015c and 
2016), such as, among others: 
- Council Decision (EU) 2015/1523 establishing provisional measures in the area 
of international protection for the benefit of Italy and of Greece; 
- Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 establishing provisional measures in the area 
of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece; 
- Council Decision (EU) 2016/1754 amending Decision (EU) 2015/1601 
establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the 
benefit of Italy and Greece; 
- The 2016 EU-Turkey Statement, providing for the return to Turkey of asylum 
seekers whose request was deemed inadmissible in Greece. This was 
particularly criticised, among other things, for its externalisation nature and for 
wrongfully considering Turkey a safe country (see Gogou, 2017 and Strik, 
2019); 
- The establishment of the EBCGA above recalled. 
These last two instruments can be read through the lenses of a wave of securitisation, 
which seems to be in place within the EU in legislation, in its implementation and in the 
policy agenda (Gabrielli, 2014; Hammerstadt, 2014; Moreno-Lax, 2018 and van der 




As for the Italian legislative framework, since national legislations must be harmonised 
and comply with EU standards (see above), it has to be dealt with starting from an EU 
perspective. And, in fact, the milestone of the Italian legislation lies in the transposition 
of EU acts into the national law and much of what has been said with regards to the 
EU applies, of course, also in the case of Italy (see the various ‘European delegation 
laws’, i.e. the acts for the transposition of EU legislation into national law: see above 
and Presidency of the Council of Ministers, nd). 
But besides that, as was recalled above, the national level has substantial margin to 
approve and implement policies, in particular in the fields of labour migration and 
undocumented migration and smuggling, but also asylum and border control, provided 
that they fit within the overall EU approach. The vast majority of the provisions related 
to migration, asylum and smuggling is included in the Testo unico delle disposizioni 
concernenti la disciplina dell’immigrazione e norme sulla condizione dello straniero 
(Consolidated Immigration Act, TUI from the Italian abbreviated form Testo Unico 
dell’Immigrazione), approved with the Legislative Decree n. 286/1998 and 
successively amended in several occasions. It lays down for the main legislative 
provisions in terms of management of labour migration (determination of the maximum 
yearly amount of visas and residence permits for non-EU citizens, to be approved 
through a legislative decree, the so-called ‘Flows Decree’), entry, stay and expulsion 
from the territory of the state (visa policy, border control, etc.), family reunification, 
minor rights, integration. 
In the TUI the core of the anti-smuggling provisions is represented by the article which 
provides for the criminalisation of the facilitation of irregular migration, namely article 
12 (which in turns is constituted by article 10 of Law n. 40/1998, the so-called ‘Turco-
Napolitano Law’. Remarkably, therefore, this provision was passed before the drafting 
of the Smuggling Protocol and the approval of the Facilitators Package).  
Article 12 TUI provides for the imprisonment up to five years for “whoever, infringing 
the provisions of this consolidated act, promotes, directs, organises, finances or 
transports aliens in the State’s territory or carries out other acts aimed at their illegal 




does not have the right to permanent residence24”. Furthermore, it provides for the 
exemption from punishment for those facilitating the irregular stay of migrants on 
humanitarian grounds, a provision which in case law is broadly interpreted, according 
to some practitioners, as to cover also the facilitation of irregular entry. Aggravated 
circumstances, with a punishment up to fifteen years detention, include those cases 
where more than five people are smuggled, migrants’ lives are put at risk or they suffer 
inhuman or degrading treatment, an organised criminal group (OCG) of three or more 
persons is involved, there is a profit element or the use of weapons. Lastly, also the 
carriers’ liability regime is considered (on the whole provisions here recalled see in 
particular article 12(1)(2)(3)(6) TUI). 
The TUI was substantially amended over the years by several laws, such as: 
- Law n. 189/2002 (the ‘Bossi-Fini Law’); 
- Law n. 94/2009 (the ‘Security package’); 
- Decree-Law n. 13/2017 (the ‘Minniti-Orlando Decree’, converted with Law n. 
46/2017); 
- Decree-Law n. 113/2018 (the ‘Security Decree’, converted with Law n. 
132/2018).  
Other important pieces of legislation approved over the last years in this subject matter 
include (a) the Legislative Decrees of the 2000s transposing into the national law a 
number of EU directives (which represent a vast majority of the migration/asylum 
related laws passed); (b) Law n. 47/2017 (the ‘Zampa Law’) and (c) Decree-Law n. 
84/2018, deliberating the cession of some naval units to the Libyan government. 
As already pointed out in chapter 2, the parliamentary debates concerning many of 
these very acts (and in particular those more directly connected to migrant smuggling 
and undocumented migration) were considered in this research, with particular 
emphasis on the two pieces of legislation that affected article 12 more directly, i.e. the 
2002 Bossi-Fini Law (introducing provisions on the role of the navy in targeting migrant 
smuggling) and the 2008/09 Security Package (tightening up the whole framework). 
                                                          




In an historical perspective, it should also be recalled that before the 1998 TUI, the 
most important migration laws in Italy were:  
- Law n. 943/1986 (the first Italian migration law); 
- Decree-Law n. 416/1989 (the ‘Martelli Law’, converted with Law n. 39/1990); 
- Decree-Law n. 451/1995 (converted with Law n. 563/1995), approved in order 
to face the high flow of migrants in need of assistance trying to enter the country;  
- The above recalled Turco-Napolitano Law. 
It is important to note this as, like in the case of the Facilitators Package, provisions 
criminalising the facilitation of irregular migration already existed in the Italian 
legislative framework even before the TUI, as they were namely introduced with the 
Martelli Law. This law punished the facilitation of irregular migration with up to two 
years detention, which became six in presence of the profit element or of an OCG to 
commit such offence25 (Article 3(8)). Similarly, the same act introduced the carriers’ 
liability regime (Article 3(9)). As said, the ‘facilitation offence’ was then amended and 
included in the Turco-Napolitano Law (Article 10), before being incorporated into the 
TUI. All these trends can be read within an overall rapprochement of the Italian 
legislation on migration to the standards set out by the Schengen Convention (cf. 
Finotelli and Sciortino, 2009). 
Finally, as in the European case, the Italian migration policy framework has also 
experienced an increasing securitisation move (see also above, with regards to the 
securitisation of the European migration legislation and chapter 1 as for the substantive 
patterns of EU and Italian migration policies).  
A last general remark needs to be made with regards to the scope of this chapter: not 
all the legislative tools and acts here briefly mentioned or explored will be analysed, in 
a policy-making perspective, throughout the research, but it was nevertheless deemed 
crucial to summarily present them in order to offer a complete framework of the 
legislative background of the issue under examination. In a specular manner, this 
chapter did not aim to provide a full legal or historical analysis of EU and Italian 
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migration policies, but merely another important piece of the toolkit for the analysis of 
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Chapter 4  




The theoretical and analytical issues explored in Part 1 of this research made it clear, 
on the basis of the perspective chosen, how important it is to adopt also a bottom-up 
approach to policy-making, which firstly address the ground dimension. 
Looking at local practices it is possible to disclose the role of actors on the ground in 
the implementation of norms, understanding (a) whether and how they distance 
themselves from the letter of the very norms, creating de facto policies, and (b) whether 
and how shifting up dynamics originate from here, in turn influencing the national and 
EU policy-making26 (see Figure 4.1.). 
In such perspective, most of the local level analysis is based on the role of agency of 
local actors within the given institutional framework, rather than focusing on multi-level 
governance (MLG), as will be the case with the national and supranational levels, 
consistently with the theoretical approach delineated in chapter 2. This chapter can 
indeed be considered some sort of introduction to the main analysis of policy-making 
dynamics that take place at a national and EU level. 
To understand the importance of local agency in creating policies and in influencing 
the policy-making stricto sensu at other levels, the perspective of the actors involved 
is central: also for this reason, unlike the other chapters, the local analysis is mostly 
based on interviews with relevant practitioners (see chapter 2) 
Concepts such as logic of appropriateness, logic of consequences, street-level 
bureaucracy and principal-agent relationship, already explored in chapter 2, are central 
in the analysis conducted in this chapter. Here the geographical focus is on the region 
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of the EU and national level upon the local one is taken for granted, considering that these former levels 
are those which make policies and/or decide to delegate powers to the local level. Indeed, the overall 
focus of the research having been placed on the policy-making, the explanatory power of the ground 




of Sicily, a place that has become crucial as arrival port for the undocumented 
migration and smuggling flows from Northern Africa, and Libya in particular. More 
specifically, the core of the research lay in the situation in the metropolitan areas of 
Palermo and Messina and, to a lesser extent, also in the broader eastern part of Sicily 
(see Figure 4.2., which shows the relevance of the areas considered in this research 
in terms of sea arrivals of migrants in 2018). 
 
Figure 4.1. – Interaction directions at a local level 
 
Source: Elaborated by the author 
 
Figure 4.2. – Sea arrivals in 2018 by disembarkation site and territorial scope of the 
chapter 
 
Source: Elaborated by the author on an original figure from UNHCR (2018c). Data updated at 




On the basis of this analysis it will be possible to provide an answer to research sub-
question (SQ)1: how does the response to migrant smuggling function on the ground 
and how does this contribute to policy-making in this field? 
 
4.2. Local agency patterns in Sicily 
Sicily is one of the more interesting cases to explore in order to get insights into the 
implementation patterns of the EU anti-smuggling framework, mainly for geopolitical 
reasons connected to its position as southern border of the EU, the rise of 
undocumented migration waves coming in particular from Libya from 2011 onwards 
and the subsequent confluence of a number of different policy measures and 
operations – both from the EU and the Italian government – in the Mediterranean area 
(see chapter 1). 
Figures point to the crucial role played by Sicily as one of the main arrival places for 
undocumented migrants (see Frontex, nda; UNHCR, 2018b and 2018c). Also, the 
tendency has been that of a dramatic decrease of these figures in 2018 for a number 
of factors that include a structural reduction connected to the absorption of the flow 
coming from Syria, the closing of the Italian harbours to non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and specific agreements concluded with the Libyan authorities 
that have reinforced the gatekeeping in the Northern African country, even though with 
major human rights concerns (see Walsh and Horowitz, 2017 and Kingsley, 2018). 
Moreover, such decrease was associated with a rise in numbers on other routes 
(especially to Spain, see Frontex, nda, ndb and ndc; Ministry of Interior, 2018; UNHCR, 
2018a and 2018c). 
Academic and grey literature (as well as interviewees speaking on this point) 
acknowledge how all these migration flows in the Mediterranean Sea are connected, 
to different extents and in different ways, to migrant smuggling (see paragraphs 1.2. 
and 1.3. Cf. also Aloyo and Cusumano, 2018, pp. 12–14; De Bruycker et al., 2013; 
Fargues and Bonfanti, 2014 and Pastore et al., 2006). 
Moving to what happens on the ground, upon arrival of smuggled migrants, there are 
clearly a number of different provisions that regulate this. However, the way in which 




say, depending on the situation, the place and the moment. This can happen for 
several reasons – or their combination – such as structural reasons coming from the 
institutional setting, discretion of street-level bureaucrats and the logics followed in 
their agency (see above). 
This chapter reports several cases where local practices show a substantial degree of 
freedom in the agency of local practitioners, discussing the reasons for it (the why 
questions recalled in chapter 2) and how such agency can essentially ‘make policies’, 
either directly or indirectly, thus activating bottom-up dynamics. Given the mainly 
interview-based nature of this chapter (see again chapter 2), its whole organisation 
and structure is based on the data coming from the very interviews.  
The contrast of migrant smuggling, consistently with the operational definition and the 
overall analysis of chapter 1, is read through three different lenses, i.e. prevention, 
repression and protection (of smuggled migrants27). The last two appear to acquire 
special importance when addressing the on the ground dimension, according to 
several interesting examples of such agency patterns which emerged throughout the 
interviews.  
Based on the data coming from the interviews, and in line with the methodological 
approach (see chapter 2), the narrative is organised around four different arenas, 
according to the type of actor: (a) judicial, (b) law enforcement, (c) local government 
and (d) non-institutional. Consistently with the overall focus of the chapter, the first two 
arenas are more specifically concerned with repression, the last two with protection. 
Reception- and asylum-related agency shall be addressed separately in section 4.2.4., 
as it cross-cuts different arenas. 
 
4.2.1. The judicial arena 
Some of the most relevant and widespread examples of agency on the ground come 
from the judiciary sector, and for this very reason is seems convenient to start the 
analysis by addressing this type of actor. It should be noted from the beginning that, 
                                                          
27 Generally, protection is de facto perceived as a secondary objective in addressing migrant smuggling, 
in spite of its importance. Consider, in particular, a comparative reading between the Smuggling Protocol 




even though the judiciary encompasses different governance levels (see the following 
chapters, and in particular chapter 7), it was decided to address it mainly as a form of 
local agency, as a typical example of norm interpretation and implementation on the 
ground, on case-by-case basis, even if within a national institution and notwithstanding 
the broader effects that this agency can generate at different levels (see paragraphs 
4.4. and 4.5.).  
As explored in chapter 3, migrant smuggling is considered an offence under Italian 
(and EU) criminal law (Article 12 Consolidated Immigration Act, TUI, i.e. the so-called 
‘facilitation offence’) and the repression (i.e. the tackling of the supply side) of the 
phenomenon very much depends on the effectiveness of the response from judicial 
and law enforcement authorities. The cases presented here, on the basis of a logical 
and relevance (according to interviewees) criterion, show how such response can vary 
significantly and have, in turn, an impact which goes beyond the single case 
addressed.  
As the prosecutors and lawyers interviewed explained, one of the main issues to be 
dealt with by the judiciary, as soon as the routes from Libya became the most relevant 
ones in 2013-14, had to do with the new situation of search and rescue operations 
undertaken outside Italian territorial waters (SIC_1, September 2018; JUD_1, 
September 2018): would in this case Italy have jurisdiction over alleged smugglers? 
Case law related to this aspect can be an insightful example of the wide scope of local 
agency. And in this study it contributes to show how Italian courts stated their 
jurisdiction, following the line of reasoning of the Prosecutor of Catania in one of the 
first cases dealing with this issue. Such view of the prosecutor’s office was not 
supported by the local court in the preliminary proceedings but was eventually 
accepted by the Court of Cassation, which overturned the decision, stating that “the 
behaviour implemented in extraterritorial waters is ideally connected to the one brought 
about in territorial waters, where the action of the rescuers in the final part of the causal 
sequence can be defined as the action of an autore mediato, forced to take action in 
order to avoid a greater damage”. Here the rescue is “artfully stimulated after putting 
in severe danger the migrant, instrumentally exploited” (Court of Cassation, 2014). It 




become enforceable within the whole Italian territory and has guided other courts in 
dealing with this issue28. 
By contrast, this extension of the jurisdiction is not applied by the judiciary for the 
misdemeanour of “illegal entry and stay into the State territory” (Article 10-bis TUI), 
which is not punished if the SAR operation takes place outside territorial waters. On 
the one side, such a difference can be explained from a legal point of view, since, in 
case of misdemeanours such as the one under article 10-bis TUI, the mere attempt 
cannot be punished (Court of Trapani, 2016 and Court of Cassation, 2016). However, 
as one lawyer interviewed interestingly noted, there is also a factual advantage coming 
from this for the judiciary: avoiding to formally investigate smuggled migrants under 
article 10-bis TUI allows the officers acting on behalf of the prosecutor’s office to 
question them straight after the rescue takes place and without them needing 
assistance from a lawyer (SIC_1, September 2018).  
At a glance, these dynamics might be perceived as the mere application of law, such 
as one of the prosecutors interviewed stated (JUD_1, September 2018). But it should 
actually be noticed that: 
1. The judicial process is never a mere application of the law, since it always 
entails a certain degree of interpretation, especially in controversial and 
innovative cases, which leads to some sort of on-the-ground policy-making 
through judicial activism (cf. Anaya, 2014, where the case of judicial activism in 
Italian courts in a civil rights issue – namely same-sex couples – is explored and 
the whole issue of judicial activism in contemporary Italy is framed29);  
                                                          
28 Unlike in the common law systems, verdicts of the Italian supreme court are solely binding for the 
case in question. First and second stages courts tend however to follow precedents, as, also in this 
specific issue, other verdicts considered show.  
29 “Over the past several years, the evolving role of the Italian judiciary as policy-shaper and policymaker 
has become a topic of interest for scholars (Marmo 2007; Pederzoli and Guarnieri 1997a, 1997b). 
Although the increasing importance of court decisions and the role that they play in the formulation of 
public policy is one of the major trends characterising contemporary democracies (Tate 1995; Vallinder 
1995), the degree to which judicial activism has manifested in Italy is arguably unique (Pederzoli and 
Guarnieri 1997b). In Italy, the rise in judicial activism is related to what Jürgen Habermas and others 
have described as a crisis of legitimation (Plant 1982). When the authority of legislatures, presidents, 
prime ministers, civil servants and other political actors is undermined and the political process is 
deadlocked or otherwise blocked, the courts provide an alternative avenue for the formulation of policy 
choices. Judicial activism in Italy in this case is no doubt largely a response to the failure of the legislative 




2. This leads to practical, remarkable consequences, in term of criminal and 
migration policies (extending the criminalisation of smugglers, limiting that of 
migrants), not necessarily in line with the positions of the policy-makers (which 
shall be further discussed below and in the following chapters), as well as for 
investigative purposes, since migrants are questioned without a lawyer, not 
being investigated for any offence (see above).  
The proactive role of judicial actors at a local level is further demonstrated by the 
decision of a prosecutor’s office to release some guidelines for the deputy prosecutors 
and for the law enforcement agencies on the above issues (as well as on some others), 
in order to provide precise directives on the actions to be taken and homogenise the 
behaviour within the district jurisdiction (JUD_1, September 2018).  
The so-called ‘exoneration clause for distress’ that can be applied, leading to drop 
charges, has become equally important in the activities of the judiciary. It is not 
uncommon, indeed, that those eventually accused of migrant smuggling (for steering 
the boat or using the compass or the satellite phone to give directions to the skipper or 
call the rescues) are in reality migrants forced to hold these duties at the time of 
boarding for the Mediterranean crossing (SIC_1, September 2018; JUD_1, September 
2018; SIC_3, October 2018; JUD_2, October 2018). More about the nature of these 
very peculiar unwanted or “alleged” smugglers – as they are called in the 
#OPENEUROPE project report named “Alleged smugglers: the invisible victims of 
human smuggling” (Oxfam Italia, Borderline Sicilia Onlus and Tavola Valdese, 2016) 
– will be said throughout this chapter and further in the research. One member of the 
judiciary reported of a case – one of the first concerning sea smuggling from Libya to 
Sicily – where a broader interpretation of the exoneration clause was proposed in the 
preliminary stage proceeding, being rejected, though, in the second stage and 
eventually also by the Court of Cassation (JUD_2, October 2018)30.  
Judges had then to comply with a more restrictive interpretation, which left some of 
them with some sense of frustration, as reported by a judge, since they know that these 
‘alleged smugglers’ are victims themselves of this system, but the supreme court held 
                                                          
30 Remarkably, in the same period, the Court of Messina stated in two different proceedings that “it has 
to be excluded that [the accused persons were] entrusted with the control over the boat in a casual and 
extemporaneous way”, since “it is not plausible that the [criminal] organisation gave to inexpert subjects 




a different opinion (JUD_2, October 2018). Notably, one of the lawyers interviewed 
somehow supported this perspective, explaining how the very judicial proceedings – 
independently on the final verdict – clearly show how a wide majority of the smugglers 
arrested in Italy are indeed “alleged” or “forced” ones (SIC_3, October 201831). 
Other two cases of relevant judicial agency on the ground, connected with the 
interpretation of actors, have to do with two opposite situations, involving the NGOs 
operating in the Mediterranean and the Minister of Interior. 
The first case refers to the investigations that, between 2017 and 2018, were started 
on the role of the NGOs working in search and rescue (SAR) operations in the 
Mediterranean Sea. They were accused, in different proceedings, by the prosecutor’s 
offices of Catania, Palermo, Ragusa and Trapani, of being part of the smuggling 
system, de facto facilitating the illegal entry of migrants into Italy and even of being in 
direct contact with smugglers in Libya (Scavo, 2018). Throughout the last months of 
2018 and the first ones of 2019 new proceedings were opened, also involving the 
Prosecutor’s Office of Agrigento, but at the time of writing none of these proceedings 
has led to an indictment and most of them, including the most remarkable one in 
Catania, were dismissed (Court of Ragusa, 2018; Marsala, 2019; Open, 2019 and 
Scavo, 2018), even at direct request of the prosecutors (see, among others, 
Prosecutor’s Office of Palermo, 2018). 
Without entering the field of legal and judicial analysis, the core element to be noticed 
is the way in which actors’ interpretation on the ground led to (or fit into or reinforced) 
the criminalisation of humanitarian actors (Carrera et al., 2018a and Cusumano and 
Gombeer, 2018). Although this has not had any concrete penal consequence so far, it 
has definitely had a strong impact in terms of policies both directly (de facto limiting 
and discouraging NGOs SAR activities, as explained by NGO_5, May 2019) and 
indirectly, namely on the Italian and EU political debate and policy-making dimension, 
as shall be seen in the next chapters. Notably, such effects did not seem to have been 
eliminated, or even mitigated, by the dismissal decisions, most likely also in the light 
                                                          
31 This terminology will be further used in the research in inverted commas to refer to these specific 
cases. When the expression alleged smuggler is meant in the broader meaning of someone accused of 




of the parallel anti-NGO game played in parliamentary committees and other 
institutions (see Open, 2019 and paragraphs 5.2.1. and 5.3.3.).  
The second case has to do with another remarkable investigation. This took place 
against the Minister of Interior Matteo Salvini, for having delayed the disembarkation 
of migrants from a ship of the Italian coast guard (the so-called ‘Diciotti case’). This 
case provides another example of judicial interpretation, involving both the 
Prosecutor’s Office and of the Court of Catania (having reached the stage of indictment 
request, see Senate of the Republic, 2019). This did not lead to any penal 
consequence for the accused, for the Senate did not authorise the indictment of 
Minister Salvini (see paragraph 5.2.1.), but it nevertheless had a very strong political 
impact and consequences, not so much directly as leading to policy-making on the 
ground, but rather indirectly, as a bottom-up dynamic into the national level. This whole 
case is considered in more detail in chapter 5, particularly in terms of the effects 
produced on the national policy-making. 
Lastly and residually, the judicial arena can also play some role in purely protection 
matters, especially when unaccompanied minors are concerned: a very interesting 
example of agency was reported by NGO_4, October 2018: s/he explained how the 
choice of certain procedural tools by the Juvenile Court, even going beyond the letter 
of the law, can be particularly significant in order to deepen the integration of minors 
victims of smuggling. This last example can be of particular interest also in the light of 
the overall discourse on the victimisation of smuggled migrants conducted in chapter 
1. 
 
4.2.2. The law enforcement arena 
In the repression dimension, additional key actors are law enforcement and border 
guard agencies. In this regard, some studies tend to stress the possibility to read their 
agency in connection with migration policies through the lenses of administrative 
discretion, at least partially:  
[P]olice re-locate borders previously set by law and re-define the mechanisms of 
inclusion through their discretionary power. (…) Some argue police officers behave 




decisions (Lipsky 1980). Yet, the police cannot exercise total discretion, as they 
represent an institution inserted into a web of powers (Fabini, 2017, p. 50).  
Some of the findings of this research confirm the applicability, albeit limited, of this 
framework to police officers, in particular in two cases: 
1. Throughout the investigations in migrant smuggling cases: SIC_1 (September 
2018) in particular reported, based on his/her experience as defence lawyer, 
that in the questioning of witnesses – i.e. smuggled migrants – wide discretion 
is applied by law enforcement as to whether to ask them if the alleged smuggler 
was forced to take control over the boat or not. S/he explained that this is, 
indeed, a key-question that sometimes is asked and sometimes not, with very 
relevant consequences for the start of the investigation. If one thinks about the 
tiredness, disorientation and confusion of smuggled migrants and alleged 
smugglers at their arrival, it becomes even clearer how important it is to ask the 
‘right’ questions, since it cannot be expected that they be particularly lucid and 
quick-thinking at that moment. 
2. Some of the interviewees also referred to a wide degree of discretion in the 
processes connected to the release of the residence permit, not only at the time 
of the process, but also for the documents requested of the migrants, that could 
vary according to the specific case. This particular aspect can arguably be seen, 
in a comprehensive approach, as a component of the effort to ensure rights and 
protection to smuggled migrants. 
Noticeably, however, the interviewed police officers denied any degree of discretion in 
their action (LAW_1, October 2018; LAW_2, October 2018; LAW_3, November 2018), 
if not in those cases, such as the release of the residence permit, where norms are 
“not rigid” and should be interpreted with “good sense” (LAW_3, November 2018). 
In any case, all local actors tend to agree on the importance of investigations and trials 
as a key element in the response to migrant smuggling and on the relevance of 
practical action, beyond policies. Positions are quite diverse, though, and even 
contradictory in some cases. 
On the one side, lawyers and NGOs stress how some practices jeopardise the rights 




respect of the guarantees provided by law. One lawyer interviewed, for example, 
explained how quite often the lack of preparation or even the prejudices of court-
appointed lawyers as well as language barriers may represent a concrete danger for 
the alleged smuggler (SIC_3, October 2018). 
On the other side, members of the judiciary see the action of NGOs as particularly 
critical (even if not necessarily going as further as the prosecutor’s offices of Agrigento, 
Catania, Palermo, Ragusa and Trapani), showing how, since NGOs started getting 
involved in SAR operations, the number of cases against smugglers dramatically 
dropped because of their lack of preparation in collecting evidence (JUD_1, September 
2018).  
JUD_1 (September 2018) also shared figures related to the relation between the 
number of disembarkations and that of the persons arrested: in SAR operations 
conducted by border guards the average number of people arrested was 2.5 (2015) 
and 3.3 (2016) for each disembarkation. In the case of SAR operation led by NGOs, 
these numbers dropped to 1 (2015) and 0.4 (2016) persons arrested/disembarkation. 
However, this conclusion was partly challenged by a high-rank law enforcement officer 
investigating on migrant smuggling, who acknowledged how this is not always the case 
and, on the contrary, NGOs can be also very useful (LAW_1, October 2018). 
Again, NGOs seem to be particularly problematic and divisive also among 
practitioners, due to their very existence and for falling outside any institutional 
hierarchy. Moreover, what happens on the ground has important consequences also 
at a national level: this is the case of the 2017 Code of conduct, which tried, among 
other things, to extend a law enforcement and border protection logic onto the action 
of humanitarian actors (see section 5.3.2.).  
Another interviewee, a law enforcement officer with directive functions, strongly 
criticised the behaviour of smuggled migrants, alleging that “legal ways to come to Italy 
exist” and “not necessarily one has to resort to illegality” and further declaring that s/he 
does “not really agree” on the assertion that it is also the insufficiency of legal ways to 
migrate to Italy that produce smuggling (LAW_2, October 2018. This last aspect is 
more lightly supported also by LAW_3, November 2018). This is important not only 
because it made reference to the agency of migrants – with a negative connotation 




the perspective of law enforcement, the idea of a demand-supply model of migrant 
smuggling and the whole approach of the smuggling spectrum (see chapter 1). 
A last feature in the proactive role of law enforcement officers (which is shared also by 
the judiciary) is an effort to ensure the highest degree of information sharing and 
cooperation, also through informal channels and beyond what is established in 
policies. In such perspective, Operation Sophia, Europol, Frontex, the International 
Organization for Migration were referred to as some of the more significant tools/actors 
to ensure this kind of cooperation (LAW_1, October 2018; LAW_2, October 2018). 
 
4.2.3. The local government and non-institutional arenas 
As was already highlighted at the beginning of the chapter, data related to local agency 
to fight migrant smuggling seems to point quite clearly towards the repression side, 
and therefore it is not surprising that such an important role is played by those 
responsible for the law enforcement and administration. However, actors that would 
technically be outside the anti-smuggling activities stricto sensu still play a very 
important role in the light of their action in the migration field, especially in connection 
with the need of protecting and assuring human conditions and rights to (smuggled) 
migrants. It is the case of local government and agencies and organisations involved 
in the reception and asylum system. 
First of all, local governments have a central role in the reception of migrants upon 
arrivals (see also chapter 3). When Mediterranean migration became particularly heavy 
in 2013-14, they had to deal with a number of issues related to the organisation of the 
“arrival mechanism” at the harbours, in a situation where there was a lack of planning 
and a lot of efforts were left to city administrations (SIC_2, October 2018). When the 
situation became more structured, both in terms of migration flows, SAR operations 
and reception system on the territory, the overall coordination of the disembarkation 
activities was taken over by the Prefettura, the local office of the central government, 
under the direct control of the Ministry of Interior. In this new situation, local 
governments’ presence at the harbours had mainly to do with (a) humanitarian and 
welfare activities, also through the municipality welfare system, and (b) the protection 
and management of unaccompanied minors, whose responsibility falls to the mayor 




Former deputy mayors for migration of two Sicilian major cities both stressed the 
importance of this activity, in particular in terms of “bringing humanity” to a place – the 
Italian border – where the securitisation wave has been dramatic. This has had a 
substantial impact not only on the experience of smuggled migrants, but also on other 
actors, such as in the story of a high-rank police officer who was so much affected by 
this experience and the way how it was dealt with by the local government, that he 
dared to say: “all this is unacceptable, we need to open our borders” (SIC_4, October 
2018).  
The role of municipalities, though, has been waning in the last months, with a more 
repressive and securitised environment, more centrality of law enforcement, also in the 
case of unaccompanied minors (SIC_2, October 2018). Notably, in one Sicilian major 
city an overturning of the engagement in migration after local elections and the change 
in government was also noted (NGO_4, October 2018). 
However, local governments – and mayors in particular – can still be particularly 
important in terms of symbolic power and networking (NGO_1, October 2018; SIC_2, 
October 2018; NGO_2, October 2018). Mayors have been involved in processes of 
advocacy, led by examples, such as in the case of the campaign against the decision 
of the Minister of Interior to close Italian harbours to NGOs ships involved in SAR 
operations32 or, more recently, the stances taken against the Security Decree (NGO_1, 
October 2018; SIC_2, October 2018; SIC_4, October 2018; NGO_4, October 2018) or, 
going even further, with the public support to Mediterranea – Saving Humans, the SAR 
and advocacy operation launched by Italian left-wing movements, parties and 
associations. 
As for the non-institutional arena, this is also quite interesting but it will mostly be 
explored in 5.3.2. and 6.3.2., i.e. the sections which deal with the horizontal dimension 
of MLG (see chapter 2), having to do with the way in which dynamics originating by 
non-institutional actors affect policy-making. However, in this paragraph one can and 
should recall that, besides national and EU institutions, local authorities can also be 
targeted in advocacy: a process which is normally considered easier and more 
                                                          
32 One NGO officer highlighted that this is even more remarkable, since this would entail more 
responsibility for the mayor and the local government more work as they would need to ensure the 




successful in terms of result (NGO_1, October 2018), even though, also in this case, 
much depends from the preferences of the recipient (NGO_3, October 2018), as the 
example of the overturning of the approach of one municipality recalled above shows 
(NGO_4, October 2018). In any case, interviewees tended to agree that local 
authorities normally show more awareness and are more keen to be influenced 
(NGO_3, October 2018; NGO_4, October 2018). 
 
4.2.4. Reception and asylum: ancillary agency 
Lastly, a couple of interesting agency examples also come from the reception and 
asylum systems, although they are not at the core of the anti-smuggling policies, but 
still connected to them, as outlined in the operational definition of migrant smuggling 
in chapter 1. Given the ancillary nature of these examples so as to understand anti-
smuggling agency patterns on the ground, they will be addressed as a whole, 
combining elements coming from different arenas.  
All the NGOs officers interviewed, who were directly involved in the reception system, 
confirmed how different theory and practice are from one another, explaining that 
officers’ discretion is very wide and therefore every single reception centre, project and 
procedure is a unique story. A clear example of that is the discrepancy between what 
is on paper and what actually happens as for the time spent in different centres at 
different stages, where mainly cooperatives, the Ministry of Interior and the local 
authorities are concerned. But the same patterns of discretion apply also for the 
necessary time to obtain a residence permit or citizenship, which should be the same 
in the whole country but it is different according to the city (NGO_4, October 2018) and 
where a key discretional role is played by the local Questura (the central police station). 
Also, some reported a reduction in guarantees for smuggled victims, migrants and 
asylum seekers – at the local agents’ discretion – such as in the case of the number 
of components of the asylum commission, sometimes composed of only one person, 
with the asylum seeker’s consent, as s/he is not aware of his/her rights or simply 
because s/he is not in the position to defend them (NGO_4, October 2018). This 
reinforces the conclusion of NGO_3 (October 2018) on the attitude of some migrants 
– even victims of smugglers – not to denounce irregularities in the reception and 




an aspect which in turn can become very important in terms of guarantees and right 
protection. 
 
4.3. Why do actors behave in a certain way? Rationality, appropriateness and 
institutional constraints 
The overall picture described above leads to reaffirm the importance of local agency 
in order to understand what happens on the ground in addressing migrant smuggling. 
The reasons why local agency assumes the characteristics discussed (and different 
from how policies are on paper) can be attributed to two different sets of explanations, 
moving along the continuum between institutions and agency, consistently with the 
new institutionalist theoretical approach chosen. 
The first type of explanation, lying on one extreme of the continuum, is structural, i.e. 
stresses how local agency is strongly influenced (if not determined, in some cases) by 
the structure of the system, leading to an outcome which is different from how it would 
be supposed on paper (cf. Olsson, 2016 and, more broadly, March and Olsen, 2011). 
First of all, structural reasons have to do with the allocation of resources and personnel 
as well as the organisation on the ground, which are deemed to be limited, in particular 
insofar as the reception system is concerned (NGO_3, October 2018; NGO_4, October 
2018). But this explanation includes also those situations in which laws are built without 
considering the situation of the territory (SIC_2, October 2018) or the peculiarities of 
the phenomenon (lawyers criticised the very construction of article 12 TUI as it was 
thought to target only a certain type of smuggler, very different from those who are 
charged now). Another element has to do with the definite hierarchy of certain local 
actors (e.g. the case of Prefettura and Questura), which strongly expose actors on the 
ground to the changes happening at the central level, being an example of that the 
takeover of the Prefetture over municipalities and non-institutional actors at 
disembarkations in the harbours (SIC_2, October 2018; SIC_4, October 2018; NGO_4, 
October 2018). 
This whole scenario is considered partly unwanted and partly wanted by the upper 
governance levels, in order to maintain an emergency situation on the ground with all 




The second set of explanations lies on the other extreme of the continuum and stresses 
the role of the actors, instead, and their freedom to act in a certain way, in the light of 
street-level bureaucracy assumptions and of the principal-agent model (cf. Lipsky, 
1980 and Pollack, 2017). Throughout this analysis several examples of this have 
arisen (and shall be summarised below) and they are readable in the combined 
perspective of logics of consequences and appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2006). 
Here it clearly emerged indeed how in a number of cases none of the two logics could 
stand alone as an explanation per se (even though certain actors would so perceive 
their behaviour or the behaviour of someone else that they reported in the interview). 
Table 4.1. summarises all the cases explored throughout this chapter, defining the 
characteristics of the agency, in the view of the concerned actor, of the interviewee 
and of the researcher. 
 













Actor: LoA – Not discretional, but 
mere application of law 
Interviewee: LoA (judiciary) + LoC 
(lawyers) 
Researcher: Combined logic. 
Legislation already provides the basis 
for jurisdiction, which is possible, 











LoC – Objective is that of a more 
efficient and homogenous procedure 









Combined logic – Perception varies 
according to the interviewed judge. 
As any extensive application of law, it 
implies a certain degree of discretion 




























Actor: LoC – Interpreted with good 
sense 
Researcher: Structural reasons + 






Lawyer Interviewee + researcher: LoC + 
Structural reasons – Prejudices, 
perceived as surplus, lack of 
preparation, language barriers and 









Interviewee + researcher: Structural 
reasons – NGOs not prepared to 
collect evidence. Less clear why they 










Interviewee: LoC – They want to 
maximise their benefits and not wait, 
going thought the flow procedure 
Researcher: LoC + Structural 
reasons – Need/determination to 












Combined logic – Perceived as part 
of their task, positive in terms of 




Municipalities Deputy-Mayor Combined logic – Perceived as part 
of the duties of a local government, 
willingness to actively protect human 




Prefettura Deputy-Mayor Researcher: LoC + Structural 
reasons – Willingness to control the 










LoC – Beyond the duties of the role, 
aim to fight for something deemed 








NGOs LoC + Structural reasons – Lack of 
resources and other structural 
reasons, justification for the existence 
of reception centres and preserve the 
reception system and job roles 





Prefettura Lawyer Interviewee + researcher: LoC + 
Structural reasons – Lack of 









NGOs Interviewee + researcher: LoC – 
Willingness to obtain protection 
and/or right to stay, so attempt to 
avoid any stance against authorities  




Judiciary Lawyer Interviewee + researcher: LoC – Not 
to be discriminated, isolated, blamed 









NGOs Interviewee + researcher: LoC + 
Structural reasons – Partly in the very 
nature of certain acts, partly result of 
political choices of very hierarchised 
institutions, consistently with central 
government policy objectives 
Overturning in 
the engagement 






LoC – Different political perspectives 
and values, clearly shows the 




procedure in a 
Juvenile Court 
Judiciary NGOs Interviewee + researcher: Combined 
logic – Extensive interpretation and 
flexibility on the basis of what law 
allows and values and orientation 
Source: Elaborated by the author 
 




1. Norm implementation concerning migrant smuggling shows a certain degree of 
difference from what the very norms say. This has mainly to do with (a) the 
activity of norms interpretation and application from the judiciary (Marmo, 2007; 
Pederzoli and Guarnieri, 1997a and 1997b) and (b) the stretch of norms on the 
side of municipalities and non-institutional actors (Lipsky, 1980; more broadly 
on the importance of these actors in migration-related governance see Zincone 
and Caponio, 2006);  
2. Structural limitations, especially connected to the allocation of resources, play 
a major role; however, even in these cases, some degree of discretion for the 
actors concerned still applies (cf. Olsson, 2016 and, on the overall 
understanding of the institutions/agency dynamics, see chapter 2);  
3. Generally a hybrid logic is found. In a policy domain where a strict regulatory 
framework coexists with principal-agent or street-level bureaucracy dynamics, 
structural limitations and very sensitive and value system affecting issues, it 
proves difficult to find cases where actions can be explained in terms of pure 
rationality or appropriateness (cf. March and Olsen, 2006);  
4. Judiciary and law enforcement tend to perceive and explain their own actions in 
terms of appropriateness, i.e. they behave in a certain way because this is what 
their role implies. They tend not to be aware of – or to disagree with, such as in 
the case of LAW_1 (October 2018), LAW_2 (October 2018) and LAW_3 
(November 2018) – the existence of a certain degree of freedom they enjoy in 
their agency and how this can be partly driven towards one direction or another 
according to the point of view of the actor. This explains more clearly the 
difference among self-perception, perception of actors and possible 
explanations of agency; 
5. The agency of municipalities is mainly driven by values, ethical and political 
considerations, and actors seem to be perfectly aware of this. Their agency 
tends to go beyond the limits the role would assign to local governments and it 
is based on a combined logic, where in particular the rational choice of the 
actors emerges in order to ensure the protection of certain rights and the 
affirmation of certain values. Their role has tended to diminish, especially in 




be essentially explained by the shift in the government at national level (cf. 
March and Olsen, 2006);   
6. NGOs’ activities seem also to be driven by a combined logic, where rational 
choices emerge – in certain cases even very strategically – with a view to 
obtaining some specific results they are fighting for. 
Furthermore, it was noted that in shaping actor’s preferences and subsequent choices, 
context-related factors seem to play an important role. In particular, interviewees 
tended to stress the general securitising and criminalising approach (SIC_1, 
September 2018; SIC_2, October 2018; SIC_3, October 2018; SIC_4, October 2018; 
NGO_4, October 2018), which in turns influences agency in different contexts. One 
example of that is the case of those members of the judiciary who are ‘discouraged’ to 
take progressive stances, because of the risk of reputation or retaliation 
consequences, either or both inside and outside the legal system, as two lawyers 
interviewed reported (SIC_1, September 2018; SIC_3, October 2018), or for the 
alleged prejudices that sometime court-appointed lawyers have towards their own 
clients (SIC_3, October 2018). 
In this scenario, some institutional actors are even considered to behave quite 
superficially because they consider the work related to migration as a surplus (NGO_3, 
October 2018). This environment can lead to a more general situation in which “you 
can even approve an act such as the Zampa Law33”, which is a quite open and 
progressive piece of legislation, but “the real problem is the applicability of some things. 
That meaning that between approving a normative, a law, and apply it… when it is for 
the good [i.e., to protect migrants], it is almost never applied, but if you ask me whether 
the Salvini Decree [i.e. the Security Decree] was applied, well the answer is yes” 
(NGO_4, October 2018). In this sense, the issue would be not so much to what extent 
norms are applied, but rather what type of norms, in terms of contents and political 
stance, are applied. 
Lastly, as one of the lawyers interviewed stated, there are also conditionings that 
produce effects even if the subject is unaware, at an emotional level (SIC_1, 
September 2018). 
                                                          




4.4. Local agency and bottom-up dynamics: from Sicily to the national and 
supranational level  
As was already mentioned, a second aspect that this chapter seeks to explore has to 
do with the indirect consequences of local agency on anti-smuggling policies, that is 
the way in which local practices influence decision-making dynamics at a national and 
EU level. In other words, the bottom-up dimension of the anti-smuggling policy-making, 
which can take place either or both intentionally (in terms of preference upload, 
information sharing, etc.) or unintentionally, through some sort of reaction in response 
to dynamics taking place on the ground (Caponio and Jones-Correa, 2017 and Zincone 
and Caponio, 2006. See also Pollack, 2009). 
Chapter 1 already showed that migration, asylum and, in our specific case, anti-
smuggling policies, differently from what it could be imagined prima facie, are far from 
being merely top-down shaped: room for the indirect effects and upload of preferences, 
stances and requests coming from the ground exists, instead.  
In order to understand how bottom-up dynamics can nevertheless take place, the same 
arenas previously explored will be considered again. Remarkably, most of the 
examples discussed below have to do with the national level rather than with the EU 
one, showing a more direct connection between different governance levels within the 
same country. However, the impact of the local level on Brussels decision-making is 
not limited to what will be explored in this chapter: other dynamics of information upload 
take place at EU level, but will be considered in chapter 6, consistently with the 
framework delineated in chapter 2, as they mainly take place in the EU institutional 
environment (parliamentary hearings and field visits). Likewise, bottom-up dynamics 
taking place in the national institutional environment – i.e. parliamentary hearings, part 
of the action of intermediate bodies (see below) and the indirect consequence of 
judicial agency on the ground – shall be discussed in chapter 5. 
A first case to explore is that of the judicial arena, considering how the judiciary bears 
a significant role in driving bottom-up change. Some case law related to migrant 
smuggling was already explored in the previous section, stressing interesting 
examples of agency at local level. From those very examples – related to the extension 
of jurisdiction and for the ‘exoneration clause for distress’ inter alia – also the 




the mere judicial policy-making on the ground, indeed, case law can become generally 
applicable if confirmed by the Court of Cassation, insofar as it sets standards that 
would eventually be followed also by other courts (cf. Anaya, 2014 and Farrell and 
Héritier, 2007, cited in Bonjour et al., 2018, p. 416, on the judicialisation of certain 
issues and the subsequent “shadow over policymaking” cast by the judiciary).  
Bottom-up effects in the judicial arena are also connected, as has been seen, to the 
response in terms of policy-making to investigations taking place on the ground, such 
as in the cases of NGOs operating in the Mediterranean Sea and of Minister Salvini 
(see section 5.2.1.). 
One of the interviewed lawyers interestingly argued that some deeper processes could 
start if one went beyond the verdicts, looking at trials evidence, referring in particular 
to the nature and characteristics of those accused of smuggling, far from the ‘ruthless 
criminal’ in any case, as considered in the political debate (SIC_3, October 2018. See 
also the smuggling spectrum in section 1.2.3.). SIC_1 (September 2018) added that, 
should policy-makers actually look at such evidence, they would be much more willing 
to change laws, as they would understand that those who are accused of smuggling 
are not smugglers, actually. 
SIC_3 (October 2018) further stressed how lawyers (being a lawyer him/herself) 
should also feel part of this and make the most in order to win cases and “create 
favourable case law”, as this would determine an overall improvement of human rights 
protection of victims and alleged smugglers who turn out to be innocent. This 
assumption incidentally reinforce the importance of case law in leading to bottom-up 
dynamics.  
Another example, though less visible and less structured, of bottom-up processes was 
referred to by JUD_1 (September 2018) and comes from the relationship between the 
members of the judiciary and the National Anti-Mafia and Anti-terrorism Prosecutor’s 
Office (DNA, from the Italian Direzione Nazionale Antimafia e Antiterrorismo). The DNA 
is in charge of coordinating investigations in different parts of Italy for some specific 
offences, including migrant smuggling. Through frequent and deep coordination 
meeting, reports, etc. members of the judiciary can upload tendencies, challenges, 
recommendations and anything else arising from the work on the ground, in order to 




the formulation of new policies, through the frequent contacts between the DNA, 
ministries and the parliament. In particular, JUD_3 (April 2019) highlighted the 
importance of coordination meetings with the different District Anti-Mafia Prosecutor’s 
Offices (DDAs, from the Italian Direzione Distrettuale Antimafia) in order to share new 
issues and patterns as soon as they come out and, more in general, for information 
sharing, such as in the remarkable case of the meeting of 25 May 2017, discussed in 
more detail in sections 5.2.1 and 6.2.1. 
These processes are further facilitated by established informal networks and mailing 
lists involving judges working on migration, which provide a basic harmonised 
framework and information sharing. This, beyond its relevance in the overall 
coordination process, then reaching the DNA, is clearly helpful to the very activity of 
the judiciary (JUD_1, September 2018).  
The DNA example highlights the importance that intermediate bodies can have in 
some bottom-up processes, especially for actors whose institutional duty is limited to 
a given territory. Another example could involve the local government arena, in 
particular through the Association of the Italian Municipalities (ANCI, from the Italian 
Associazione Nazionale dei Comuni Italiani), where the same dynamics already 
explored in the case of the DNA take place. One former deputy mayor stressed such 
importance (SIC_2, October 2018), in particular for the activation of the Sistema di 
Protezione per Richiedenti Asilo e Rifugiati (SPRAR, Protection System for Asylum-
seekers and Refugees), which is a very advanced component of the reception of 
migrants and protection of victims. Still, another former deputy mayor, in turn, 
explained how the real impact of what happened in ANCI is arguable, since the real 
and main input came from the EU and not from the municipalities (SIC_4, October 
2018). 
According to some, the national level is too much influenced by the EU (SIC_4, October 
2018): for this very reason, municipalities have found it easier to spread dynamics 
horizontally among other cities, rather than insisting on the national level (SIC_2, 
October 2018; SIC_4, October 2018). In practice, instead of allocating time and 
resources to very difficult processes with a high likelihood of failure, some cities have 




moving throughout discretional implementation, rather than trying to change the 
legislative framework.   
Last but not least, in certain cases preference upload processes can also take place 
in the law enforcement arena, contributing to the shape of policies at national level: 
however, this rarely takes the form of legislative acts, rather converging into 
“operational protocols” from the Central Directorate for Immigration and Border Police, 
which are always built on examples, practices and preferences coming from the ground 
(LAW_3, November 2018). 
Concluding this paragraph, two general considerations related to the intermediate 
bodies can be made, contributing to the overall debate on the bottom-up approach to 
migration MLG (Caponio and Jones-Correa, 2017). Firstly, it should be noted that they 
are active not only at a national level but also in the interaction with the EU, this being 
a partial exception (alongside the ones already mentioned and which will be discussed 
in chapter 6) to the limited direct connection ground/EU. Secondly, more in general, it 
should be recalled that for their very intermediate nature, they will be further analysed 
at the other two levels. Whereas in this chapter the focus is placed on the first part of 
the process, i.e. how actors on the ground upload information and practices to these 
intermediate bodies, in the next chapters the focus will be placed on the second part 
of such process, i.e. how the very intermediate bodies bring the uploaded information 
and practices to the policy-makers at a national and supranational level (see Figure 
4.3.). 
 
Figure 4.3. – The analysis of the intermediate bodies 
 




4.5. General considerations  
This chapter sought to offer some introductory insights and explanations concerning 
the agency at local level and its direct and indirect impact on the policy-making against 
the smuggling of migrants. Through this process, the elements needed to answer SQ1 
– i.e. how does the response to migrant smuggling function on the ground and how 
does this contribute to policy-making in this field? – were considered.  
It was shown how different, under certain circumstances, theory and practice can be, 
also highlighting the reasons for this:  
1. Structural reasons embedded in the institutions (see March and Olsen, 1984 
and 2011);  
2. The discretional agency of street-level bureaucracy (Lipsky, 1980), based on 
two distinct and complementary logics (appropriateness and consequence, cf. 
March and Olsen, 2006);  
3. Principal-agent relationship dynamics (Bonjour et al., 2018 and Pollack, 2017).  
In so doing, the perception of the actors involved was also given due attention and 
importance. How and to what extent all these dynamics can lead to shifting processes 
was also considered, with regards to both vertical and horizontal dynamics. In other 
words, it was shown how agency on the ground, particularly deviating from the letter 
of norms, creates de facto policies, in the very moment in which such process takes 
place or through bottom-up dynamics, which could consist in wanted as well as in 
unwanted consequences (see Figure 4.4.). 
Among the main conclusions, it was found that agency is mainly driven by the presence 
of structural factors and by a hybrid logic, including both appropriateness and 
consequence considerations. The importance of values is deemed particularly 
important, especially in the agency of local governments, lawyers and NGOs. In 
bottom-up processes, the role of intermediate bodies proved to be particularly 







Figure 4.4. – Local agency and policy-making 
 
Source: Elaborated by the author 
   
As an introduction to the substantive part of this research, this chapter sought to offer 
a set of points of reflection that will be further elaborated in the next chapters. 
Implementation and evaluation are part of the policy cycle, of course, but preliminary 
findings seem to point in the direction of a limited awareness of this at a policy-making 
level (or that certain requests, albeit based in concrete analyses and experience on 
the ground, are deliberately ignored). In particular clear-cut definitions of and 
approaches to smuggling are challenged in the everyday practice, but they are still in 
place in the EU and Italian frameworks (even though a certain degree of change seems 
to have happened in the last years), with regards to the separation between migrant 
smuggling and the overall migration and asylum framework, the approach to SAR 
operations as well as the connotation and characterisation of smugglers which seems 
to be one of the most critical points today. All of these issues shall be further discussed, 
from other perspectives, in the next chapters. 
A last consideration has to do with a concrete effect that the issues explored in this 
chapter can have. Especially in a period where the political discourse (and policies) 
are becoming day after day more securitising and securitised, the space left to the 
action at local level and in bottom-up dynamics can represent a challenge or an 
opportunity, depending on the point of view and political stance of the reader, but it is 




Chapter 5  
“Between the Mediterranean and Schengen34”: the Italian policy-
making against migrant smuggling 
 
5.1. Introduction 
After exploring the main patterns of agency on the ground and the way in which this 
shapes policies, both directly and indirectly, it becomes important to focus on the 
upper, national level, to understand how policy-making dynamics work here, In so 
doing, this chapter seeks to answer research sub-question (SQ)2: what factors and 
dynamics are relevant to the formulation of policies against migrant smuggling on a 
national level? 
In order to do so, the analytical model outlined in chapter 2 will be applied: this means 
that, first of all, migrant smuggling is going to be framed lato sensu, including in the 
analysis also connected policies (such as undocumented migration and, where 
applicable, asylum and other related policies). Many of the legislative acts outlined in 
chapter 3 will therefore be considered. 
Secondly, the national level will be explored through the ‘multi-level’ (paragraph 5.2.) 
and ‘governance’ (paragraph 5.3.) aspects of the analytical model, also making some 
references to the continuum between institution and agency (layer 1), even though this 
aspect shall be addressed systematically and more in detail in chapter 7.  
Following an essentially narrative-based description of the data gathered, the most 
relevant issues addressed shall be considered from multiple points of view. This, rather 
than constituting an unnecessary repetition, shall make the most of the heuristic 
relevance of the analytical model, making it possible to consider the different 
components of the same phenomenon and to draw comprehensive and in-depth 
conclusions about it. 
                                                          
34 This phrase is inspired by the title of a previous work of the author, originally in Spanish – “La cuestión 
fronteriza en Italia: entre el Mediterráneo y Schengen” – in the volume edited in 2017 by Beatriz Zepeda, 
Fernando Carrión and Francisco Enríquez and titled “El sistema fronterizo global en América Latina: un 




Again, it should be stressed how this differentiation is mostly analytical: therefore, 
elements of ‘governance’ might be in background in the ‘multi-level’ layer and vice 
versa, and the same might happen within the same layer between different arenas. 
Within each section of the different paragraphs, the narrative is relevance-based, 
rather than merely chronological. 
Lastly, an analytical synopsis will conclude the chapter (paragraph 5.4.), highlighting 
those aspects that characterise the policy-making at a national level. This synopsis will 
be recalled and analysed in more depth in the research (namely in chapter 7), in an 
overall approach which will bring together the local, national and supranational levels, 
analysing the institution/agency dynamics across the different levels and also focusing 
on some specific aspects emerged throughout the research. 
 
5.2. Multi-level dynamics 
In the understanding of the policy-making patterns at a national level, the vertical 
dimension of multi-level governance (MLG) is interesting in relation to what happens 
both at a local and at an EU level. 
As was already pointed out in chapter 2, such interaction is analysed beyond the 
different allocation of responsibilities descending from EU treaties and national 
legislation: it has rather to do with the agency of actors among these different levels, 
and with how what happens at a given governance level has an influence on the 
agency of actors situated at other levels, in absence of normative hierarchy. 
In the case of national policies, such influence and interaction is considered in two 
different political spaces: (a) the ‘connection with the ground’ and (b) the 
‘Europeanisation35’ layers. As for the direction of this interaction, in this chapter this 
aspect is considered both from the local and EU level uniquely towards the national 
level (Figure 5.1.). For each layer, the main actors are highlighted, disclosing the main 
patterns and challenges, as well as the substantive issues mostly addressed. 
 
                                                          
35 In this context the term ‘Europeanisation’ is used broadly, in line with Vink and Graziano (2007, p. 7), 




Figure 5.1. – Interaction directions at a national level 
 
Source: Elaborated by the author 
 
5.2.1. Uploading from the ground: intermediate bodies and parliamentary committees 
The impact of the practices taking place on the ground on national policy-making was 
already partly sketched in chapter 4: as widely pointed out in different parts of the 
research, these upload processes can be read and observed from a double 
perspective, and this is exactly what shall be done here, integrating the local 
perspective of chapter 4 with a national one.  
This interaction process mostly has to do with the information exchange and 
preference upload, which take place in arenas where the two levels (or, more precisely, 
actors operating in two levels) meet. In the considered cases, this happens in particular 
in the special committees of the Italian parliament, established with specific 
investigative or in-depth analysis tasks on given subject matters, and in those 
intermediate bodies – National Anti-Mafia and Anti-terrorism Prosecutor’s Office (DNA) 
and the Association of the Italian Municipalities (ANCI) above all – recalled in the 
previous chapter. 
Furthermore, the judiciary also plays an important role, bringing an impact on national 
discourse and policy-making with specific peculiarities that go beyond a mere 
information upload, much like in the other cases considered at the implementation 
level. 
Starting off with the role of the parliamentary committees – as they seem to offer some 
of the most relevant examples over the time frame considered – their interest for 




appears to be crucial. This is particularly the case of special committees such as the 
Parliamentary Committee of Control for the Enforcement of the Schengen Agreement 
(the Schengen Committee), the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry into the reception, 
identification and expulsion system as well as into the migrant detention conditions and 
on the allocated public resources (the Reception Committee) and the Parliamentary 
Committee of Inquiry into Mafia-related and other criminal organisations (the Anti-Mafia 
Committee). They are characterised by a work of in-depth analysis aimed at giving the 
two houses of the parliament a clearer understanding of a given phenomenon and 
thanks to numerous hearings of experts, which provide Members of Parliament (MPs) 
with direct and highly valuable information regarding the implementation of given 
policies. But it is also the case of standing committees, such as in the case of the 
Fourth Standing Committee of the Senate of the Republic (Senate Defence 
Committee). 
Such crucial role was particularly clear throughout the XVII Legislature (2013-2018), 
and specifically in the last two years, in association with the emergence of a strongly 
divisive political debate in Italy on undocumented migration, search and rescue (SAR) 
operations and smuggling. 
The Senate Defence Committee dedicated an ad hoc “Fact-finding inquiry on the 
contribution of the Italian army on the control of migratory flows in the Mediterranean 
Sea and the impact of non-governmental organisation activities”, lasting one month, 
from Session n. 217 of 6 April 2017 to Session n. 236 of 16 May 2017 of the XVII 
Legislature. Throughout the inquiry, the following experts and practitioners were heard: 
Operation Sophia commander-in-chief; representatives of Proactiva Open Arms, SOS 
Méditerranée, Life Boat, Save the children, Doctors without borders, MOAS, Jugend 
Rettet, Sea Watch, Sea Eye; Frontex executive director; law enforcement agencies, 
navy, coast guard officers; Prosecutors of Catania, Siracusa and Trapani. In the 
conclusive report, unanimously approved by the Senate Defence Committee in 
Session n. 236 of XVII Legislature of 16 May 2017, it is acknowledged that “there are 
not any ongoing investigations on non-governmental organisations as such but only 
an investigation of the Prosecutor’s Office of Trapani regarding, among others, single 
persons involved in the operations”. Nevertheless, a recommendation is expressed to 




(Senate of the Republic, 2017, pp. 15–17), in a sort of burden of proof reversal. This 
case is notable, as (a) it represents one of the first examples of a refocus of the political 
debate on SAR-engaged NGOs and (b) it happened before those formal investigations 
on NGOs (which were recalled in the previous chapter) would even start. 
Zooming in on this issue, in special parliamentary committees, key players of these 
hearings were in particular prosecutors working on the aforementioned issues – and 
namely the National Anti-Mafia and Anti-terrorism Prosecutor and the Prosecutors of 
Catania and Catanzaro. Likewise in the Senate Defence Committee, they were able 
(especially the first and the second one, much less the latter) to provide MPs with direct 
information on some of the most urgent, and somewhat controversial, issues, 
including: 
1. The possible risks that humanitarian actors – and namely NGOs leading SAR 
operations – would be punishable under article 12 Consolidated Immigration 
Act (TUI), given the lack of a humanitarian exemption and the creation of de 
facto humanitarian corridors; 
2. The problems arising from the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) 
mandate of EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia, especially in terms of 
investigation and prosecution of smugglers, such as the long-standing issue of 
the possibility to embark Italian law enforcement officers; 
3. The inherent different nature of humanitarian and security operations, with 
different priorities (saving lives vs. fighting criminals) and subsequent 
differences in operational protocols, such as the proximity to the Libyan coasts36 
(on all these aspects see Schengen Committee, XVII Legislature, Session n. 
41, 22 March 2017, Session n. 49, 23 May 2017 and Session n. 50, 31 May 
2017; Senate Defence Committee, XVII Legislature, Session n. 227, 3 May 
2017; Reception Committee, XVII Legislature, Session n. 83, 9 May 2017; Anti-
Mafia Committee, XVII Legislature, Session n. 203, 9 May 2017). 
                                                          
36 In this perspective, the Prosecutor of Catania explained how they managed, in a DNA coordination 
meeting, to slightly change the approach of Operation Sophia, making it move back and avoiding to be 
an alleged pull factor for migrants and smugglers (Schengen Committee, XVII Legislature, Session n. 




The Prosecutor of Catania, Carmelo Zuccaro37, was particularly present. He also often 
expressed his point of view as to the priorities to be addressed with regard to some of 
the aforementioned issues, stressing (a) the need of embarking investigative police on 
NGOs and Operation Sophia ships in order to strengthen the fight against smugglers; 
(b) the importance to focus on high-level smugglers, actually pivotal in the smuggling 
organisation, and not on mere facilitators; (c) the priority to avoid de facto corridors, 
through SAR operations in Libyan territorial waters (Schengen Committee, XVII 
Legislature, Session n. 41, 22 March 2017; Reception Committee, XVII Legislature, 
Session n. 83, 9 May 2017; Anti-Mafia Committee, XVII Legislature, Session n. 203, 9 
May 2017). 
In an era where the migratory debate is so particularly polarised, it does not come as 
a surprise that Prosecutor Zuccaro’s declarations had an enormous impact within the 
very committees (and in the whole political debate afterwards). Here the two main 
trends saw the centre-right coalition supporting Prosecutor Zuccaro’s views and widely 
targeting the NGOs, whereas the centre-left parties (even if the then governing 
Democratic Party to a lesser extent) showed a more critical attitude, asking also for 
further clarifications (see, among others, Schengen Committee, XVII Legislature, 
Session n. 41, 22 March 2017; Senate Defence Committee, XVII Legislature, Session 
n. 227, 3 May 2017). 
Some extracts from the parliamentary debates in plenary session are also useful to 
understand the impact on the overall political discourse, also in terms of the tone of it, 
of the process taking place in the committee hearings in terms of targeting NGO-led 
activities: 
[W]e found out that some of the ships in the Mediterranean Sea, those managed by 
NGO missions, that are provoking a scandal, and it surprises me that the Government 
has not said anything at all. Today there is an inquiry committee opened by the 
Defence Committee, which will highlight how these missions, falsely humanitarian, 
are purely profit-driven missions, aimed at fostering that clandestine migration 
                                                          
37 Since the early months of 2017, the Prosecutor of Catania made himself known nationwide for some 
public and official statements as well as interviews, that focused on possible and alleged connections 
between NGOs and smugglers. As to April 2019, none of the investigated NGOs has been indicted and, 
with the exception of those cases where investigation is still ongoing, all the other ones were dismissed 




business […] that is clearly destabilising not only our country, but Europe as a whole 
(MP Nicola Molteni, LN, Chamber of Deputies, XVII Legislature, Session n. 779, 12 
April 2017). 
These organisations have a very ambiguous role: they work in cahoots with human 
smugglers, reaching Libyan seas, warning people smuggling organisations and 
fostering the illegal activities. Is it possible that no member of the Government have 
read the statements of the Prosecutor of Catania, Mr Zuccaro, in the Schengen 
Committee? (MP Rocco Palese, CoR, Chamber of Deputies, XVII Legislature, 
Session n. 779, 12 April 2017). 
[These are] news reported by all newspapers: if it is indeed true that there exist NGOs 
which work in cahoots with human smugglers and that are in contact with them, once 
this has been ascertained, the Italian Government must immediately interrupt its 
relationships with these organisations and stop funding them (MP Carlo Giovanardi, 
GAL, Senate of the Republic, XVII Legislature, Session n. 795, 29 March 2017). 
The work of the Anti-Mafia Committee appears even richer – though less NGO-
focused. Several issues coming from the experience on the ground (especially through 
hearings and field visits) were acknowledged and became part of the policy 
background information. They include the operational difficulty in the fight against 
smuggling, the overlapping between smuggling and trafficking in persons (TIP) – with 
the possibility of some sort of transformation en route – and the need to think of an 
integrated approach that overcomes such a strict separation. Notably, given the overall 
political climate and some of the issues already considered in chapter 4 as for the 
distance between policy-makers approach and what actually happens on the ground, 
the committee unanimously accepted the view that: (a) smuggled migrants are victims; 
(b) sometimes they have to steer the vessel themselves; (c) the migratory pressure 
itself leads to more business for smugglers and more structured organisations (Anti-
Mafia Committee 2017. See also the smuggling spectrum in section 1.2.3.).  
The question which remains open is to what extent these analyses have led to a 
concrete impact on the national policy-making (cf. Zincone and Caponio, 2006), as will 
be further discussed in the next paragraphs. In parallel, a concern on the basis 
according to which experts are invited to be heard in committees also arises, 




perspective, that the Prosecutor of Catania and his views on the NGOs dominated the 
debate in special committees, in turn reinforcing the echo of such views in the general 
political debate, in spite of other issues supported by stronger evidence. 
A second important arena related to the connection of policy adoption dynamics with 
the agency on the ground is that of intermediate bodies, as was partly already explored 
in the previous chapter. Also in this case, the richest bodies in terms of cases are ANCI 
and DNA (see chapter 4), which act at a national level both institutionally (especially 
through hearings in parliamentary standing and special committees and in ad hoc 
tables, meetings and fora) and through the presence in the general debate. This allows 
them to exercise influence over the public opinion, which makes them quite powerful, 
even if with a clear mandate that limit them from an institutional point of view (ITA_1, 
March 2019; JUD_3, April 2019). 
The role played by the DNA in this layer has mainly to do with the gathering of 
information and expertise, coming mainly (but not exclusively) from the repressive 
activity, towards decision-makers. 
This happens mainly through the issuing of reports, the organisation of coordination 
meetings with the District Anti-Mafia Prosecutor’s Offices (DDAs, which are meant to 
deal with new issues and patterns as soon as they come out, see also chapter 4), ad 
hoc meetings with experts coming from different agencies and institutions and specific 
contacts with the decision-makers, such as the hearings of the National Anti-Mafia and 
Anti-terrorism Prosecutor in parliamentary committees (JUD_3, April 2019) and the 
sharing in those arenas of all the analyses and guidelines realised on migrant 
smuggling (Schengen Committee, XVII Legislature, Session n. 50, 31 May 2017). 
Focusing in particular on these last two points, JUD_3 (April 2019), on the one side, 
expressed the perception of a progressively more limited connection of the DNA with 
decision-makers, proved also by the lack of recent hearings on this subject matter in 
parliamentary committees. 
On the other side, though, the importance of these inter-agencies meetings comes out 
clearly, not only in terms of operational coordination (which would then be marginal at 
this point of the analysis, where the focus is on the policy-making), but also in terms of 
potential information upload processes. This is the case, for example, of an important 




and involved numerous actors such as DDAs, law enforcement agencies, Frontex, 
Eurojust, Europol, EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia, among others. The fact that 
the National Anti-Mafia and Anti-terrorism Prosecutor decided to share the 
proceedings of the meeting with the Schengen Committee (Schengen Committee, XVII 
Legislature, Session n. 50, 31 May 2017) is remarkable as specific case of information 
upload, concerning a very in-depth point of view, shared by several practitioners. 
Indeed, in this 25 May meeting a number of the most critical issues concerning the 
smuggling of migrants into Italy were discussed, with the overall goal to update 
knowledge on the modus operandi of criminal organisations. In such context, the 
National Anti-Mafia and Anti-terrorism Prosecutor thought it important to improve the 
horizontal cooperation between Prosecutors’ Offices and to understand possible 
interferences of NGOs in smuggling and related investigations; the head of 
EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia focused on the value of keeping contacts at high 
level with the Libyan coast guard to facilitate rescue at sea (as well as to invite also the 
head of Libyan police at a follow-up meeting); other actors stressed the “political 
nature” of the problems at hand, the need to focus on big smugglers and not on the 
individual facilitator, the importance of Eurojust’s involvement (JUD_3, April 2019). 
Through these very processes, the DNA was able to provide decision-makers with 
clear and in-depth information on the patterns of migrant smuggling into EU and Italy, 
which, as a national deputy anti-Mafia prosecutor reaffirms (JUD_3, April 2019), takes 
into account: 
1. The actual existence of a plurality of forms of smuggling (in line with the 
smuggling spectrum elaborated in chapter 1); 
2. The extensive horizontal cooperation between the above mentioned institutions 
participating in the meeting;  
3. The cooperation with third countries, both within and outside the EU, such as 
Nigeria, Libya (through an agreement with the Attorney General for judicial 
cooperation and where cooperation can also be important to stop violence in 





4. How the modus operandi of smugglers, within the same central Mediterranean 
route, has changed over the years: until 2013 mother ships were used to 
transport migrants up to the limits of Italian territorial waters. Then, the launch 
of governmental SAR operations first, and NGO-led ones afterwards, 
introduced changes in smuggling dynamics, with the use of smaller vessels that 
would be rescued in high seas. Similarly, also the routes that were followed 
changed, according to changes in policies both in Africa (Tunisia, then Egypt, 
then Libya) and in Europe (see the closing harbours policy below), also showing 
a high reaction and adaptation capacity from smugglers, as confirmed also by 
NGO_1 (October 2018). 
The second intermediate body – ANCI – is rather working to represent, at a central 
level, interests and priorities of the municipalities. Given the municipality limited 
competency in this subject matter, already recalled in chapter 4, ANCI mainly works 
on reception and integration rather than on migration and smuggling policies stricto 
sensu, but it nevertheless plays a central role in the construction of the overall 
migration discourse at a national level and provides an institutional space for the 
upload of local government priorities (ITA_1, March 2019), as, again, pointed out in 
chapter 4. 
To that end, ANCI has used a plurality of institutional arenas, such as the National 
Coordination Table (institutionalised by the Legislative Decree n. 142/2005), i.e. a 
permanent table on migration at Ministry of Interior, representing a “very interesting 
transmission belt” in terms of successful upload processes, but that from 2016 onwards 
has been less frequent. Across-the-board tools, such as the Unified Conference State-
Regions or ad hoc ANCI instruments like the Immigration Committee or the Anti-
trafficking Control Room have also been used (ITA_1, March 2019). 
In fact, TIP (whose importance in a smuggling perspective is widely acknowledged, 
see chapter 1) has represented an ANCI priority: here the national association has met 
the requests coming from local authorities, even if they have progressively reduced the 
efforts at national level in this area, in which commitment is still very variable, 
depending on administrators’ sensitivity (ITA_1, March 2019). The same officer 
recalled how the technical role of ANCI in this area used to be important, also stressing 




most notable challenges, it was mentioned that this issue is dealt with by the Equal 
Opportunities Department at the Presidency of the Council of Ministers (and not by the 
Ministry of Interior, as the overall migration policies). 
Notably, no coordination has taken place at ANCI level among those cities at the 
frontline for disembarkations, even though this situation entails a high level of 
complexity in terms of vertical relationship between national and local level (see 
chapter 4). Also, those mayors who took a clear stance against the closing harbours 
policy did not try to invest ANCI with this issue, considering it unlikely to bring any 
substantive change and it falling outside the mandate of the institution (ITA_1, March 
2019), given also its ‘technical’ nature, therefore showing some sort of non-suitability 
for dealing with highly politicised and divisive issues. 
However, ITA_1 (March 2019) made clear that the role of ANCI has been very 
important in informing the policy-making in migration-related issues, though with a 
fluctuating impact. In the past ANCI’s voice was definitely heard, whereas today the 
situation is much more complex (e.g. the same interviewee, who is an ANCI officer, 
referred that the National Coordination Table gathered only once in the first nine 
months of the Conte government). 
The officer explained that often, for policy-makers, “at the end of the day, reality matters 
little, so technique is also a little bit snubbed” and, for example, alleged connections 
between migratory flows and criminality supersede what data say about it (ITA_1, 
March 2019). This gives new centrality both to ANCI and to the bureaucratic structure 
of ministries: on the one side, indeed, ANCI tries to fill the existing information gap, 
being its activities very much evidence-based, whereas ministry bureaucrats do a 
crucial work in terms of consistency, logic. They continue to be the same, no matter 
which government is in power, and are aware of how important is “to work very much 
with us [ANCI], because we are the only ones able to bring the real, concrete needs of 
the territories”. And even if it is very difficult to stay grounded in reality in this field and 
not even scientific and technical issues are fully neutral, the overall idea is that by sort 
of keeping a low profile is still possible to work effectively (ITA_1, March 2019). 
Lastly, the role of the judiciary (cf. Marmo, 2007) in facilitating upload processes from 
the implementation level to the national policy-making level also deserves some 




of a norm or its impact (as those cases considered in chapter 4), but where their agency 
has some substantial impact on the national policy discourse and making. The judicial 
proceeding against the Minister of Interior Matteo Salvini, related to the so-called 
‘Diciotti case’ are emblematic of this.  
The case – which was quickly mentioned in the previous chapter and which will also 
be analysed in relation to other arenas, being emblematic of the overall complexity and 
cross-cutting nature of this field – has to do with the decision of the Ministry of Interior 
to delay the assignment of a place of safety (POS) for the disembarkation of 177 
migrants, rescued in a SAR operation by the ship of the Italian coast guard “Ubaldo 
Diciotti” in August 2018, by five days (Barone, 2019 and D’Amato, 2018). Considering 
that these events were the result of the conduct of the Minister himself, the Court of 
Catania – notwithstanding a request for dismissal presented by Prosecutor Zuccaro – 
decided to indict Minister Salvini for ‘aggravated kidnapping’ and, according to the 
Italian law, requested the Senate to authorise the indictment38.  
Minister Salvini, according to the judges, “acting as Minister” and “in breach of the 
international conventions on maritime rescue” did not allow “without any reasonable 
ground the Department for Civil Freedom and Immigration in charge […] to assign in a 
timely manner a place of safety”. Such a decision “halted the disembarkation 
procedure of migrants, so consciously determining the unlawful deprivation of their 
personal freedom, forcing them to remain in critical psycho-physical conditions on 
board the ship ‘U. Diciotti’, docked in Catania harbour from 23:49 of 20 August until 
late night of 25 August” (Senate of the Republic, 2019, p. 49. See also Barone, 2019). 
Leaving aside any consideration related to the indictment itself, which would lead to a 
criminal law analysis falling outside the scope of this research, what appears of clear 
interest here is the effects that this judicial decision had on the national policy-making 
                                                          
38 This procedure is laid down in Article 96 of the Italian Constitution, which states: “The President of the 
Council of Ministers and the Ministers, even if they resign from office, are subject to normal justice for 
crimes committed in the exercise of their duties, provided authorisation is given by the Senate of the 
Republic or the Chamber of Deputies, in accordance with the norms established by Constitutional Law” 
(unofficial English translation retrieved from https://www.senato.it). Constitutional Law n. 1/1989 states 
at Article 5 that “the authorisation provided for in Article 96 of the Constitution is entitled to the House 
that the persons [object of the proceeding] belong to”, which in the case of Minister Salvini is the Senate. 
This very Constitutional Law further clarifies, at Article 9(3), that the House must ascertain whether the 
accused “acted for the safeguard of a constitutionally relevant interest of the State or in pursuit of a 




process. This took place in terms of (a) policy focus and (b) choice of policy instruments 
(besides the expected impact on the political debate, in particular in the parliamentary 
arena, which will be further explored below). 
Notwithstanding the decision of the Senate to deny the indictment authorisation 
(Senate of the Republic, XVIII Legislature, Session n. 100, 20 March 2019), the Diciotti 
case made indeed clear to the decision-makers the risks of such an approach to the 
management of SAR operations and disembarkations, both in judicial and public 
opinion terms. 
Since the Conte Government took office in June 2018, Minister Salvini – leader of the 
far right party Lega Nord, whose political discourse has focused on strict migration 
control and xenophobic stances since the beginning (see chapter 2) – made the issues 
of closing harbours and having a stricter, Rome-led control over disembarkations after 
SAR operations some of his priorities. 
Between June 2018 and January 2019 (when the Court of Catania requested the 
indictment authorisation to the Senate), several cases regarding the denial or delay of 
the docking authorisation were top news in Italian newspapers and polarised the 
political debate. In the vast majority of cases such episodes concerned NGO ships 
(Aquarius in June and August 2018, Open Arms in December 2018, Sea Watch 3 and 
Sea Eye in December 2018/January 2019, see Shah Povia, 2019). Few exceptions 
were made with some timid attempts at intervening in government-led operations, such 
as in the case of the disembarkation of 106 migrants in Messina from the Irish navy 
ship “Samuel Beckett” in July 2018, after which the Minister of Interior declared that he 
would have urged a change in the mandate of Operation Sophia, considering such 
disembarkations in Italy unacceptable (Albanese, 2018); or, again in July 2018, an 
early case involving the Italian coast guard ship “Ubaldo Diciotti”, halted in the harbour 
of Trapani again by a decision of Minister Salvini (RaiNews, 2018a). 
The Diciotti case of August 2018 was actually the first case where a strong stance was 
adopted by the Minister of Interior towards a government-led operation. 
During the following months, little changed in the action of the Italian government on 
the harbour issue, which was characterised by the persistence of a policy mainly based 




entailed, in expert opinions, problems of competence and legitimacy (Tommasone, 
2019a). 
But the long effects of the Diciotti case and of the connected judicial proceeding against 
Matteo Salvini had concrete impact on that. Indeed, on the one side, in terms of policy 
focus, after the Diciotti case, the target of the closing harbour over the period 
considered returned to be NGOs, arguably in the light of the very understanding of the 
different consequences arising when government-led operations are involved, in the 
absence of grounded reasons for that and in protracting this for numerous days. 
On the other side, policy instruments changed drastically (cf. Capano and Lippi, 2017). 
Starting in March 2019, in the very days in which the Senate denied the indictment 
authorisation, Minister Salvini issued a number of ‘directives’ (see chapter 3 on the 
legal nature of these acts), addressing either in general terms or on a case-by-case 
basis the situation of NGOs, providing specific instructions to law enforcement and 
border control agencies (Minister of Interior, 2018a, 2018b and 2018c). It appeared 
then that the political and verbal approach previously chosen was considered no longer 
effective and suitable, opening up to possible judicial consequences (even in the lack 
of a written policy directive), and where, on the contrary, the absence of such a clear 
statement could become counterproductive. 
 
5.2.2. Europeanisation and its (unwanted) consequences 
Considering the other between-the-level interaction within this MLG approach, it 
becomes important to focus on the impact of EU politics on the national policy-making 
related to the smuggling of migrants. The issue at stake is not the impact of EU 
legislation on the national one, which is taken for granted in the light of the 
commitments of Italy as a Member State (MS) of the European Union (see chapter 3). 
Rather, it is interesting to understand how the EU influences the Italian policy-making, 
in terms of the political process taking place in Brussels and not merely in terms of the 
actual legislation arising from it (cf. Vink and Graziano, 2007). 
Firstly, the overall EU policy-making and political discourse have an impact on the 




This is the case of the missed reforms, such as those concerning the Common 
European Asylum Framework (CEAS) or the Facilitators Package, which left Italian 
decision-makers with some policy problems open, related, for example, to the 
relocation mechanisms in the Dublin III Regulation (as will be considered in chapter 6) 
or to the alleged ‘pull factors’ entailed in the Qualification Directive and in the Reception 
Directive, where the persisting differences in the grounds for asylum and in the 
reception conditions can and, allegedly, are considered throughout the smuggling 
process for ‘asylum-shopping’ (EUR_1, March 2019). Something similar happened 
with the missed reform of the Facilitators Package, which then left Italy with the 
unsolved issues of the material benefit and humanitarian exemption (see chapters 3, 
6 and 7). 
This reinforces the narrative, particularly relevant in the political debate in the last 
years, of a sort of ‘blame Brussels’ game39, even though this very narrative often goes 
much beyond the real responsibilities of the EU and of other MSs and cannot be taken 
as an excuse for the inaction of Italy (EUR_2, May 2019. E.g. the very material benefit 
and humanitarian exemption issues, which, even if the EU failed to make them 
mandatory, could still be included in legislation at national level, see Carrera et al., 
2016 and 2018b; UNODC, 2017, pp. 38–42). 
Another interesting example has to do with the (light) pressure to address some 
specific issues coming from EU bodies, such as the case, reported by EUR_1 (March 
2019), who is a governmental officer acting at EU level, of the European Commission 
(EC, the Commission) encouraging MSs to consider the option of reopening legal 
channels for economic migrants, also with a view to positively impacting on 
undocumented migration. 
The lack of harmonisation of some procedures, such as in the case of joint 
investigations teams to target smugglers (JUD_3, April 2019), as well as the failure or 
the unwillingness in carrying out specific initiatives, albeit previous commitments to do 
                                                          
39 Another example affecting the attitude of Italian policy-makers towards EU institutions in this direction 
can be seen in the failed negotiations, which took mostly place only a few months before the time frame 
considered in this research, for a takeover of the EU in the Italian-led SAR operation Mare Nostrum (see 




so40, also contribute to the delineation of the present framework. Here, the 
shortcomings at EU level entail, aside from a direct and quite expected impact on the 
implementation level, some degree of impact on the national policy-making, at least in 
terms of setting the agenda and the policy goals, leaving certain issues unsolved and 
the responsibility to address them upon MSs. 
The Diciotti case, already explored above in the previous chapter, can be interesting 
also in order to understand the Europeanisation dynamics (confirming the analytical 
relevance of the model applied here, enabling the isolation of different components of 
the same phenomenon, which can then be explored from a plurality of perspectives, 
see chapter 2). Putting aside the consequences of the very case previously mentioned 
and focusing on the reasons that led to it, instead, the EU political debate becomes 
central in order to understand the origin of such case. 
Throughout the summer of 2018 one of the main issue that were debated had to do 
with the mandate of EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia and with the possibility of 
waiving the norms on the first point of irregular entry logic (RaiNews 2018b), with a 
clear and specific commitment in this regard by Minister Salvini. And the emergence 
of the Diciotti case – or, rather, the policy choices of Italy that would then lead to the 
emergence of the Diciotti case – need to be read in the light of such debate and as a 
way of intervening in it, as is apparent from the declarations to the judges of Catania 
made by the chief of staff and the deputy chief of staff of Minister Salvini (Senate of 
the Republic, 2019, pp. 30, 37–38) and by the two very main actors of the case:  
The Italian government opened a dialogue with the European institutions, with a view 
to sharing a plan for the relocation of migrants […]. Once the attempt to solve the 
issue at European level was over, on 25 August, i.e. the day after the meeting in 
Brussels, the disembarkation of migrants in Catania harbour was anyway authorised. 
[…] What changed, compared to the past, is that Italy is no longer available to 
indiscriminately receive migrants, contributing, even just accidentally, to increase and 
incite the smuggling of human beings and compensating for a responsibility which is 
of the European Union, dulling the bond of solidarity which rests on each Member 
                                                          
40 Such as those fourteen development-based projects designed by Libyan communities to address the 
root causes of the smuggling industry, dropped by the EU for the electoral phase in other MSs (ITA_2, 
April 2019. See also declarations of Minister Minniti in Senate of the Republic, Foreign Affairs and 




State (Giuseppe Conte, President of the Council of Ministers, Senate of the Republic, 
XVIII Legislature, Session n. 35, 12 September 2018). 
We opened a controversy: sea of another sovereign State, obligations assumed at 
European Council level. We started with phone calls, minutes, written notes from the 
Italian Permanent Representation, from the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, 
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, from the Ministry of Interior […] It is clear and 
manifest, indeed (and it is also on the record) that those four days staying in an Italian 
harbour […] were necessary […] to wake up someone that was clearly sleeping. 
Those four days were actually decisive, but clearly not enough for someone. […] We 
wanted to involve the international community that up until one month before did not 
lift a finger, and we made it (Matteo Salvini, Minister of Interior, Senate of the Republic, 
XVIII Legislature, Session n. 100, 20 March 2019). 
Such EU-related ultimate goal of the agency of Italian government in the Diciotti case, 
confirmed by the above declarations of President Conte and Minister Salvini, was also 
clearly acknowledged by practitioners (ITA_2, April 2019; JUD_3, April 2019; EUR_2, 
May 2019). They tended to share a negative opinion about it, significantly illustrated 
by a former top-level Ministry of Interior officer: “Thinking that through a ‘muscular’ 
policy towards Europe relocation can be obtained or rewarding goals for the country 
can be achieved, in my opinion, is dull, blind […] and the result is for all to see: we are 
completely isolated” (ITA_2, April 2019). 
Besides the policy-making process and the overall political debate, two other potential 
Europeanisation dynamics emerged throughout the analysis.  
Firstly, NGO_5 (May 2019) stressed the role of agencies, which have been pivotal in 
bringing certain issues forward. The most evident case is that of the confidential report 
issued by Frontex in 2016, disclosed by the Financial Times and then published by 
The Intercept, which played a central role in the opening of investigations against NGO 
activities on the central Mediterranean route, though shortly afterwards its content was 
clarified by Frontex itself, scaling down the scope of the allegation (Campbell, 2017 
and Floris and Bagnoli, 2017). 
Secondly, a few reflections can be made on the impact of the EU jurisdictional arena 
on national policy-making, broadly considered both in terms of Commission 




(CJEU). Over the period considered, such impact seemed to be quite limited and 
happened exclusively in terms of infringement procedure, rather than through the 
CJEU41.   
The most remarkable example connected to the issue at stake, indeed, took place 
throughout 2016, with an infringement procedure brought by the Commission upon 
Italy and Greece for failing to collecting and transmitting, through the Eurodac system, 
the fingerprints of undocumented migrants accessing the EU through the external 
borders of these two countries. Such procedures were closed after one year, given the 
fulfilment of the obligation by the relelvant MSs (Custodero, 2016) and did not seem to 
have any other impact on national policy-making. On the contrary, none of the 
judgements of the CJEU appeared to have substantial influence on policy-making in 
Italy: in this perspective, the applicable patterns are dissimilar from those that will be 
explored below in relation to the rulings of the Italian Constitutional Court, which do not 
only have direct effect on the implementation level, but also contribute to setting the 
agenda at a policy-making level (see section 5.3.3.). 
 
5.3. Governance dynamics 
Consistently with the analytical model proposed in chapter 2, the horizontal dynamics 
pertaining to the ‘governance’ part of MLG shall now be considered (Caponio, 2017 
and Zincone and Caponio, 2006). This will be done, methodologically, by replicating 
the operation conducted in the previous paragraph, i.e. through the unpacking of the 
national policy-making dynamics emerged in the analysis into its different components: 
interaction between different policy areas, between formal and informal actors and 
between different institutions. 
 
5.3.1. A mix of policy areas 
Anti-smuggling policies are at the centre of an intersection of different policy areas for 
the very structural characteristics of this subject matter. The nature of smuggling as a 
phenomenon in-between migration and security was already analysed in chapter 1, 
                                                          
41 Whereas the relationship with the European Court of Human Rights, albeit definitely interesting in the 




and the very operational definition of the phenomenon, based on the smuggling 
spectrum, points in that direction. In this sense, a broader approach that includes these 
different policy areas in the understanding of the anti-smuggling policy adoption 
dynamics is the direct consequence of the smuggling spectrum elaborated in section 
1.2.3. 
A good starting point for the understanding of such complexity can be the point of view 
of INT_2 (April 2019), in whose words the complicated and potentially contradictory 
aspects of the very concept of migrant smuggling clearly emerge:  
I don’t know how to present it, whether to present it as a problem or something actually 
that is not an issue. [… ] Smuggling per se […] is a criminal justice issue, that cannot 
be dealt on its own because that’s very linked to migration at large. […] I believe that 
policies that address migration in general should have smuggling in there, as part of 
it, but policy against smuggling is somehow a little bit limited.  
In other words, on the one side smuggling is a criminal phenomenon, but on the other 
side it is part of a broader migration discourse, which also includes a demand side, 
affects the very concept of smuggling, the policies to tackle it and the way in which 
policy-makers address smuggling (perfectly in line with the smuggling spectrum, see 
again section 1.2.3.). At a very minimum, the fact that no criminal phenomenon can be 
defeated exclusively through the penal response is notably further stated by a member 
of the judiciary as JUD_3 (April 2019). 
Following this perspective and going beyond a merely repressive approach to 
smuggling, practitioners find, first of all, quite clear a connection with the overall 
migration framework, starting with the issue of the lack of possibility to access Italy in 
a lawful manner, as affirmed by INT_2 (April 2019) and ITA_2 (April 2019): Italian 
embassies abroad do not release visas (NGO_1, October 2018) and only highly-skilled 
migrants have this possibility. Furthermore, the Flows Decree (see chapter 3) has been 
de facto hardly been used in the past ten years, since “in terms of political consensus, 
passing a [proper] Flow Decree would be unpopular. […] But now it is already time to 
overcome this very approach, in my opinion” (ITA_2, April 2019). 
In the shaping of the current approach, also situational factors, such as the economic 




immigration more difficult (if not impossible), causing substantial effects on smuggling. 
Recently, though, at an EU level the possibility of reopening of legal channels has 
started to be debated again and this would have a positive impact in the fight against 
undocumented migration (EUR_1, March 2019). 
Also EUR_2 (May 2019) confirmed this view: 
The connection is quite evident. […] There is a demand for migration, which clashes 
with the complete inadequacy of the migration and asylum policies. […] Migration 
policies of MSs are particularly restrictive […] If we take as example even just the 
Italian case, it is clear that we have a legislation – the TUI, as then amended in 
particular by the Bossi-Fini Law – which does not actually provide for any regular 
access channel.  
These considerations seem perfectly in line with the operational definition of this study 
(i.e. the smuggling spectrum) and its analytical toolbox, conencting demand and supply 
for migration and by so doing offering an integrated perspective on the rise of 
undocumented migration. Furthermore and most notably, they explain the complexity 
of the policy-making aimed at countering smuggling, to be read within a broader 
migration policy approach, where the decision to widen or reduce the opportunities for 
documented migration has direct effects on migrant smuggling and its policy 
framework. 
But smuggling policies are also structurally connected with the asylum framework, 
again in line with the smuggling spectrum and the operational definition provided in 
section 1.2.3. A connection which is even more notable, as in the asylum framework 
the EU itself gains a primary role (as will be discussed in the following chapter, referring 
in particular to the missed CEAS reforms), therefore entailing both an inter-arena and 
inter-level connection. 
EUR_1, who is a practitioner acting at the junction of these arenas and levels, 
acknowledged the situation and the connection between these policies, further 
suggesting that the start of resettlement programmes in these last years, albeit limited 
and concerning small numbers, can also be read in this direction. However, s/he also 
warned on how a more effective asylum policy would not necessarily lead to eliminate 




would anyway be a selection and, therefore, someone who remains out (EUR_1, 
March 2019). 
Partly in line with this, JUD_3 (April 2019) argued how more resettlements and 
humanitarian corridors would not necessarily lead to a reduction of smuggling flows, 
as there would still be economic migration and a lack of legal opportunities to access 
Italy. EUR_1 (March 2019), on the other side, stressed how the very increase of asylum 
seekers (also of “specious” ones) was one of the causes that led – jointly with the 
economic crisis and with the political consensus logics above recalled by ITA_2 (April 
2019) – to halt economic migrant flows to Italy and the EU. A circular paradox that 
explains the complex tripartite relationships between migration, asylum and smuggling 
policy-making and that leads back to the question on how is possible to enter lawfully 
into Italy (JUD_3, April 2019). 
Indeed, in spite of the structural complexity of the issue, the current framework appears 
to be strongly security-based, with the result that decision-making in the migration and 
asylum arenas, instead of having positive side effects on anti-smuggling policies, has 
further complicated the situation (NGO_3, October 2018, stressed how, conversely, 
smuggling is often approached in a comprehensive way on the ground by NGOs).  
Actually, going even further, the situation appears to be turned upside down: the 
general migration and asylum policies are not used to reduce the demand side for 
smuggling whereas, on the contrary, smuggling policies are used to manage migration. 
In the words of a UNODC officer, “we talked about the sliding effect that has been of 
using it as a migration management instrument, which is not. […]The intent, rather than 
fighting smuggling, is to manage migration better” (INT_2, April 2019). Politics of 
externalisation and militarisation of SAR are all expressions of such limited approach 
(EUR_2, May 2019). Notably, such security-based approach has had a direct negative 
influence also on local policy-making: even those which were defined as “reasonable” 
policies are difficult to be implemented because of the climate. They need to be 
“disguised” (ITA_1, March 2019). 
But besides migration and asylum, smuggling policies are also structurally connected 
to other policy areas, such as foreign affairs. Here issues such as readmission 
agreements (EUR_1, March 2019; ITA_2, April 2019), development cooperation 




bases need to be built at an intergovernmental level and which can play a major role, 
enabling the identification of the real leaders of smuggling network and not merely the 
facilitator, JUD_3, April 2019; ITA_2, April 2019) and capacity building arise.  
As for the latter, it is particularly thought-provoking to look at the case of those policies 
aimed at offering opportunities to people involved in the smuggling industry to live 
lawfully, such as in the attempt made in 2017 by then Minister of Interior Marco Minniti 
with mayors and ethnic leaders in Southern Libya (Senate of the Republic, Foreign 
Affairs and Defence Committees, XVII Legislature, Joint Session, 30 July 2017, 
reported also by ITA_2, April 2019). Such an attempt was based on the idea that, as 
pointed out by the smuggling spectrum (see section 1.2.3.), smuggling is a complex 
phenomenon where different levels of involvement and responsibilities coexist and that 
there are people who “survive” thanks to small facilitation. This logic is supported also 
by INT_2 (April 2019), who stresses the importance of crime prevention actions to 
prevent more people from joining the smuggling industry, whereas NGO_5 (May 2019), 
had a completely different understanding of the work conducted by then Minister 
Minniti in Libya, sarcastically defined it a “masterpiece”, explaining how  
Minniti did what, I believe, no Lega Nord politician would have been able to do, i.e. as 
a man of the intelligence42 he was able […] to go to Libya, to understand the 
connections between militias, pseudo-governments and smugglers and to make 
everybody substantially agree on the fact that if before one would take money to make 
people go forward towards Europe, money could be used now to stop them, this would 
be absolutely uninfluential.  
Former Minister Maroni (Lega Nord), s/he continued, did “direct pushback towards 
Libya, leading to very explicit convictions, for example, by the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR), whereas this whole new thing of truly delegating the whole 
dirty job to the Libyans […] opened a new playing field”. This shows the potential 
ambiguity even of comprehensive approaches to smuggling, meaning that the 
acknowledgement of the interaction between different policy areas does not 
necessarily entail more progressive stances and policy goals. 
                                                          
42 Marco Minniti is broadly acknowledged as a long-time intelligence expert. He also served as 
Undersecretary of State for Intelligence Services (2013–2016) and established the ICSA (Intelligence 




Capacity building and development cooperation are, in fact, the areas that have been 
most controversial (the inherent risk of a ‘shifting south’ approach was widely 
discussed also by NGO_1, October 2018), considering in particular the agreements 
between Italy and Libya, such as the 2017 Italy-Libya Deal (defended instead by ITA_2, 
April 2019) and the 2018 agreement to provide vessels to the Libyan coast guard (De 
Giovannangeli, 2018a and Genoviva, 2017) or the issue of “disguised development 
cooperation” (EUR_2, May 2019). This refers to the reallocation of resources from 
genuine development cooperation to the management and control of borders, and, 
what is more, ignoring the importance not only of building better living conditions for 
would-be migrants and asylum seekers, but also for those involved in the smuggling 
industry (EUR_2, May 2019 and ITA_2, April 2019. NGO_1, October 2018, points out 
that third countries-related policies depend very much on their substantive content). 
Among the effects of such policy areas interaction there has been, notably and in 
particular throughout the Conte Government, some tension between the Ministry of 
Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, connected to the very approach to 
smuggling and its relationship with Italy’s foreign policy (see De Giovannangeli, 
2018b), moving the interaction from merely inter-policy areas to inter-institutional. 
The defence policy area has also shown to have an interesting relationship with anti-
smuggling policies. ITA_2 (April 2019), based on his/her experience as former top-
level officer at the Ministry of Interior, stressed the importance, for example, of taking 
action in Africa for the stabilisation of Libya, which became a particularly important 
issue after the deterioration of ISIS territory. In this perspective, it is notable that the 
framework chosen at EU level for EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia is namely 
CSDP, as will be further discussed in the next chapter.  
Such a connection, similarly to the case of foreign policy, has created some tension in 
those cases in which the Ministry of Interior was perceived to ‘invade’ the domain of 
security and defence policy, such for the revision of the mandate of Operation Sophia 
(Albanese, 2018) and the Salvini Directive of 16 April, deemed an illegitimate attempt 
to determine the action of the defence corps (Palmerini, 2019 and Sarzanini, 2019). 
A residual way in which migrant smuggling policies have been affected by the 
interaction between different policy areas has to do with the logics of parliamentary 




the same bill, i.e. a heterogeneous parliamentary policy-making. This is a dynamic 
which used to very much affect anti-smuggling related legislation in the past, whereas 
it seems to be doing so to a much lesser extent today (essentially, and only partially, 
in the Minniti-Orlando Decree). However, it can be still meaningful to understand these 
dynamics as an important corollary to the policy-making in this domain: for this very 
reason, Box 5.1. offers a quick digression into the past, out of the time frame 
considered, without jeopardising the overall methodological validity of the research, 
whose results are based over the time frame explicitly considered (see also chapter 
2).   
 
Box 5.1. – Heterogeneous parliamentary policy-making  
Heterogeneous parliamentary policy-making, even if it does not relate directly to the content 
of smuggling-related legislation, clearly has an impact on the policy-making process, on the 
basis of two alternative patterns. 
The first one is the little attention given in the parliamentary debate to the migratory 
phenomenon, deemed as marginal in comparison to other issues contained in the same bill. 
This is the case, for example, of the Senate parliamentary debate for the conversion of 
Decree-Law n. 92/2008, where an amendment of the rapporteurs MP Carlo Vizzini and MP 
Filippo Berselli (both of Popolo delle Libertà party, PdL), arguably aimed at suspending 
ongoing trials involving the then President of the Council of Ministers Silvio Berlusconi, 
monopolised a significant part of the debate (La Stampa, 2008; Grevi, 2008. See also, in 
particular, Senate of the Republic, XVI Legislature, Session n. 20, 17 June 2008). 
A second pattern consists in using certain previsions as an excuse to gather favourable 
votes towards a bill, even through a confidence vote, and is particularly useful to secure the 
approval of contested laws (see the parliamentary debates for the approval of Law n. 
94/2009, where both issues – heterogeneity and confidence vote – and their combination 
are extensively addressed, and in particular: Chamber of Deputies, XVI Legislature, Session 
n. 176, 13 May 2009; Session n. 177, 14 May 2009; Senate of the Republic, XVI Legislature, 
Session n. 232, 2 July 2009). 
 
5.3.2. Non-institutional actors: the unwanted consequences of NGO agency 
Getting to informal-to-institutional dynamics (see paragraph 2.3.) in the making of 
national anti-smuggling policies, the key-actor which seems to come out from the 
evidence considered are NGOs, as for the number of examples in which they were 
involved and relevance and impact of them. In the previous chapter, some practices 




instead on how these very actors can and actually do influence the national policy-
making through (a) advocacy and (b) unintended consequences. 
Advocacy is a typical – often statutory – mandate of these bodies, sometimes 
implemented with good results, such as in the policy-making process of the Zampa 
Law, for the protection of unaccompanied minors, including those victims of smuggling 
(NGO_1, October 2019; NGO_3, October 2018).  
Advocacy processes can be very important, in spite of the difficulties they present 
(NGO_1, October 2019; NGO_3, October 2018; NGO_4, October 2018), and 
eventually depend very much on the willingness and the availability of the recipient (in 
most cases the national government). Interviewed NGO officers highlighted the 
difficulty emerged in particular with the Conte Government, not only because of the 
deep difference of points of views, but also because of the unpreparedness of NGOs 
to actively and effectively bring their issues concerning some policies, such in the 
remarkable case of the Security Decree (NGO_4, October 2018). However, as s/he 
further reported, “you can advocate, but there is where it ends up. The real tool is […] 
to find and realise legal political stratagems on the ground”: a point which, in turn, leads 
us back to the discrepancies between theory and practice existing on the ground – this 
was widely discussed in chapter 4 – and on how local authorities tend to be more open 
to advocacy processes (NGO_3, October 2018; NGO_4, October 2018).  
NGO_1 added that “there is a point where the different pressures are blocked. […] We 
have a ‘below’ which is extremely active […] and also a very high level” which is so, 
whereas the EU and the national level are completely “blocked” (a view which is more 
broadly shared also by SIC_3, October 2018, and SIC_4, October 2018).  
Still, in this process two factors can become problematic and should be given due 
attention:  
1. The points of view adopted by the NGOs and uploaded in bottom-up processes 
are not necessarily (and normally are not) those of smuggled migrants (NGO_3, 
October 2018), which entails the risk of leaving them voiceless;  
2. NGOs can sometimes face the risk of losing credibility – towards migrants, 




imposed by governments, which in turn also affects their impact (and willingness 
to be engaged) in bottom-up dynamics (NGO_1, October 2019). 
Dynamics of informal-to-institutional agency can also be the result of unintended 
consequences (Pollack, 2009. See also Bonjour and Vink, 2013), originated by NGO 
practices, as in the case of one of the widest and strongest examples of impact that 
informal actors appeared to have on the national policy-making: policing 
humanitarianism. 
Italian policies targeting humanitarian actors are not unique: on the contrary, they are 
consistent with a general pattern that has spread throughout Europe in the last years 
(Carrera et al., 2018b, pp. 51 – 87). In this specific case, as unforeseen result of the 
agency of NGOs in SAR operations in the Mediterranean Sea, mostly launched since 
2015 in response to the perceived insufficient effort of governments to save lives, they 
have taken the shape of the 2017 Code of conduct and of the 2018 closing harbour 
policy (NGO_4, October 2019). 
The Code of conduct, strongly wanted by then Minister of Interior Marco Minniti, was 
conceived as a way of disciplining NGOs, in the light of the inquiry conducted in the 
Defence Committee of the Senate (Senate of the Republic, Foreign Affairs and 
Defence Committees, XVII Legislature, Joint Session, 30 July 2017) and arguably of 
the criticisms brought forward by Prosecutor Zuccaro (also on the basis of the 
confidential report issued by Frontex in 2016) and widely debated in Special and 
Standing Committees of the Italian Parliament (see above). 
Strongly criticised and even rejected by most NGOs as a way to curb their agency and 
to impose law enforcement and border protection logics on pure humanitarian action, 
the Code of conduct was eventually signed by five NGOs. However, the effects were 
merely political, considering how no direct consequence followed for those NGOs 
which decided not to sign it (ASGI, 2017; Cusumano, 2017 and Scavo, 2017). 
This is not surprising, since the very unclear nature of the Code has been highlighted 
since the first moments, making it look more like a political manifesto aimed at a 
delegitimising NGOs (cf. Cusumano, 2017). However, in order to respond to such 
criticism and to overcome internal opposition on it, Minister Minniti sought the support 




actual legislative shape and value of it (RaiNews, 2017 and European Parliament, 
2018a). 
Nevertheless, the importance of the Code of conduct in the Italian policy-making 
cannot be denied, at least for two reasons. Firstly, as was already outlined, because it 
shows an interesting pattern, it being the result of the combination of the unintended 
consequences of NGOs agency, information spread by EU agencies and the bottom-
up processes in intermediate bodies such as parliamentary committees. Secondly, 
because its delegitimising effects opened up (or at least reinforced) a political space 
that would eventually make possible, following the line of policing humanitarianism, the 
much more affecting closing harbour policy. 
Some extracts of parliamentary proceedings of the XVII and XVIII legislature can be 
significant to this extent, showing the anti-NGO point of view of several MPs, even in 
the lack of any hard evidence connecting them to smugglers (see above): 
[There are] non-governmental organisations that go rescue smugglers’ rubber boats 
offshore Libya […]. I think that the Ministry of Interior should do something with regard 
to these self-styled non-governmental organisations. I think that these ships should 
be seized; I think that these people should be reported for facilitation of illegal 
immigration (MP Giorgia Meloni, FdI, Chamber of Deputies, XVII Legislature, Session 
n. 779, 12 April 2017). 
We worked together in Parliament throughout last legislature with the then 
Government […] and I claim for Forza Italia, opposition party also by then, the credit 
for urging a fact-finding inquiry on NGOs and for determining a regulation that limited 
their action (MP Maurizio Gasparri, FI, Senate of the Republic, XVIII Legislature, 
Session n. 11, 13 June 2018). 
And so someone has to explain why NGOs […] seem to have as exclusive landing 
place Italy. I do have a very clear idea: perhaps one of these organisations’ funders 
has a very clear plan in mind, which is that of destabilising this country, of creating a 
social emergency […]. NGO pirate ships, that smuggle people in cahoots with those 
who organise smuggling on the Libyan coasts, are criminal (MP Riccardo Molinari, 




[We say] ‘no’ to the blackmail of NGOs, that very often rescue migrants directly on 
Libyan coasts (MP Francesco D’Uva, M5S, Chamber of Deputies, XVIII Legislature, 
Session n. 20, 27 June 2018). 
So I think that this House should show solidarity for the shameful campaign of 
criminalisation of NGOs; NGOs and volunteers that, in these years, under the 
coordination of the Italian authorities in charge, have saved dozens and dozens of 
women, men and children at seas. It is not acceptable to generalise, it is not 
acceptable to support a propaganda campaign aimed at criminalising these 
associations (MP Federico Fornaro, LeU, Chamber of Deputies, XVIII Legislature, 
Session n. 20, 27 June 2018). 
[MP Salvatore Deidda:] Perhaps not all NGOs are like this, but the State has to take 
its responsibility back, this is what I keep saying, [SAR operations] cannot be 
delegated to organisations that we do not know anything about and it cannot be 
delegated to organisations that are funded by multinationals, that, above all, smuggle, 
that have economic benefits from smuggling human beings […]  
[MP Federico Fornaro:] Who would these organisations be? Give us the names! You 
can give the names yourself! (MP Salvatore Deidda, FdI, and MP Federico Fornaro, 
LeU, Chamber of Deputies, XVIII Legislature, session n. 38, 3 August 2018). 
However, former Minister Minniti tried to distance himself from the allegations of a 
continuity in these policies (Partito Democratico, 2018) and also ITA_2 (April 2019), 
former top-level officer of the Ministry of Interior, pointed to the substantial difference 
between these two approaches, according to his point of view. But the arguments of 
those who support this continuity seem to be more convincing (Cusumano and 
Gombeer, 2018), considering also how the option for harbour closures was already 
there in 2017, as Cusumano (2019, p. 112) himself recalls: “the Italian Minister of 
Interior, backed by the European Commission, reinstated the threat of closing Italian 
ports to non-signatory organizations43.” 
Moving on to the closing harbours policy, its essence was already explored in the 
previous sections and can be recalled by saying that starting 10 June 2018, a few days 
                                                          
43 On the arguable continuity between Marco Minniti’s and Matteo Salvini’s approaches, more will be 




after swearing in, the new Minister of Interior Matteo Salvini decided to prohibit the 
docking in Italian harbours of any NGO ships transporting migrants. The first case was 
that of the Aquarius ship, carrying 629 migrants, but a number of others followed in the 
next months, such as the one concerning Proactiva Open Arms in December 2018 or 
those of Sea Eye and Sea Watch 3 in January 2019, among others (Il Tempo, 2018; 
SkyTg24, 2018 and Tommasone 2019a). 
Still today, however, it is unclear in which way it was possible to apply what appears 
to be a ‘policy without legislation’: as previously explored, indeed, until the 
developments of the Diciotti case and the issuing of first Salvini Directive on 18 March 
2019, no official act was actually passed and numerous controversies came out about 
the very legitimacy of this policy (Cusumano and Gombeer, 2018; Scavo, 2019; 
Tommasone, 2019a and 2019b. Cf. also Cardwell, 2018 and his concept of ‘new 
governance’). 
The first Salvini Directive aimed to set out some sort of reinforced protocol for law 
enforcement and border guard agencies, on the basis that “there is a need to crystallise 
and sanction those conducts explicitly aimed at the breach of the international maritime 
rescue law and of the national and European immigration law, which are perpetrated 
in a continuative and methodical way” (Minister of Interior, 2019a, p. 3). 
On such bases, Minister Salvini stated that non-Italian NGO ships (to which this 
directive expressly applies) were not free to navigate in Italian seas, since this would 
clearly constitute a threat to “the order and security of Italian state”, being their aim that 
of “introducing irregular migrants, in breach of the applicable immigration law, without 
identification documents and proceeding from foreign countries exposed to a terrorist 
threat” (Minister of Interior, 2019a, pp. 6–8). 
In this perspective, the 18 March 2019 Directive can be considered as an interpretation 
of the ongoing situation to be used by law enforcement and border guard agencies, 
but whose legitimacy and legal value were questioned (Ansa, 2019 and Lania, 2019). 
After a second directive issued on the 28 March, amending the first one, two other 
directives were issued on 4 April 2019 and 16 April 2019, dealing with two specific 
cases, respectively the Alan Kurdi ship of the NGO Sea Eye and the Mare Jonio ship 




involving a ship registered in Italy, belonging to an Italian organisation, and therefore 
more difficult to target (Minister of Interior, 2019a, 2019b and 2019c). 
Again, legitimacy and legal values of these directives were strongly questioned by 
practitioners, former navy officers and ministry officials, experts, insisting in particular 
on the lack of competence of the Ministry of Interior and the right of foreign vessels to 
navigate in territorial seas (Ansa, 2019; Lania, 2019 and Morcone, 2019). 
The closing harbour policy and the Salvini Directives became central in the political 
debate, within and outside Italy, involving also other policy areas, e.g. the foreign policy 
implications of the Alan Kurdi case, where a note verbale was sent to the German 
Embassy in Rome in order to request that the situation be taken care of. They also 
caused a strong reaction of those who were referred to by the Ministry of Interior in 
order to legitimise the directives, and namely IOM (whose presence in Libya would 
“guarantee the respect of migrants’ rights and, at the same time, quicker rescues”) and 
the European Commission. The latter, according to the Ministry, would have stated 
that “Libya can and must rescue migrants at sea, and has then to be considered a 
trustworthy country” (RaiNews, 2019). All declarations denied by EC, IOM and also by 
UNHCR, which expressed concerns on Libya, further urging, through the High 
Commissioner Filippo Grandi himself, not to refer to UNHCR activities in Libya in a 
specious way so as to deny reception in Europe (Ziniti, 2019). 
As one of the NGO officers who were interviewed noted, a key-actor in this chain of 
unintended consequences has been Operation Mediterranea and its ship Mare Jonio, 
which decided to openly challenge the closing harbours policy in October 2018, 
reopening a game which seemed to be already closed, with the abandonment of the 
central Mediterranean Sea by other NGOs, following Italian policies. The launch of this 
challenging practice was at the basis of the reaction of the Italian government, 
whereas, on the other side, stimulated other NGOs to get back to sea (NGO_5, May 
2019). 
 
5.3.3. Executivisation of policies and inter-institutional interaction 
A last dimension to understand the national policy-making in this subject matter relates 




between parliament and government – the most prominent actors – which essentially 
happens in relation to the legislative process for the approval of norms and to the 
overall political debate, both key-components of the policy-making at national level. 
Smuggling-related policies appear to be definitely executive-centred, with the 
government dominating the legislative process, whereas the parliament continues to 
experience a greater importance in the overall political debate (cf., also more broadly 
on the roles of governments and parliaments, Capano and Giuliani, 2003; Capano, 
Howlett and Ramesh, 2015; Rasch and Tsebelis, 2013 and Zucchini, 2013). 
The time perspective adopted to analyse such interaction is broader than the in the 
rest of the research, again without compromising the methodological accuracy, but 
merely with the objective to widen the empirical description (any argument or 
conclusion is going to be built on cases before 2013, see also chapter 2). This can be 
useful in order to observe the institutional agency of government and parliament in the 
approval of the most important policies related to smuggling and undocumented 
migration (including all the laws substantially amending the provisions on facilitation of 
irregular migration) since 2002, when the first substantive changes of the TUI took 
place, until 2019 (see Table 5.1. and also the parliamentary sources listed in chapter 
2).  
The government role was central in all of the eight main legislative acts that were 
approved in this subject matter throughout these years. Firstly, six out of eight were 
decrees-law, approved by the government and then converted into law by the 
parliament, being the remaining two laws of governmental legislative initiative. And the 
recent recourse to non-orthodox instruments such as for the 2017 Code of conduct or 
the 2018 closing harbours policy also contributes to the marginalisation of the 
parliament. 
The prominence of the government was further expressed in the decision to call for a 
confidence vote either in one or both of the houses in three of these laws, and namely 
in two of the most recent ones (the 2017 Minniti-Orlando Decree and the 2018 Security 
Decree): a parliamentary procedure that de facto impedes any amendment to the bill. 
A further element substantially constraining, at least historically, the role of parliament 
is the heterogeneity of the bills where these migration provisions were included, as 




smuggling policy-making. This was the case, in particular, in two of the acts composing 
the Security Package (Decree-Law n. 92/2008, converted by Law n. 125/2008; Law 
94/2009), where important anti-Mafia measures were approved and, within the proper 
time frame of the research, of the Minniti-Orlando Decree, bringing important changes 
into the judicial organisation. This issue – especially when in conjunction with a 
confidence vote – could lead MPs to vote in favour of a bill even if in disagreement on 
the migration-related aspects, after balancing them with the other provisions contained 
in the bill. 
 
Table 5.1. – Laws on migrant smuggling-related issues 
Law Year Initiative Parliament impact 
Law n. 106/2002 2002 Converting DL n. 
51/2002 
Minor changes 
Law n. 189/2002 
(Bossi-Fini Law) 
2001/02 Government Tension in the government 
coalition between Lega and 
Christian Democrats: no 
amendment on amnesty, but 
motion (then in fact realised) 
Law n. 271/2004 
(Correction to 
Bossi-Fini Law) 
2004 Converting DL n. 
241/2004 
Minor changes  
Law n. 125/2008 
(Part of the 
Security Package) 





Law n. 94/2009 
(Part of the 
Security Package) 
2008/09 Government  Confidence vote 
Anti-Mafia measures 
Article 10-bis of TUI, modified in 
the Senate and softened 
Law n. 46/2017 
(Minniti-Orlando 
Decree) 
2017 Converting DL n. 
13/2017 
Maxi-amendment to soften some 
of the critics (both inside and 
outside) but only very partially 
and superficially. However 




Law n. 98/2018 
(Vessels cession to 
Libya) 
2018 Converting DL n. 
84/2018 
Almost unanimity at Senate, 
much more controversial at 
Chamber: rejected all the 
amendments of PD on human 
rights (after many criticisms from 
NGOs for unanimity at Senate) 
Law n. 132/2018 
(Security Decree) 
2018 Converting DL n. 
113/2018 
Confidence vote both houses 
Source: Elaborated by the author 
 
However, even if subordinate to government, the role of parliament in the legislative 
process is not insignificant. Besides those minor changes that were brought into almost 
all the bills considered and the peculiar case of Law n. 98/2018, which was passed 
without any significant amendment with an almost unanimous vote at the Senate and 
the rejection of all the amendments presented at the Chamber (De Giovannangeli, 
2018a and la Repubblica, 2018), the role of parliament clearly emerged in the following 
cases: 
1. Law n. 189/2002: amendment of MP Bruno Tabacci (Union of Christian and 
Centre Democrats, UDC, majority coalition) to include an amnesty of 
undocumented migrants, supported by the oppositions. After a long debate and 
tensions within the majority coalition and the government, the amendment was 
transformed into a motion to commit the government to actually make the 
amnesty (which would eventually be realised with Decree-Law 195/2002), 
avoiding also a confidence vote threatened by Minister Umberto Bossi (Senate 
of the Republic, XIV Legislature, Session n. 200, 27 June 2002; Jerkov, 2002 
and la Repubblica, 2002); 
2. Law n. 94/2009: criminalisation of the illegal entry. The provision of the bill was 
changed during the debate in Senate and softened, after strong criticisms from 
the oppositions and from the judiciary (Chamber of Deputies, “L’attività 
parlamentare e di governo in materia di immigrazione nella XVI legislative”, sic); 
3. Law n. 46/2017: maxi-amendment of the government at the Senate to change 
some of the criticism highlighted by oppositions, NGOs and other non-




These examples, anyway, cannot challenge the primary and absolute role acquired by 
the government in migrant smuggling-related legislation, often creating also political 
and institutional conflicts for the complete marginalisation of parliament, such as those 
arising in these parliamentary speeches, regardless the political orientation of the 
government: 
[I]n this moment a façade is taking place in this House: that of having to debate on 
the whole of the amendments when we all know that, given that a confidence vote 
was called, in reality there will be no room to talk about the proposed amendments. 
We even have to thank for this, because otherwise there would not have even been 
room to leave something on the record of this House in the very moment in which the 
latter is going to approve, through a confidence vote, some norms that will impact 
(heavily) on the future of our country (MP Rita Bernardini, PD, Chamber of Deputies, 
XVI Legislature, Session n. 175, 12 May 2009). 
The amendments could have been discussed for their content, whereas a negative 
opinion was issued on all of them with a simple motivation: there is no time to discuss 
them, a confidence vote is going to be called in this House, the bill is secured, in fact 
(MP Fabiana Dadone, M5S, Chamber of Deputies, XVIII Legislature, Session n. 779, 
12 April 2017). 
What happened […] is that the Government, this majority and, regrettably, even the 
Presidency […] took on the gravest responsibility of restricting the parliamentary 
debate and of placing a motive of political interest fully connected with the majority 
internal dynamics before the centrality of the Parliament, so often declared […]. This 
bill has in fact flown over the Chamber of Deputies, because, as you all are aware of, 
a confidence vote will be called in a few hours also in this House of our Parliament 
(MP Riccardo Magi, +E, Chamber of Deputies, XVIII Legislature, Session n. 90, 26 
November 2018). 
President, colleagues, Government, the majority today brings into this House the 
conversion into law of Decree-law n. 113/2018, clumsily called “Security Decree”. It 
does so after having forced the Senate to a confidence vote, and then, here at the 
Chamber, fully abolishing the time for debate in the Standing Committee and being 
about to call for another confidence vote. Hence, the role of parliament has been fully 




the Senate (MP Giuseppina Occhionero, LeU, Chamber of Deputies, XVIII 
Legislature, Session n. 90, 26 November 2018). 
A significant case, as for the marginalisation of the parliament, is the appeal to the 
Constitutional Court presented in 2018 by four MPs of the left wing coalition Liberi e 
Uguali (LeU), in a procedure for a “[conflict] arising from allocation of powers of the 
State44” (article 134 of the Italian Constitution), for the government not having brought 
the 2017 Italy-Libya Deal to parliamentary ratification, as any international treaty would 
require under article 80 of the Italian Constitution (ASGI, 2018). 
The point of view of ITA_2 (April 2019) is worth recalling, as s/he explained how the 
situation concerning the role of parliament is “particularly serious”. Referring to the role 
of the two houses in the legislative process, s/he “would have expected a different 
attitude in parliament, how to say, an outrage towards this dramatic involution” 
experienced with the Conte Government, which is “strongly weakening the institutional 
and constitutional structure of our country”.  
It should be further noted that a progressive abandonment of an economic and welfare 
approach to migration occurred, with a move of migration provisions towards security-
related legislation (also in terms of political debate, see below), essentially falling within 
the right side of the smuggling spectrum (see section 1.2.3.). In such perspective, the 
political affiliation to the Lega Nord party of the Ministers presenting or de facto 
promoting five of these acts is significant (cf. Verbeek and Zaslove, 2015. See also 
section 2.4.1.). It remains controversial, in the view of practitioners, depending very 
much also on the role and the political stance, whether some continuity in the approach 
can be found also with the only legislative act coming from a PD-led government. Such 
continuity is openly challenged by a former top-level officer of the Ministry of Interior 
(ITA_2, April 2019), more timidly contested by a progressive MEP (EUR_2, May 2019), 
considered possible by an ANCI officer (ITA_1, March 2019) and strongly supported 
by an officer of an NGO operating in the Mediterranean Sea (NGO_5, May 2019), who 
said that “Salvini would not exist without Minniti”. At least under certain points of view, 
namely those related to the ‘shifting south’ policies and the policing of humanitarianism, 
                                                          




such continuity seems uncontested45 (cf. Carrera et al., 2018a; Cusumano, 2019 and 
Cusumano and Gombeer, 2018), in line with the findings of this research (see also 
below on the political positioning of government parties in the political debate on these 
very issues, whose importance was stressed also by ITA_1, March 2019). 
As was already anticipated, the parliament still has a very important role in terms of 
definition of the political discourse. This is the institutional space where it is possible to 
understand how migrant smuggling is the subject of political tension and how it is 
(re)framed and (re)worded in the institutional agenda: parliamentary communication is 
a political act as it contributes to (de)legitimising a specific issue (cf., also for a historical 
understanding of the issue, Capano and Giuliani, 2003).  
Adopting, again, a broader time perspective (and holding all the methodological 
disclaimers previously mentioned), based on the observation of how this subject matter 
has been framed in the parliamentary arena since 1998, through an analysis of the 
parliamentary proceedings (see chapter 2 for a more detailed understanding of the 
sources used to reach these conclusions), the following five aspects can be 
highlighted. 
Firstly, there has been a progressive securitisation of the migration debate, with the 
emergence of a centrality for issues connected to border protection and management, 
repression of undocumented migration, and migrant smuggling. The initial coexistence 
of this debate with a focus on economic opportunities connected to the influx of 
migrants dropped over the years, together with a substantive change in the policies 
passed (cf. the proceedings for the approval of the Bossi-Fini Law in 2002 – where, 
notwithstanding the strong security-based approach, the economic-related approach 
is still present in background, and those of Law n. 271/2004 or Law n. 94/2009).  
Secondly, the main issues debated in the smuggling-related legislative processes have 
been the ‘shifting south’ approach, the need to promote development cooperation in 
                                                          
45 Consider also that the PD-led Government in 2016 decided not to pass delegated legislation on the 
abolishment of the offence of illegal entry, considering the “particularly sensitive character of the 
concerned interests” and that “in the lack of a broader and more systematic intervention, the repressive 




Africa to stop big influxes of migrants, the offence of illegal entry, the role of the EU, 
the Dublin III Regulation and the role of NGOs46.  
Thirdly, as for the very role of the EU and other MSs, its characterisation has been 
changing over the years, moving from initially being some term of reference, somehow 
to imitate, to a defaulting party (with different degrees of responsibility, depending on 
the political stance) to be recalled to its responsibility. The debates and motions that 
precede the meetings of the European Council bear particular significance, serving as 
sort of ‘shopping lists’ of obligations to be fulfilled by the supranational actor and its 
Member States (see, among others, Chamber of Deputies, XVIII Legislature, Session 
n. 20, 27 June 2018; Senate of the Republic, XVIII Legislature, Session n. 47, 16 
October 2018 and the attached motions). 
Fourthly, the importance of the political spectrum: a clear-cut difference between right-
wing and left-wing parties has arisen in the debates on migrant smuggling and 
undocumented migration. This becomes particularly clear in the most controversial 
issues such as the offence of illegal entry, human rights in Libya, the existence of a 
right to migrate and the role of NGOs, where the positioning of MPs on the political 
spectrum is very definite. It could be noted also the existence of some connection with 
the smuggling spectrum, where right-wing policy-makers tend to have a view of 
smuggling falling in the right end of the continuum, whereas left-wing ones tend to 
embrace a more comprehensive view of the phenomenon (see the smuggling 
spectrum in section 1.2.3.). On other issues – namely a deeper involvement of the EU, 
the need of development cooperation, the importance of humanitarian corridors and 
the fight against smugglers – there seems to be a shared sensibility and a stronger 
inclination to find an agreement. Still, nuances and logics are very different and in 
several cases some stances can appear to be specious or anyway subordinated to 
other logics. In this perspective, the analysis further showed: 
1. The progressive decrease in the political distance between the Democratic 
Party (PD) and the centre-right coalition on certain issues (namely ‘shifting 
south’, the role of NGOs, the goal of a drop of the migrant arrival numbers), 
                                                          
46 This aspect is based on and exclusively related to the legislative debates, which were analysed in 
their entirety. Parliamentary motions and questions are excluded from this aspect, since the selection 
of which motions and questions to consider was based on a keyword research (see chapter 2) and this 




especially during the PD-led government. Conversely, this rapprochement did 
not seem to involve those parties on the left side of PD;  
2. The difference between the stances in the political-symbolic arena and the 
actual policies passed, as the latter tend to be less polarised and more in 
continuity with one another (see above). 
Both of these points are substantially in line with the findings on the overall migration 
policy-making in Italy (Caponio and Cappiali, 2018; Giuliani, 2008 and Zincone, 2011; 
see also section 2.4.1.) and were to a certain extent acknowledged by the same 
decision-makers, who even talked about PD and centre-right policies in terms of 
convergence and continuity: 
There was no need for the President to tell us that the bill is partly in continuity with 
what the previous Government, and namely Minister Minniti, did. We did know that. I 
would rather call it plagiarism, or, perhaps, embezzlement (MP Alessia Rotta, PD, 
Chamber of Deputies, XVIII Legislature, Session n. 39, 6 August 2018). 
Disembarkations today are at historic low, although Salvini is telling that they are an 
emergency, but they are at a historic low. There was a Minister of this Republic, whose 
name is Marco Minniti, who made disembarkations dropping by 80% and there is no 
need for Salvini’s propaganda of these days to say that “thanks to him 
disembarkations dropped”. This is the usual Salvini’s lie (MP Alessia Morani, PD, 
Chamber of Deputies, XVIII Legislature, Session n. 39, 6 August 2018). 
I deal with immigration, I closely observed what Minister Minniti did: he did neither 
more nor less than what the centre-right has been saying for three years that it should 
have been done. It is clear that at a certain point disembarkations dropped (MP 
Giorgio Silli, FI, Chamber of Deputies, XVIII Legislature, Session n. 39, 6 August 
2018). 
Today […] we witness a split personality of that party [PD], which even repudiates 
those actions undertaken one year ago, when it was in government. But there is a 
clear reason for that: going at any cost against the yellow-green government. Mr 
President, do you want to know what the oppositions are demonstrating? That, if we 
had an immediate solutions for the wars all over the world, they would start cheering 
for conflicts, just to row against us (MP Sabrina De Carlo, M5S, Chamber of Deputies, 




[Talking about agreements with Libya and the cession of patrol boats to the Libyan 
coast guard] We need to have the courage to say thing as they are: the point is not 
that Libya does not want to sign the Geneva Convention; rather, it cannot. Because 
in Libya the conditions to have access to the Geneva Convention are not met. We will 
vote for this amendment [but] I ask you, though – since this is a serious conversation 
– to take this out propaganda. I ask also the colleagues of the Democratic Party, 
because in the past legislature, just almost one year ago, you voted against this very 
same question, with regard to the first decree conceding patrol boats. So please, let’s 
stop with this human rights rhetoric (MP Erasmo Palazzotto, LeU, Chamber of 
Deputies, XVIII Legislature, Session n. 39, 6 August 2018). 
Fifthly, the tendency to lack evidence-based debates: data are cited very rarely, as well 
as the information coming from the ground, if not quite partially and in an instrumental 
way to support pre-existing opinions (being particularly significant the NGO-related 
debates), whereas concepts are very often mixed up (e.g. the persisting confusion 
between migrant smuggling and trafficking in persons. Cf., among others, Chamber of 
Deputies, XVIII Legislature, Session n. 20, 27 June 2018; Session n. 38, 3 August 
2018). 
A more specific focus on the XVIII legislature (started in 2018) confirms the previous 
findings and increase in particular two of them:  
1. The polarisation of the debate, with a stronger role for the Lega Nord and the 
other far-right party Fratelli d’Italia (FdI), calling for a naval blockade against 
Libya (see, among others, Chamber of Deputies, XVIII Legislature, Session n. 
38, 3 August 2018. Cf. also Caponio and Cappiali, 2018; Tronconi, 2018 and 
Verbeek and Zaslove, 2015). On the other side, the PD seemed to regain more 
pro-migration stances, once left the government, with some notable exceptions 
(i.e. the claim to be them the ones responsible for the achievement of a drop in 
arrival numbers, as above recalled). The debate on the signature of the Global 
Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) is particularly 
significant in this perspective, showing the extreme anti-immigration attitudes of 
some MPs:  
The most dangerous […] is the principle based on which immigration is a 
fundamental right of any human being. Now, you understand, colleagues, that 




and this means that who is fleeing from war, who is fleeing from violence, but 
also who is fleeing from famine, who is fleeing from the heat, who moves 
because [s/he] is up to, anybody (sic) – is a fundamental right of the human 
being, it means, President Carfagna, that means that the borders of nation 
states no longer exist, that nation states no longer exist (MP Giorgia Meloni, 
FdI, Chamber of Deputies, XVIII Legislature, Session n. 92, 28 November 
2018); 
2. The recall for a deeper involvement of the EU, with (undocumented) migration 
as the central topic in European Council debates (with the partial exception of 
December 2018, because of the issues related to the Budget Law). Here the 
most concerning issues have been the reform of Dublin III Regulation, the need 
for more solidarity, investment programmes in Libya, the redefinition of the 
Operation Sophia mandate, the support to the hypothesis of an Italian naval 
blockade and the relationship with the Visegrád Group (see, among others, 
Chamber of Deputies, XVIII Legislature, Session n. 20, 27 June 2018; Senate 
of the Republic, XVIII Legislature, Session n. 47, 16 October 2018 and the 
attached motions). 
In a political space that is widely dominated by the parliament, the government, 
however, still plays an important role.  
Firstly, the government is central in setting the parliamentary agenda (see Rasch and 
Tsebelis, 2013 and, in particular, the chapter of Zucchini, 2013), by submitting specific 
bills, which (regardless the actual policy output) in turn determine the focus of 
parliamentary debates. For example, when in 2008 the government decided to propose 
to the parliament a bill including the criminalisation of illegal entry, this was the basis 
for the subsequent parliamentary debate, which actually focused very much on this 
very issue, strongly polarising the different parties and coalitions.  
Secondly, the government takes part in the parliamentary debates, both those related 
to the legislative discussion and those connected to the general function of scrutiny of 
governmental action, for example answering parliamentary questions or motions. 
Furthermore, the government plays a central role also outside of the parliamentary 




Hence, even if the parliament seems to gain much importance and political space in 
the political-symbolic arena, if compared to the legislative one, quite paradoxically the 
government still plays a central role in setting the rules of the game or anyway 
participating in the debate. 
A last element of reflection, based on the very unbalance between these two 
institutions, has to do with the deliberate parliamentarisation of certain issues, decided 
by the government in order to overcome difficulties and divisions within the government 
itself. This has been the case, for example, of the signature of the GCM, 
parliamentarised by the government parties for this very reason, and paradoxically 
criticised by opposition MPs: 
[N]o, the Government will not take a position on the Global Compact, because this 
matter is too important, we need to parliamentarise the decision. There, that’s too bad 
that we cannot make a 360 degrees panoramic photo to see how this Government 
parliamentarises the decision on the Global Compact. This absence is embarrassing, 
loud, and we should probably realise and infer that there is, in other places, a 
gathering of intelligences to bring about, unbelievably, a majority motion on the Global 
Compact which says everything and its opposite. Because on the Global Compact 
this majority will generate an example of extraordinary fence-sitting: ‘we are against, 
but not entirely”, or ‘we are in favour, but not completely’. […] We find it extremely 
serious that the Government did not expressed itself, we believe that if Italians could 
see the image of this House sadly empty and grey, under thousands of perspectives, 
then Italians would realise the difficulty of this government to find a solution, differently 
from all the other sovereign governments in Europe, that already said ‘no’, no ifs and 
buts, to the Global Compact and to the constitutionalisation of the invasion towards 
them, reclaiming the right to govern migratory flows, reclaiming the right to say that 
immigration is controlled by the state (MP Andrea Delmastro Delle Vedove, FdI, 
Chamber of Deputies, XVIII Legislature, Session n. 102, 18 December 2018). 
Still, in case of divisions on these matters, the parliamentary game can be risky, as 
again has been the case throughout the XVIII legislature, with those differences 
between Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S) and Lega Nord (from a political point of view, even 
though they are not reflected in the voting behaviour) that Forza Italia and Fratelli 
d’Italia attempted to exploit to weaken the government cohesion (see, in particular, 




n. 91, 27 November 2018; Session n. 92, 28 November 2018; Session n. 99, 11 
december 2018; Session n. 102, 18 December 2018). 
Besides the twofold game between government and parliament in said arenas, a third 
institutional actor needs to be considered at a national level: the judiciary. The 
approach chosen in this research already acknowledged the importance of it as an 
actor in the policy-making, but placed it mostly in the multi-level layer, stressing the 
role of judges on the ground:  
1. In adjudicating individual cases, applying and interpreting the law;  
2. In initiating that process of judicial review which would eventually produce its 
effects on a national level upon a pronunciation of the Court of Cassation, but 
that could not take place without the proactive role of the judiciary on the ground 
(see chapter 4);  
3. In impacting on policy-makers decision as an indirect consequence, such as in 
the Diciotti case. 
However, even following such approach, there is one judicial actor that still needs to 
be considered at a national level tout court: the Constitutional Court. Over the years, 
the Court has issued important rulings related to migration laws, assessing their 
consistency with the Italian Constitution. 
The most relevant rulings – or, better, the two rulings with the strongest impact on the 
political debate and on the relationships with the legislative actors – which should 
therefore be recalled are those concerning the aggravating factor of “illegally being on 
the national territory” and the offence of “illegal entry and stay in the territory of the 
state”. Following the same rationale, based on the distinction between the illegitimacy 
of a more severe punishment based on personal qualities unrelated to the offence 
(Judgement n. 249/2010), on the one side, and the discretion of decision-makers in 
criminalising a specific conduct (Judgement n. 250/2010), on the other side, the Court 
declared the unconstitutionality of the aggravating factor, but not that of the offence. 
Besides that, as previously recalled, the Constitutional Court plays a role also in 
deciding about conflicts on the allocation of powers among different organs of the state, 




Acting as guardian of the Constitution and as a referee in conflicts between institutions, 
the Constitutional Court becomes then an important actor in the overall governance of 
the subject matter, whose discretion is nevertheless limited by the ways of access to 
it, i.e. a posteriori judicial review or directly from the concerned power of the state, but 
in no case motu proprio or through a direct access of citizens (see Rebessi and 
Zucchini, 2018 and Volcansek, 2000, also more broadly on the role of the 
Constitutional Court in the policy-making process).  
 
5.4. Policy-making dynamics at a national level: an analytical synopsis  
This conclusive paragraph intends to draw some general analytical conclusions 
referred to the national level as a whole, considered in terms of multi-level dynamics 
and with a view also to highlight the agency patterns of different actors, which shall be 
discussed more in detail in chapter 7 (see also chapter 2). 
Data related to the national level have been organised and presented according to the 
analytical model of the research, considering them under five different components, 
constituting the ‘multi-level’ and the ‘governance’ layers. It should be recalled, in such 
perspective, that the analytical relevance of such model lies exactly in the capacity of 
isolating and stressing certain elements over others, while in real life the same 
phenomenon presents a complex set of aspects and empirical connections: this 
explains the various overlapping and repetitions throughout the chapter. 
On such bases it is possible to provide an answer to SQ2 – i.e. what factors and 
dynamics are relevant to the formulation of policies against migrant smuggling on a 
national level? – in the light of both vertical and horizontal dynamics. 
Starting with the multi-level dynamics (layer 2 of the model, see chapter 2), the cases 
considered show a substantial difference between the interaction of the national level 
with the local and the EU one. As a first general consideration, a number of different 
cases of bottom-up dynamics were showed, compared to the more limited scope of 
the top-down examples coming from the European Union. Such a difference becomes 
even more definite if considering ‘wanted’ consequences, i.e. processes of preference 




of unwanted consequences (as side effects of Europeanisation, cf. Vink and Graziano, 
2007). 
This first conclusion is in itself quite significant, in particular considering that the 
exploration of bottom-up dynamics in migration studies and, even more, the 
combination of that with an understanding also of top-down dynamics have traditionally 
been neglected (Zincone and Caponio, 2006). 
However, this does not tell us much yet as for the effectiveness of these very 
processes, i.e. to what extent and why these shifts are able to inform national policy-
making dynamics. In order to understand that, it is necessary to zoom into the actors 
that take leading role in these processes, the main patterns in terms of policy-making 
as well as the substantive issues concerned.  
In the connection with the ground, besides decision-makers (MPs and ministries), as 
the recipients of the information and preference coming from the local level, key roles 
are those of the judiciary (both in terms of prosecutor’s offices and courts) and local 
governments. The role of both of them in influencing the policy adoption has been 
widely considered in this and in the previous chapter, as well as in relevant literature 
(Caponio and Jones-Correa, 2017 and Marmo, 2007); however, what is crucial in the 
understanding of the existing patterns is the way in which these processes are 
particularly facilitated by two institutional arenas: (a) the parliamentary committees and 
(b) the intermediate bodies (see also chapter 4). 
This element acquires particular relevance in terms of information and preference 
upload, since they essentially work as a collector and organiser of local actors and 
information, providing also an institutional support for their voices to be heard. In this 
sense, the case of the judiciary is emblematic, being able (for example as for the role 
assumed by the Prosecutor of Catania) to play a substantial role even far outside the 
judicial arena (meant as the institutional space tasked with the judicial function). 
Furthermore, in particular in the case of intermediate bodies, they represent a typical 
example of institutions in the broader meaning of March and Olsen (1984 and 2011), 
enabling local agency to unfold even beyond and in deeper ways than the letter of 
norms would provide for (e.g. the lobbying of municipalities through ANCI). 
However, even beyond the actual impact on policies (which shall be discussed below), 




policy-making is represented by the qualitative information selection. In other words, it 
appears that not all type of information is successfully uploaded, opening the 
possibilities of severe shortcomings in it. This is basically explained in the light of:  
1. The lack of representativeness and/or proportionality in guest selection in 
committee hearings: again, the case of the Prosecutor of Catania can be an 
interesting example, given his stance on NGO-led SAR operations, in 
comparison, for example, with other actors examined in chapter 4 or even in 
this very chapter, pertaining to the judiciary or to other institutions. Nevertheless, 
the debate was ‘dominated’ by his views; 
2. The institutionally divisive nature of migrant smuggling and (undocumented) 
migration: as emerged in the overall analysis of this chapter (and of the previous 
one), besides personal preferences, expertise and experiences, the institutional 
membership also seems to influence the individual stance on the concerned 
issues, in line with the new institutionalist argument (cf. Olsson, 2016). 
If these challenges are strictly connected with the overall institutional architecture, two 
more contingent issues that emerged still have an impact on these processes, i.e.  
1. The reported decrease of meetings and non-institutional tables over the years, 
which can clearly jeopardise the overall shifting up process; 
2. The discretionary and potentially creative role of bureaucracy, also besides the 
one already explored on the ground (Fabini, 2007 and Lipsky, 1980), also at a 
national level, as reported in the case on negotiations between intermediate 
bodies and the government, and can be essentially read in terms of the room 
left for agency by the institutional delegation coming from the principal, i.e. the 
government itself (Tallberg, 2002). 
Lastly, as for the unwanted consequences, they mainly refer to typical forms of judicial 
activism, widely considered in literature (Anaya, 2014 and Marmo, 2007). 
In the Europeanisation arena, as was briefly mentioned, the situation appears to be 
different and much less rich in examples. Here the main actors are EU institutions and 
agencies (which can be very effective in influencing the policy-making on specific 




more marginal role of the judiciary function, of the EC (for the infringement procedure) 
and of the CJEU. 
The interaction between the two levels appears much less organised in terms of arenas 
and the relevant cases analysed fall more within the scope of unintended 
consequences (see Pollack, 2009) and there seems to be little room for any ‘shadow 
of hierarchy’ (Scharpf, 1994). This can be mostly explained in terms of the institutional 
nature of this relationship, i.e. the legislative competence attributed to the EU (see 
chapter 3) and, partly, to the twofold role of national government as de facto policy-
maker in Italy and co-policy-maker in Europe.  
In such perspective, in anti-smuggling policies, the basis of the EU influence on 
national policy-making, rather than in terms either of ‘venue shopping’ (Guiraudon, 
2000) or ‘liberal constraints’ (Kaunert and Léonard, 2012, among others. See also 
Bonjour et al., 2018), can be read in terms of (a) side effects of EU missed reforms or 
policy failures (cf. Scipioni 2018b); (b) ‘excuse shopping’, i.e. the ‘blame Brussels’ 
game above recalled, offering a political space of getaway to be used as a scapegoat.  
All this is not always consistent with the Italian agency at a supranational level and 
sometimes does not even reflect the actual room for manoeuvre that would persist at 
a national level. This last aspect can be better understood by turning the principal-
agent model upside down, as mostly considered in EU literature. Here national policy-
makers could act as agents of an EU principal, intervening in all those policy areas 
where MSs would be free to legislate. But Italian policy-makers actually tend not to use 
this legislative discretion at national policy level, even though there would actually be 
room for it, and tending instead to make a political issue on the shortcomings of EU 
policy-making (EUR_1, March 2019; EUR_2, May 2019). 
Overall, the relationship between the levels seems characterised by an ambivalent role 
and perception of the EU (cf. Abbondanza, 2017, for example, on the Italian 
dissatisfaction with EU commitment and, on the other side, the “wide margin of 
appreciation in the hands of EU Member States” on certain key aspects, Carrera et al., 
2016, p. 61). 
As for the main substantive issues addressed, much of the between-the-level 




1. SAR operations, both in terms of the role of NGOs, the humanitarian vs. security 
based logics (in particular considering Operation Sophia), and the closing 
harbours policy (Cusumano, 2019; Cusumano and Gombeer, 2018 and Cuttitta, 
2018); 
2. Aspects of the ‘facilitation offence’, in particular related to the humanitarian 
exemption and the difference between smugglers and facilitators (Carrera et al., 
2018b). 
Other aspects residually addressed include: (a) the need of international cooperation 
(as a request coming in particular from the judiciary); (b) the multifaceted nature of 
smuggling (consistently with the smuggling spectrum in section 1.2.3.), again brought 
forward by the judiciary but emerged also in institutional dialogues with Brussels, in 
particular as for an ambivalent perception of the demand side for smuggling; (c) the 
burden sharing among MSs as for the reallocation of asylum seekers. 
Substantive issues are important to consider, even if the policy content is not the 
explanandum of the research, as they can offer an interesting perspective in order to 
understand the impact that this process of information upload (and download) actually 
has in terms of the policies eventually formulated. The tendency that has been 
witnessed is that of a more successful between-the-level communication in cases of 
restrictive policy preferences, regardless the specific issue, as part of a general 
securitising approach (cf. Abbondanza, 2017), falling essentially on the right side of 
the smuggling spectrum (see section 1.2.3.) and selectively reinforcing pre-existing 
policy options (cf. path dependency dynamics in Pollack, 2009). 
This can happen in two different moments:  
1. During the shifting up/down dynamic, such as limiting access to intermediate 
bodies or more generally ignoring requests or evidence coming from the 
supranational or the local level (e.g. the whole parliamentary committees work 
on NGO-led SAR);  
2. Throughout the policy formulation and adoption stricto sensu, as was observed 
in the ‘governance’ dynamics and shall be further discussed below (to provide 




of the Anti-Mafia Committee can be recalled, though it has not led to any specific 
policy).  
This argument, in turn, leads on to the question of evidence-based policy-making 
(Baldwin-Edwards, Blitz and Crawley, 2019), in relation to the influence of the local 
level (in terms of practices, challenges and expertise) onto the national policy-making. 
The criticism of such situation can be best expressed through the words of a UNODC 
officer (INT_2, April 2019): 
I think we need really more evidence-based approaches to develop these policies or 
to test their impact. [Member States] do not seem to be necessarily able to critically 
assess the effectiveness of their action and especially the side effects it could have. I 
mean because, in a way, that’s also the way you would unveil or confirm the fact that 
the primary motives for the action were flows [of migrants]; that it was not organised 
crime that was being targeted but unwanted migration, most likely. 
This aspect constitutes a major issue in the national policy-making, posing a relevant 
question as to the actual possibility of a bottom-up influence in smuggling-related 
policy-making. 
Insofar as the ‘governance’ aspect (layer 3 of the model, see chapter 2) is concerned, 
the analysis conducted allowed to focus, in turn, on different policy areas, on the 
external interaction of policy-makers and on internal dynamics within the institutional 
framework. The same issue has, in certain cases, been addressed by these multiple 
perspectives, again stressing the analytical relevance of the model proposed. 
The main actors considered have been national decision-makers, and namely the 
government and the parliament. The relationships between and within them have been 
highlighted in particular in the first and third dimension of the layer. Also other 
institutional (Constitutional Court, law enforcement agencies) and, even more, non-
institutional actors (NGOs) have been considered as for their influence on the national 
policy-making process, but definitely to a lesser extent if compared to the two decision-
makers. 
Numerous different patterns have arisen through this multiple perspective, and shall 




Firstly, the focus on the different policy areas included in the anti-smuggling framework, 
arising from the smuggling spectrum and confirmed by several sources, has allowed 
to consider the consequences of such structural overlapping and interaction, in 
particular in terms of:  
1. Complexity of the policy-making process;  
2. The ambivalence of such complexity, sometimes used also instrumentally (e.g. 
in the ‘shifting south’ policies, see Lavenex, 2006), whereas deliberately ignored 
in other cases (the demand side for smuggling, see the smuggling spectrum in 
section 1.2.3. and Perkowski and Squire, 2019);  
3. Effects on institutional dynamics, in particular in terms of conflicts within policy-
makers (cf. Zincone, 2011);  
4. Shape and nature of bills and legislative acts, which appear very 
heterogeneous, composite and not necessarily matching the policy goals 
(Finotelli and Sciortino, 2009). 
Secondly, as for the non-institutional dynamics, the importance of policy practices has 
been the central element. On purpose informal-to-institutional dynamics take actually 
place only very limitedly, and in quite unsatisfactory ways, such as in the case of the 
maxi-amendment to the Minniti-Orlando Decree. Differently, they assume the form of 
unintended consequences, rather than being the deliberate result of a process aimed 
at influencing the national policy-making (Carrera et al., 2018a). From here some 
responses arise, often taking the form of ‘new governance’ extra-legislative tools 
(Cardwell, 2018), through a careful choice (Capano and Lippi, 2017), also raising 
concern in terms of lawfulness and effectiveness (Cusumano, 2019 and Cusumano 
and Gombeer, 2018). The clearest examples in this perspective are the 2017 Code of 
conduct and the 2018/19 closing harbours policy. They in turn bring another important 
issue forward, i.e. the continuity within the political spectrum between these two 
policies and their respective legislators, i.e. a centre-left and a right wing government 
(see Cusumano and Gombeer, 2018; Giuliani, 2008 and Zincone, 2011). 





1. The dominant role of the government, in terms of executive-centred policies, as 
well as a very important actor also in the political debate; 
2. The yet important role of the parliament, crucial in the political discourse and to 
a lesser extent also influential in the policy adoption stricto sensu; 
3. The importance of the political spectrum, in a highly politicised and divisive 
issue, but still a certain continuity between centre-left and centre-right (or right 
wing) parties (Giuliani, 2008 and Zincone, 2011); 
4. The lack of major evidence-based debates (Baldwin-Edwards et al., 2019, see 
also above); 
5. The importance of issues of effectiveness and accountability in the 
parliamentary debates  and in the policy evaluation; 
6. The role of the Constitutional Court, as an influential actor in this subject matter 
(cf. Rebessi and Zucchini, 2018 and Volcansek, 2000), even if clearly more 
limited compared to the decision-makers. 
Very rarely arena linkages take place, mainly due to the hardly challenged leading role 
of the government, to the detriment of the parliament. Few cases of arena linkages 
have happened through the combination of heterogeneous bills and confidence vote, 
by so doing de facto limiting the freedom of actions of majority MPs, ‘taking them 
hostage’ through another policy arena or, more broadly and deeply, threatening a 
government crisis (cf. Héritier, 2019 and Tsebelis, 1990). 
Differently form layer 2, in this specific case the analysis of the policy content is not 
relevant in order to explain the greater or lesser success of processes of information 
upload or download. However, an understanding of the content of bills and policies, or, 
more broadly, of the overall political debate is nevertheless important, in particular in 
order to better assess the degree of success of between-the-level communication and 
to what extent policies are actually evidence-based. 
In this perspective, in spite of the multifaceted nature of smuggling, at the basis of the 
operational definition used in this research and widely acknowledged by practitioners 
(the smuggling spectrum, see section 1.2.3.), as reported throughout the research and 
explored in the interaction between the different policy areas, smuggling-related policy-




This takes the shape of the use of anti-smuggling as a migration management tool, 
policing humanitarianism (and in particular SAR NGO-led activities), ‘shifting south’ 
approach (which is arguably comprehensive, as including a foreign policy and 
development cooperation dimension, but still extremely security-based), a much less 
economic-based migration debate and a focus on the offence of illegal entry.  
Besides that, another last very important issue mostly addressed, especially in 
parliamentary debates, was the role of the European Union, often perceived in very 
contradictory ways, and the overall process of reform of Dublin III Regulation in 
particular (see chapter 6). 
Table 5.2. summarises and highlights the most relevant aspects here discussed, 
according to the different layers. 
 
Table 5.2. – Policy-making dynamics at a national level (layers 2 and 3)  
 
Main actors Main substantive 
issues involved or 
addressed 










Intermediate bodies (i.e. 




SAR operations (different 
nature, role of NGOs) 
Need of international 
cooperation 
Multifaceted and 







institutionally limited but 
politically powerful  
Role of judiciary outside judicial 
arena  
Smuggling not only politically 
but also institutionally divisive 
Role of bureaucracy 
Guest selection bias in 
Committees 
Shortcomings in information 
upload and impact on policies 
E
U 
EU institutions and 
agencies 
National government  
(EC, CJEU) 
Different effects of 
missed reforms  
Burden sharing 
Role of NGOs in SAR 
Ambivalent perception of 
the demand side 
Ambivalent role and perception 
of the EU 
‘Blame Brussels’ 
Limited impact of the judicial 
arena 
Role of agencies 













National decision-makers Multifaceted nature of 
smuggling and 
connection with other 
policies  
Securitisation (anti-
smuggling as migration 
management) 
Facilitation vs. smuggling 
Overlapping with other policy 
areas (structural/instrumental)  
Overlapping/heterogeneity bills 
Primacy of Ministry of Interior  
Limited scope of decision-
makers’ choices  

















Centrality of informal practices 
and their unintended 
consequences 
‘New governance’ tools  to 
address NGOs practices in the 
Mediterranean 
Potential limited scope of 
advocacy 
Continuity right-left  



















‘Shifting south’ approach 
Development 
cooperation  
Offence of illegal entry  
Role of the EU 
(ambivalent perception) 
Dublin III Regulation  
Role of NGOs in SAR 
Executive-centred policies 
Parliament crucial for political 
discourse 
Government still influential on 
political debate (agenda-
setting) 
Importance of the political 
spectrum 
Lack of evidence-based 
debates  
Limited role of judiciary 
Continuity right-left  
Effectiveness and 
accountability 





Chapter 6  
Multiple levels, policy areas, informal and institutional actors: 
making policies in the anti-smuggling domain at an EU level 
 
6.1. Introduction 
To conclude the analysis of the different layers of governance, this chapter focuses on 
the multi-level and governance dynamics taking place at an EU level, similarly to the 
analysis of chapter 5 on the Italian level, in order to understand how policies are 
actually designed and what factors matter. In this regard, besides the widely 
acknowledged supranational vs. intergovernmental dynamics (see chapter 1), attention 
will be given again to the information and preference upload processes, as well as to 
the various policy areas involved, considering both non-institutional and institutional 
dynamics. 
Processes of vertical communication shall consider the interaction between Sicilian, 
Italian and EU actors, based on the case selection for this research. Again, in line with 
the smuggling spectrum (see section 1.2.3.) and the applicable legislative framework 
(see chapter 3), a broader set of policies will be considered, rather than those 
specifically addressing the smuggling of migrants, including, among others, demand-
oriented policies and the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) reform. 
The overall analysis shall be based, such as in the previous chapter, on the analytical 
model elaborated in chapter 2, and in particular on layer 2 (‘multi-level’ dynamics, 
paragraph 6.2.) and layer 3 (‘governance’ dynamics, paragraph 6.3.), whereas 
elements of layer 1 (agency/institutions) will be addressed case by case throughout 
the chapter and in a more complete and comprehensive way in paragraph 6.4. and in 
chapter 7. Policy-making processes will be presented according to the different layers 
and following an impact/relevance assessment, which does not always correspond to 
a chronological one. 
Finally, paragraph 6.4. will be dedicated to an analytical synopsis of the issues 
addressed throughout the chapter and to answer research sub-question (SQ)3: what 




smuggling on a supranational level?  As in chapter 5, the most theoretical and 
analytical perspective of the chapter will lie there, compared to a more narrative style, 
presenting the data collected, in the rest of it.  
It should be recalled again, lastly, that the application of the analytical model will make 
it possible to analyse and address the same phenomenon or policy-making process 
from multiple points of view, in so lying its high heuristic power. On the other side, 
though, this entails the risk of a feeling of repetition and/or overlapping in the reader, 
within this very chapter and with aspects already considered in chapters 4 and 5, which 
is nevertheless unavoidable in order to disclose and navigate through the overall 
complexity of the subject matter. 
 
6.2. Multi-level dynamics  
The exploration of the multi-level dynamics, involving both the ground and national 
dimensions (see Figure 6.1. below), that affect the EU policy-making on migrant 
smuggling and related policies show several similarities to the national level, both in 
terms of patterns and of substantive issues addressed. However, one remarkable 
difference, that should be underscored from the very beginning, has to do with the way 
in which policy-makers gather information: in particular to (a) the different role of 
parliamentary hearings, both in terms of number and impact of them; (b) the use of a 
very peculiar instrument, i.e. field visits; (c) the role of research (experts and academia) 
in shifting up dynamics. All these issues turn central in the analysis of these processes. 
 
Figure 6.1. – Interaction directions at a supranational level 
 




6.2.1. Intermediate bodies, parliamentary committees and field visits: the connection 
with the local level 
Direct institutional connection between the Sicilian and the supranational level (hence 
bypassing the national one), in terms of influence of the EU policy-making process, 
takes first of all place through the intermediate bodies47.  
Here the main role is that of the Association of the Italian Municipalities (ANCI), which 
besides the activities undertaken at a national level, is quite active also at an EU level. 
This happens, specifically, in the work that ANCI conducts with the Committee of 
Regions (CoR), which encompasses a double track. On the one side, there is an 
interest from the EU and Member States (MSs) to better understand migration-related 
issues in Italy, and in particular the reception system (which, as seen, is nevertheless 
peripheral in this analysis); on the other side, through the CoR, ANCI seeks to gain 
more power for Italian municipalities, in particular securing direct management over 
EU funds for migration-related programmes (ITA_1, March 2019).  
It is particularly interesting to take note of one of the main advantages of this last 
aspect, in the opinion of ITA_1 (March 2019): there are migration issues that are 
“neutral” for mayors, regardless their political affiliation, such as part of the 
reception/protection policies (see section 4.2.4.). Therefore, a direct management on 
the local level would ensure less polarisation and a better adherence to the reality of 
policy responses. 
Eurojust and Europol, mostly in connection with the National Anti-Mafia and Anti-
terrorism Prosecutor’s Office (DNA), also play a central role in the intermediate bodies 
arena. In particular, JUD_3 (April 2019), who is a member of the judiciary acting at 
national level, recalled the efforts that Italian authorities undertook (also) through 
Eurojust to strengthen judicial cooperation with third countries and within the EU, also 
with information sharing and joint investigations team, and to overcome, from a 
                                                          
47 The intermediate bodies, consistently with the approach chosen, at an EU level could be considered 
either in the section analysing the connections with the ground or in the one dedicated to the connections 
with the national level, depending on where the stress is placed between the local and the national sides 
of intermediate bodies’ activities. The choice to place them in this section emphasise the local origin 
(and consequences) of the issues brought forward by the intermediate bodies, consistently with the 




legislative point of view, those shortcomings that jeopardise the effectiveness of these 
very efforts, such as different procedural rules in MSs. 
The DNA meeting of 25 May 2017 – already mentioned in the previous chapters – is 
significant in this regard, with the presence of practitioners situated at three different 
levels, including Europol and Eurojust (as well as other EU bodies such as Frontex and 
EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia), with a view to facilitating the interaction between 
the different levels and the understanding of actual existing smuggling patterns 
(JUD_3, April 2019).  
In this whole line of cooperation and information upload there is an involvement also 
of Operation Sophia, which, besides the meeting of 25 May 2017, signed in 2017 a 
protocol with the DNA aimed at information sharing (JUD_3, April 2019 and 
EUNAVFOR MED, 2018), even though the ultimate nature of the EU mission is 
different, as it shall be further discussed. 
The cooperation between DNA and Operation Sophia made it also possible to realise 
a report where some very important facts and evidence-based analyses on smuggling 
were provided, such as the strong impact of the 2017 Code of conduct on the extent 
of the involvement of NGOs in search and rescue (SAR) operations or the 
organisational aspects of smuggling networks, often very structured in Libya, whereas 
the actual facilitator falls outside it (JUD_3, April 2019 and EUNAVFOR MED, 2018).  
Likewise at a national level, also European Parliament (EP, the Parliament) standing 
committees – Civil liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) in particular –  carried out 
very relevant activities for the processes of information and preference uploads over 
the period considered, namely through hearings and field visits. Differently from the 
Italian case, though, the EP did not show to use hearings for systematic inquiry of 
issues related to migrant smuggling, also because of different institutional 
arrangements, privileging the use of the European Parliament Research Service 
(EPRS), providing substantive information on “delicate dossiers” (EUR_2, May 2019. 
See also 6.3.2.). 
Nevertheless, a few hearings relevant to the subject matter took place and should 
therefore be recalled, such as (a) the hearings organised between April and July 2015, 
in preparation for the Strategic Report on Migration, and which involved several MS 




“Search and rescue in the Central Mediterranean” of 12 July 2017, where alongside 
Frontex and NGOs, also the Italian coast guard was heard (European Parliament, 
2017a). 
However, more significant – and remarkable, if compared to the activities of the 
national parliament – events were the field visits organised by the LIBE Committee, 
that allowed Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) to meet several local 
institutions, in different occasions, and to get to know personally some of the most 
relevant issues at local level, such as in these examples:  
1. The joint visit with the Committee on Budgets (BUDG) to Sicily of 22-24 July 
2015, where EU policy-makers could meet the Prefetti of Agrigento and Ragusa 
and the Vice-Prefetto of Catania, as well as the heads of the Italian police 
(Questori) of Catania, Agrigento and Ragusa and other national institutions, 
NGOs and field officers of EU agencies (European Parliament, 2015c);  
2. The EP LIBE delegation to  Lampedusa (Italy) on search and rescue, in the 
context of the strategic own-initiative report on “the situation in the 
Mediterranean and the need for a holistic EU approach to migration” of 17-18 
September 2015, where MEPs could meet the Mayor of Lampedusa, some navy 
officers (and NGOs) and assist to a migrant disembarkation (European 
Parliament, 2015b);  
3. The mission to Italy of 18-21 April 2017, which enabled MEPs to meet 
Prefettura, judicial, police and navy authorities in Catania as well as several 
national institutional and non-institutional authorities in Rome, besides visiting a 
reception centre (European Parliament, 2017b). 
In the latter case, in particular, several issues related to smuggling (also in line with the 
smuggling spectrum, see section 1.2.3.) were brought to the attention of MEPs, such 
as the difference between smugglers and facilitators, the issue of ‘forced’ smugglers, 
as well as the role of NGOs and the lack of any proof of connection with smugglers in 
Libya – an issue which was most likely addressed also in a following meeting with 
Prosecutor Zuccaro, which was kept confidential, though (European Parliament, 




This layer as a whole does not seem particularly rich in examples of information and 
preference upload. However, this does not necessarily mean that EU policies are not 
evidence-based (Baldwin-Edwards et al., 2019), but it could rather be the effect of a 
different institutional architecture (as we shall see below, in section 6.3.2., paragraph 
6.4. and chapter 7), privileging those other forms of information collection above 
recalled. As EUR_1 (March 2019) put it, EU policies are supported by a knowledge of 
the phenomena. The European Commission (EC, the Commission), for example, has 
its own sources and a method based on different knowledge tools and the legislative 
procedure as such includes actors that enjoy an in-depth knowledge of the 
phenomenon. EUR_2, based on his/her direct experience as MEP, confirmed that this 
view is applicable also to the European Parliament, pointing out, in particular, the 
existence of the EPRS above recalled, which provides MEPs with substantive 
expertise, coming also from the ground, through ad-hoc research works. A different 
story is that of the Council of the EU (the Council), where “everything is very little 
transparent, differently from the Parliament” (EUR_2, May 2019). 
 
6.2.2. The ambiguous impact of the national level 
The Italian political debate and legislative process also have an impact on the EU 
policy-making in smuggling-related issues. The way in which the debate at a national 
level influences the decision-making process of the European Union, in particular, 
needs to be considered. This seems to happen through (a) direct connection between 
the two levels; (b) influence of the national political debate in the preference shaping 
of actors situated at a supranational level (both in the EP and in the Council).  
Hearings and field visits play an important role in establishing a connection between 
the national and EU level, in the same way as this happens in the relationship with the 
local level explored above. They include, in particular:  
1. The inter-parliamentary committee meetings “A holistic approach to migration” 
of 23 September 2015, “The Third Reform of the Common European Asylum 
System – Up for the Challenge” of 28 February 2017 and “The European 
Agenda on Migration – What about Legal Avenues and Integration?” of 24 




2. The hearing “The reform of the Dublin System and Crisis Relocation” of 10 
October 2016;  
3. The 2015 LIBE/BUDG Committees visits to Sicily and the 2017 LIBE Committee 
visit to Italy, already mentioned in the previous section. This enabled MEP to 
meet and discuss relevant issues for EU policies with Italian Members of 
Parliament (MPs), high-level public administration officers and members of the 
government. 
However, what was said in the previous section on the different role and importance 
that hearings assume at an EU level stands true also with regard to the national level, 
limiting also the explanatory power of the substantive issues addressed in this upload 
processes. Likewise, also here the mediated contribution of research and academia 
plays a crucial role, which will be further discussed in section 6.3.2. 
Also the national parliament is an important actor in Italy-EU dynamics, either directly 
or indirectly. As for the first, this is the case, among others, of the reasoned opinions, 
based on the principle of subsidiarity, issued on the Dublin III Regulation reform 
proposals: the Italian Parliament expressed its negative evaluation, considering in 
particular the lack of sufficient mechanisms in order to ensure a fair sharing of 
responsibilities among MSs and stronger cooperation, so as to relieve external border 
countries (Chamber of Deputies, 2016 and Senate of the Republic, 2016). A topic 
which has definitely shaped the Italian debate and stance on asylum and the overall 
migration management and fight towards undocumented migration (see, for example, 
the Diciotti case). 
Indirect influence has more broadly to do with the overall national political debate, 
which contributes to shape the preferences of actors situated at a supranational level. 
An example in this perspective is the influence that the stances of the national 
government (and, in turn, the political debate) have on MEPs, in determining their 
course of action, as stated by EUR_2 (May 2019). S/he also reported the possibility of 
having an opposite process, in particular with MEPs trying to influence their national 
government on asylum issues, without great success, though. S/he stressed, however, 
how in the EP is still possible to build transversal majorities, also differently from the 
national arena (on the connection between MEPs policy preferences on asylum and 




In this scenario, the national political actor which acquires more relevance is definitely 
government (over parliament), and its role is clearly twofold: on the one side, it is a 
national actor expressing its own preferences and sharing relevant information with 
supranational actors; on the other side, it is acting, together with the other MSs, as co-
legislator, within the Council. It is the type of action considered, therefore, that makes 
it clear at what level and in which capacity the government is acting, and so also in 
what analytical layer such an action falls. 
Two recent cases clearly show some patterns of governmental action towards the EU 
in this subject matter. The first one has to do with the 2017 Code of conduct (and, to a 
lesser extent, to the Italy-Libya Deal of the same year). In this circumstance, the 
influence of Italian dynamics on the EU policy-making came in terms of a request of 
support and endorsement towards national policies that had been very controversial in 
terms of legitimacy and effectiveness (see chapter 5). A sort of request of burden and 
responsibility sharing with EU institutions from the PD-led government, which was 
eventually granted by the European Union (Cusumano, 2019; European Council, 2017; 
European Parliament, 2018a and RaiNews, 2017). 
The second example is related to the strong request coming, in 2018, from the 
M5S/Lega Nord government of changing the mandate of Operation Sophia (and, more 
in general, the relocation system within the Dublin system) and which would have led 
to the Diciotti case, as was widely explored in the previous chapter. In this case, 
therefore, the request of an EU action was not going towards the (even merely political) 
support of existing national policies, but rather in the opposite direction of changing an 
EU policy, under the threat of a national assertive action on disembarkations. The EU 
did not substantially amend its policies in this field and the Diciotti case and the wider 
closing harbours policy did not seem to produce the desired effects on the EU level 
(Council of the EU, 2019 and Frenzen, 2018. See also Rasche, 2018). 
The opinion of ITA_2 (April 2019) on this “muscular policy” was already reported in 
chapter 5, as well as the effects in terms of isolation, and they are worth being recalled 
here. S/he further added, however, how this isolation is also the result of not having 
sought an agreement at an EU level with countries such as Germany, France, Sweden 
or Spain, that could have been keen to open a dialogue on this issue. Bringing the 




therefore, rather than trying to exercise pressure from the national level, seeking the 
political support of the Visegrád Group.  
The approach to the EU of the last two Italian governments – and of their two respective 
Ministers of Interior, Marco Minniti and Matteo Salvini – seems rather different. In the 
words of EUR_2 (May 2019), Minniti, “even if too timidly, […] was trying to assert the 
principle that Italy must not be left alone, whereas Salvini plays both sides […] and this 
policy ends up by worsening the relationships with those partners who could be the 
first to help Italy in relocations”. S/he explained that Minister Minniti, indeed, although 
not pushing at all for Dublin III Regulation reform, was extremely active on “the 
externalisation policies with Libya [at an EU level], then also supported by the whole 
Council and also by the European Commission”, whereas, in the case of Minister 
Salvini, “since the Diciotti case he contrasted not really the “right ones”, […] but against 
the ones who […] have given some signals of solidarity”.  
Besides the opinion of EUR_2 (May 2019), who, as a progressive MEP, could be 
somehow biased, these views are supported also by ITA_2 (April 2019), who recalled 
also the example of the Libyan-based development cooperation projects, on which Italy 
unsuccessfully tried to involve also the EU. More generally, strong criticism was 
directed against Minister Salvini for not participating in Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) 
Councils, inconsistently with the political discourse conducted (Montalto Monella, 
2019). 
Lastly on Ministers Minniti and Salvini, it should be clear that even if some differences 
in the type of vertical relationship between national government and EU institutions 
exist, this is not conclusive in terms of substantive difference in the political and policy 
approach of the two at a national and EU level, as was already explored in chapter 5, 
where the issue of continuity was already sketched, and as it will be further discussed 
in the next sections and chapter. 
As a general conclusive remark on the national level influence on EU policy-making, 
all the practitioners responding on this issue agreed on the substantial influence that 
MSs (and Italy in particular) have on the EU, also besides the mere presence of the 
national government in the Council and European Council. “This rhetoric according to 
which Brussels decides alone is false”, and this applies not only to the role of national 




2019). INT_2 (April 2019) further explained how the EU approach reflects what 
happens at a national level, although s/he has seen “more caution at the European 
Commission’s side nowadays” than in MSs in using “instruments to fight migrant 
smuggling to actually fight irregular migration, […] responding to the concerns that we 
have seen emerging in many EU countries in the past years”. Last but not least, EUR_1 
(March 2019) stressed that even though Italy tends to complain considerably about the 
lack of influence on EU policies, it is important to always assess to what extent choices 
are good for the EU as a whole, beyond the individual MSs, since choices at an EU 
level need to balance all the interests at stake and something will be necessarily 
sacrificed. 
 
6.3. Governance dynamics  
Horizontal dynamics, involving institutional and informal actors, are particularly salient 
at an EU level, also considering the deeply complex governance structure of this 
institution. In this perspective, this paragraph clearly falls within the overall debate 
reported in chapter 1 on the institutional evolution of the EU policy-making in the Area 
of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ, see Bonjour et al., 2018; Huber, 2015; 
Maricut, 2016 and Trauner and Ripoll Servent, 2016) Not surprisingly, therefore, the 
analytical distinction among different components of the layer often overlap, in 
particular between different policy areas and different institutions, as shall be clear from 
the first lines of the next section. 
 
6.3.1. Beyond the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: other policies and 
governance consequences 
Similarly to the national level, also at an EU level the very nature of migrant smuggling 
favours the connection between different policy areas, essentially within the law-
making arena. In this case, the overlapping occurs mainly with (a) asylum policies 
(rather than general migration policies, consistently with the competence division 
between EU and MSs) and, as at a national level, with (b) defence and foreign policies 




In fact, the very need for an integrated approach, encompassing different areas of 
policy, is acknowledged by the EU in all the key-documents regarding migrant 
smuggling (European Commission, 2015a and 2015b and European Parliament, 
2016). The issue at stake, therefore, is to what extent and in which manner this 
comprehensive approach, which would be consistent with the smuggling spectrum 
elaborated in section 1.2.3., has actually taken place and how these different areas 
have interacted. 
The centrality of asylum policies came clearly out as early as in 2015, in (a) the Working 
Document on Developing safe and lawful routes for asylum seekers and refugees into 
the EU, including the Union resettlement policy and corresponding integration policies 
and in (b) the Working Document on tackling criminal smuggling, trafficking and labour 
exploitation of irregular migrants, focusing on the importance of resettlement, 
humanitarian visas, temporary protection directive and drawing some considerations 
on legal migration and on the fragmented scenario (European Parliament, 2015d, pp. 
1–2 and European Parliament, 2015e, p. 5). In the second document, the remarkable 
opinion of UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, François Crépeau, 
on the need to open new entry channels as a tool to fight against smuggling is also 
reported (European Parliament, 2015e, p. 5). 
In the same year, the European Parliament resolution of 10 September 2015 on 
migration and refugees in Europe (2015/2833(RSP)) further stressed this aspect: 
[The European Parliament r]ecalls that the possibilities for people in need of protection 
to legally enter the EU are very limited, and deplores the fact that they have no other 
option but to resort to criminal smugglers and dangerous routes to find protection in 
Europe, as a result of, among other factors, the building of fences and sealing-off of 
external borders; considers it therefore a high priority that the EU and its Member 
States create safe and legal avenues for refugees, such as humanitarian corridors 
and humanitarian visas; stresses that, in addition to a compulsory resettlement 
programme, Member States should agree to provide other tools, such as enhanced 
family reunification, private sponsorship schemes and flexible visa arrangements, 
including for study and work; believes that it is necessary to amend the Visa Code by 
including more specific common provisions on humanitarian visas; asks Member 




Such an approach was confirmed in the European Parliament resolution of 12 April 
2016 on the situation in the Mediterranean and the need for a holistic EU approach to 
migration (2015/2095(INI)), where it is stated that: 
[C]riminal networks and smugglers exploit the desperation of people trying to enter 
the Union while fleeing persecution or war […], safe and legal routes for refugees to 
access the Union are limited, and many continue to take the risk of embarking on 
dangerous routes[. Therefore] the creation of  new safe and lawful routes for asylum 
seekers and refugees to enter the Union, building on existing legislation and practices, 
would allow the Union and the Member States to have a better overview of the 
protection needs and of the inflow into the Union and to undermine the business 
model of the smugglers. 
The overall commitment of the European Parliament towards humanitarian visas and 
its struggle, over the whole legislature, with the Council in this respect (see below) 
goes exactly in this very direction. Key elements, in this regard, are the 2016 Report 
on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
Union Code on Visas (Visa Code) (recast) (COM(2014)0164 – C8 0001/2014 – 
2014/0094(COD)), where the EP proposed some amendments to include humanitarian 
visas in the reform process, the subsequent deadlock and the 2018 Report with 
recommendations to the Commission on Humanitarian Visas (2017/2270(INL)).  
The words of a MEP are significant in making the shared approach of the majority of 
the house clear in this respect and the tone of the debate, disclosing those elements 
of a moral debate (not always consistent with policy outcomes) that characterise this 
supranational arena, as we shall see below: 
Do we realise that the southern border of Europe is the most dangerous border in the 
world for irregular migrants? Do you think it is possible to go on with this irresponsible 
management of a complex and unstoppable phenomenon such as immigration? Do 
you think it is wise to continue building walls around this fortress called Europe, letting 
that the Mediterranean become a big cemetery? […]. Let’s increase and make more 
efficient the legal access channels for asylum-seekers, for family reunifications, for 
those looking for a job (MEP Laura Agea, EFDD, 8th European Parliament, Session 




Furthermore, the centrality of the issue was widely stated also by several practitioners, 
in different ways and with different nuances. EUR_1 (March 2019) spoke extensively 
about this point, starting by drawing a clear connection between smuggling and some 
sort of ‘asylum shopping’, definitely pointing in the direction of asylum policies as a pull 
factors both for smugglers and for smuggled migrants. In his/her opinion, policy 
choices have a substantial impact in determining the organisation and reorganisation 
smugglers (s/he spoke of this in terms of “resilience”). Answering a question on the 
demand side for smuggling, s/he pointed out that such a demand is facilitated by wrong 
information and frauds, and s/he referred to UNHCR and IOM reports supporting this 
conclusion. 
These processes are facilitated, according to EUR_1 (March 2019), by the internet and 
social networks, and it is then notable that the Italian Ministry of Interior and the 
European Asylum Support Office (EASO) decided to use these very systems in order 
to disseminate counter-information. 
The whole EU asylum framework (with the partial exception of the Procedures 
Directive) has a significant impact on this. The Qualification Directive and the different 
transposition into national laws establish the grounds for granting asylum, that, once 
known, could arguably be used by smugglers to prep migrants and orientate flows 
towards those countries where better conditions of protection are offered (e.g. the 
protection for persecution on sexual orientation grounds, which is acknowledged in 
Italy and not in other countries, EUR_1, March 2019). The same interviewee, who is a 
governmental officer acting at EU level, further stated that the Reception Conditions 
Directive would also entail pull factor in terms of different reception systems, whereas 
the Dublin III Regulation would lead smugglers to instruct smuggled asylum-seekers 
on how the EU asylum system works as such and in different countries, explaining the 
possibility of a legal application after a secondary movement if they were not reachable 
by competent authorities for one year. Consistently, to avoid this, the whole CEAS 
reform and Dublin III Regulation recast are all about avoiding secondary movements. 
But the issue can (and should) be addressed also from another perspective, i.e. that 
of smuggled migrants, who in fact end up in the hands of smugglers, if they lack legal 
ways to reach the EU and apply for asylum (or to do so in origin or transit countries), 




1.2.3.). Such a situation was acknowledged by EUR_2 (May 2019), who clearly stated 
how “also in the acquis communautaire there is a lack of legal and safe channels of 
access” and how the demand for smuggling needs an answer, insofar as asylum is 
concerned, also at an EU level. INT_2 (April 2019) added that “you will continue having 
smugglers as long as you don’t have legal channels” and this opinion is shared by 
ITA_2 (April 2019), who further stressed the impossibility to get a visa from embassies 
abroad. In this perspective, the failure to provide for a mandatory system of 
humanitarian visas within the EU is particularly significant (European Parliament, 
2019). 
However, EUR_1 (March 2019) reported that these are “recurrent issues in the 
different discussions” and “this connection [with smuggling] is made also in the asylum 
subject matter”; there is an effort in this sense by EU institutions, in particular to widen 
the access to asylum through resettlements and humanitarian readmissions. However, 
in his/her opinion, there are three critical issues connected to the policies in this field:  
1. There is, nevertheless, a selection of those who will be admitted. Hence, 
broader access to asylum would not be “sufficient to cover all the needs and 
therefore there will always be those who will resort to smugglers”, so the 
phenomenon cannot be completely eliminated in this way, even though the 
situation can improve;  
2. The increase of asylum seekers contributed (alongside the economic crisis) to 
halt legal economic migration opportunities, then opening up a problem on 
another side;  
3. The EU approach has not been rigorous, mostly for human rights 
considerations.  
The increase in asylum applications, according to him/her, was mostly specious and 
such a generous approach ended up encouraging smugglers, in the lack of a 
counterbalance: “we can let them enter, but then we need to be very quick in assessing 
the cases – the individual cases – and be also able to promptly manage the responses 
[…]:  quick case evaluation and also quick repatriation […] of those people who are not 
entitled to be granted protection” (EUR_1, March 2019). 
The potential limits of humanitarian corridors as a tool also to fight smugglers were 




of economic migration and the connected problem of the substantial lack of legal 
opportunities for economic migration. This led him/her to reaffirm the importance of 
addressing the migratory phenomenon at the very origin (with the involvement of 
foreign – development cooperation – policies). Such a comprehensive “policy aimed 
at reducing […], containing and tackling the smuggling of migrants”, in the view of 
ITA_2 (April 2019), took actually place, especially by strengthening the humanitarian 
presence in Libya and the very opening of humanitarian corridors, thanks to the Italian 
efforts.    
This last point helps, in turn, to build a connection with another policy area which is 
extremely relevant in the EU fight against migrant smuggling: defence and foreign 
policy, being the overall ‘shifting south’ and development cooperation policies a great 
part of it. In this very context, ITA_2 (April 2019) explained that “the primary interest of 
Europe is definitely to stabilise Libya” and this “not only for the migration issue, but also 
for geopolitical relations, also for the energetic issue [… and because] there definitely 
is a security issue”. A stance which seems quite shared by EU policy-makers, 
considering, among other things, the overall support brought to Italian externalisation 
policies towards Libya (European Council, 2017) or the conclusions of the Joint 
Communication “Migration on the Central Mediterranean route – Managing flows, 
saving lives” (JOIN (2017) 4 final) of 25 January 2017. Here a set of comprehensive 
operational actions is set out, including: (a) cooperation with other potential departure 
states, (b) protection of the southern border of Libya, (c) financial support for North 
Africa (European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy, 2017). 
Such an approach towards North Africa – and Libya in particular – is not surprising if 
one recalls how the EU dealt with the so-called Balkan route and the shifting out 
agreement signed with Turkey (EUR_2, May 2019), which demonstrate a rooted and 
persistent rationale, from the policy-makers’ perspective, in the EU externalisation 
policies (cf. Strik, 2019). 
EUR_1 (March 2019) strongly stressed the importance of having effective tools in this 
external domain at an EU level, being readmission agreements some of the most 




of the existing agreements, explaining how in her opinion they can indirectly be a pull 
factor for would-be migrants.  
Yet, the existing framework in this field is strongly criticised by practitioners such as 
NGO_1 (October 2018), NGO_5 (May 2019) and EUR_2 (May 2019), among others. 
The latter, in particular, elaborating on his/her criticisms of the existing of a “disguised” 
international cooperation in Africa, explained the whole limits in terms of long term 
sustainability and effectiveness of this part of EU foreign policies in Africa, which, 
focusing on the tackling of undocumented migration, but not proving any real 
alternative policy for the economic system of countries affected by the smuggling 
system, are destined to fail (such an approach was more broadly shared by other 
practitioners such as ITA_2, April 2019). 
Also EU SAR operations prove to be particularly important in this policy area, being 
established as Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operation (Sophia) or 
led by Frontex jointly with relevant MSs (Operations Themis and Poseidon). Focusing 
in particular on Operation Sophia, criticism was brought concerning the fact that the 
legislative framework chosen ended up placing it outside the scrutiny of the Parliament 
(Carrera and Lannoo, 2018, p. 4. This view is supported also by EUR_2, May 2019). 
This opens up a whole, broader area of debate concerning the direct effect that the 
choice of a particular framework has in terms of the activation of different procedures, 
involvement of different actors and, in particular, limitation of the parliamentary and 
judicial scrutiny over policies. In such perspective, EUR_2 (May 2019) further referred, 
for example, based on his/her direct experience as MEP, of the criticisms concerned 
to the decision of the European Council not to bring to the EP the 2016 agreement with 
Turkey for ratification as a strategy to marginalise the Parliament. Carrera and Lannoo 
(2018, p. 6) – and partly also EUR_2 (May 2019) as well as, to a broader extent, also 
other interviewees – stressed in such context the importance of an integrated approach 
to SAR and asylum, placing it under clear judicial review.  
Lastly, the criminal law framework is of utmost importance. As was already considered 
at a national level, rather than being one of the components of the overall approach to 
migrant smuggling (considered stricto sensu as on offence in itself, as pointed out 




chapters 1 and 2), it appears to be the main component and leading rationale followed 
by policy-makers. 
A criminal and security-based approach to migrant smuggling is quite clear in particular 
in the stances of the Council (Council of the EU, 2016 and 2018), especially as 
opposed to a wider approach chosen by the EP. Similarly, Europol suggested in its 
2017 and 2018 EMSC reports the penal approach as the core element of the way 
forward in targeting smuggling. This would not be surprising, given the very nature of 
Europol, but it becomes striking:  
1. When said in the context of the general proposition that “migrant smuggling 
requires a multidisciplinary approach, the law enforcement cooperation being 
just one of the several areas in need of further coordination and strengthening” 
(Europol, 2017, p. 18); 
2. For the very decision of the EC of embedding the European Migrant Smuggling 
Centre (EMSC) into Europol, rather than in or in-between other EU agencies or 
institutions (Europol, 2016a). 
This leads the issue back to the view of some practitioners – in particular those coming 
from an international organisation (IO)-background – according to whom, through this 
mostly repressive approach, the EU would have actually used the anti-smuggling tools 
to control undocumented migration. In such perspective, INT_1 (March 2019) 
explained that the EU pointed out the difference between smuggling and facilitation of 
irregular migration, arguing that the EU approach on facilitation had a wider scope, 
which would explain why UN Smuggling Protocol provisions were not actually 
translated into EU legislation. But – INT_1 further noted – this proves particularly 
problematic, since, for example, the provision of a material benefit is crucial in order to 
“criminalise only criminals”, whereas having a wider scope and risking of criminalising 
also non-profit-driven activities, would lead to something completely different from the 
spirit of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
(UNTOC) and the protocols thereto. In the words of INT_2 (April 2019), “the goal 
pursued seems to be different if you drop the benefit element”. 
The same view, as was already pointed out in other sections, is generally shared by 
other practitioners and is particularly emblematic, again from an international point of 




other destination countries: “Why should we make our life harder by sticking to the 
international definition that has been agreed upon?”. 
Therefore, rather than having broader provisions, the EU seems to have an approach 
which fails to differentiate enough conducts that are actually clearly different, such as 
those of smugglers and facilitators (INT_2, April 2019. This point was extensively 
discussed also with judges operating at different levels, such as JUD_2, October 2018 
and JUD_3, April 2019). 
INT_2 noted that this approach is quite common in destination countries (such as US, 
Australia, Canada) and that, even though there have been attempts to counterbalance 
it with a positive discourse about tackling trafficking in persons (TIP) – “it was more 
acceptable to tackle trafficking” – and, sometimes, with some generosity towards 
refugees, the main problem persists: “Smuggling is more a criminal justice topic, the 
people dealing with it have this criminal justice background” (INT_2, April 2019). 
Therefore, when it is used as a tool for migration management, problems arise. Going 
even further, and assuming the perspective that there are other crucial, connected 
components of the phenomenon, if these are neglected and the criminal justice 
response is the only relied upon, shortcomings and failures become even more evident 
and foreseeable. 
Following such rationale, what is really relevant within the criminal law policy area is 
not its connection with smuggling, which actually lies in its very nature, but rather the 
dominance of such component in the overall approach and its peculiar repressive 
nature. 
It should be noted, in conclusion, that the centrality of the criminal law component in 
anti-smuggling policies has not led to a leading role for the Directorate-General for 
Justice and Consumers (DG JUST), as, at a national level, has not led to a centrality 
of the Ministries of Justice. Interviewees responding on this point, clearly confirmed the 
main role of the Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME) and 
of the Ministry of Interior, placing this criminal law approach back into the overall 
migration field (see also 6.3.3.) 
Having a comprehensive view on how these different policy areas interact, EUR_2 
(May 2019) expressed the need of having different responses, at different levels, in 




governance, in different policy areas, and providing responses in the short, medium 
and long term, from SAR to internal and external solidarity, from humanitarian visas to 
a real commitment to address the root causes of migration. For the time being, though, 
such a comprehensive approach, albeit sought in political declarations (European 
Commission, 2015a and 2015b), does not seem to have been truly achieved (see 
paragraph 6.4. and chapter 7).  
Furthermore, as was partly hinted at, the analysis of the interaction between different 
policy areas remains central also for the understanding of how this entails the 
competence of different organs at an EU level and the activation of different legislative 
procedures: moving from one policy area to another leads to substantial institutional 
and procedural consequences (which builds a strong and clear connection with the 
dimension considered in 6.3.3.). 
 
6.3.2. Non-institutional actors: the role of research in the EU policy-making  
Horizontal processes involving the role of non-institutional actors in policy-making (see 
paragraph 2.3.) are important at the EU level. They show, indeed, the centrality of 
research and consultation processes in the law-making arena (as partly recalled above 
in exploring the connection with the ground of the European Parliament), in so marking 
a clear peculiarity of this governance level. 
There are different relevant examples in this subject matter of processes of dialogue 
between informal and institutional actors, mediated by research bodies and/or 
consultations. In this sense, it is particularly significant to look at the process for the 
assessment of the need for a revision of the Facilitators Package (FP), which involved 
both the Commission and the Parliament, in different procedures, at different times, 
making it interesting not only the comparative analysis of the two processes, but also 
of their outputs (even though other examples exist, in a broader context, such as 
Abdoulaye Diallo et al., 2018).  
On the side of the Commission, a Regulatory fitness and performance programme 
(REFIT) was launched in order to assess the suitability of a legislative reform on the 
facilitation of unauthorised entry. It was mainly based on two studies (being one of 




2014 and 2016 (European Commission, 2017a). On the side of the European 
Parliament, two other studies were produced, in 2016 and 2018, respectively at 
request of the LIBE committee and of the EP committee on petitions (PETI), titled “Fit 
for purpose? The Facilitation Directive and the criminalisation of humanitarian 
assistance to irregular migrants” and “Fit for purpose? The Facilitation Directive and 
the criminalisation of humanitarian assistance to irregular migrants: 2018 Update”. The 
former was a general study on the legislative framework of the EU in this subject 
matter, its impact on MSs legislation and its shortcomings, whereas the latter was an 
update which took in consideration, in particular, cases of criminalisation of 
humanitarian actors. 
Both processes were characterised by a substantial contribution from informal actors, 
bringing knowledge and preferences into the institutional level, enabling not only NGOs 
and other practitioners, but also academia and experts more in general to be taken 
into account in the policy-making process. 
Even more interestingly, the REFIT was accompanied in 2016 by a 12-week open 
public consultation titled “Tackling migrant smuggling: is the EU legislation fit for 
purpose?”, which allowed the EC to collect 2425 standard contributions from private 
individuals as well as, to a lesser extent, member of academia, organisations and other 
formal or informal institutions (European Commission, 2017b, pp. 1–2). 
The Commission public consultation showed that the wide majority of respondents 
believed that the Facilitators Package (a) was not effective, (b) did not protect 
humanitarian help, (c) did not protect smuggled migrants, (d) did not define smuggling 
clearly enough (European Commission, 2017b, pp. 5–8). Likewise, the very large 
majority of respondents, respectively the 87.85% and 92.6%, “considered that 
facilitation of unauthorised entry or transit should only be criminalised when committed 
for financial gain” and “were in favour of EU law making it obligatory for Member States 
not to sanction those that facilitate unauthorised entry or transit for humanitarian 
reasons” (European Commission, 2017b, pp. 10–11). Also, one international 
organisation expressed the opinion that the objectives of the FP target more 
undocumented migration than the smuggling of migrants (European Commission, 




The 2016 Fit for purpose study drew similar conclusions, in particular for the 
unintended consequences that the Facilitators Package had in terms of criminalisation 
of humanitarian help and negative perception of undocumented migrants and those 
who assist them. It further noted the profound gap between the EU legislation in this 
field and the UN framework and the problematic issue of the use of the financial gain 
element. Lastly, it underscored the existence of an information gap as to the actual 
implementation of these instruments (Carrera et al., 2016). 
The 2018 Fit for purpose update was quite similar in terms of approach, but it is 
particularly interesting as it offered an update based on the developments occurred 
after the beginning of the 2015 so-called ‘refugee crisis’, in particular in terms of (a) 
use of anti-smuggling legislation as migration management tool and (b) policing 
humanitarianism (Carrera et al., 2018b, pp. 22–23). The study offers several examples, 
regarding also Italy, where the formal exemption of humanitarian assistance did not 
impede the development of climate of intimidation and harassment towards 
humanitarian actors, with a particular focus on SAR in the Mediterranean Sea (notably, 
the authors show how even MSs providing for humanitarian exemption policed NGOs, 
such as in cases of judicial harassment in Italy in connection with the 2017 Code of 
conduct. Carrera et al., 2018b, pp. 30–31, 67–68). Lastly, it is noted how the lack of 
information from the ground has had substantial effects on the conceptualisation of 
smuggling and smugglers, based on unchallenged assumptions (criminal 
professionals working in highly organised criminal groups, based on ‘business model’) 
that have been taken for granted by EU agencies (Carrera et al., 2018b, p. 96). 
Moving to the Commission REFIT, several issues were considered, such as the 
jurisdiction in high seas or the counterproductive effectives of criminalising the illegal 
entry (European Commission, 2017a, pp. 10, 24), but one of the main focus was again 
on the humanitarian exemption.  
In this regard, the EC acknowledged that “[t]he lack of a mandatory humanitarian 
exemption has been the subject of ongoing criticism from scholars, European and 
international institutions and NGO coalitions such as the European Social Platform”. It 
also acknowledged that “[t]he great majority of the individuals, academics, associations 
and NGOs who responded to the public consultation have also considered that EU law 




account the criticisms of the EP-commissioned study of Carrera et al. (2016) and that 
“[f]or a minority of Member States, the Package has not been effective in creating 
clarity and legal certainty over the distinction between criminal facilitation and 
humanitarian assistance” (European Commission, 2017a, pp. 20–21). In spite of all of 
this, it concluded that “as of today there appears to be rather limited evidence that 
social workers, family member or citizens acting out of compassion have been 
prosecuted or convicted for facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit or residence” and 
that also the connected fear is diminishing, even in country were humanitarian 
exemption is not provided for (European Commission, 2017a, pp. 21–22). 
As for another issue widely debated in this arena, i.e. the element of financial again, 
the Commission did not properly address it, limiting itself to explain the rationale for 
not including it in the FP, in particular on the basis of the difficulty of proving that an 
actual economic transaction took place, as in the opinion of an Italian prosecutor 
reported by INT_1 (March 2019), but without going more in-depth as to possible 
alternative approaches (European Commission, 2017a, pp. 8–9). 
The REFIT conclusions merely state that “there is no sufficient evidence to draw firm 
conclusions about the need for a revision of the Facilitators Package at this point in 
time” and only acknowledging that “[t]he main areas for improvement that have 
emerged as a result of the evaluation concern the perceived risk of criminalisation of 
humanitarian assistance” (European Commission, 2017a, p. 35). 
The different impact of the REFIT and Fit for purpose processes in terms of policy-
making appears manifest: the European Commission assumed a position of non-
intervention, though it seems in contradiction with the overall analysis conducted and 
available evidence. The EP, on the other side, consistently with the findings of the 
studies commissioned, voted in favour of a resolution in order to avoid the 
criminalisation under the smuggling framework of humanitarian activities (European 
Parliament, 2018b). 
Table 6.1., elaborated by Carrera et al. (2018b, pp. 28 – 29) is particularly interesting, 
as it analytically compares the main studies undertaken into the FP in the last years 
(including the ones considered in this section), highlighting the key challenges pointed 
out by each of them. It appears manifest that a great difference between the REFIT 




institutions, and the ICF study in particular, which was prepared for the European 
Commission itself, within the framework of the very REFIT) exists. 
 
Table 6.1. – Key challenges of the Facilitators Packages in the main studies 
 
Source: Carrera et al., 2018b, pp. 28–29 
 
However, holding the EC the power of legislative initiative, the impact of the REFIT 
was therefore more immediate and evident in terms of policy-making. Such an aspect 
seems consistent with the opinion of a MEP, who pointed out that the Commission 
appeared to be back in 2015 more inclined to progressive and ambitious positions, in 
line with the Parliament, in terms of migration policies, but it progressively moved 




These aspects are particularly relevant and shall be further considered in paragraph 
6.4. and in chapter 7.  
Lastly, the EC non-intervention decision seems even more striking if put in a historical 
perspective, recalling the very concerns expressed by the Commission at the time of 
the approval of the Facilitators Package in 2001. At that time, the European 
Commissioner Vitorino backed some of the concerns of the Parliament and expressed 
doubts as for the overall approach chosen by the Council, namely focusing on some 
of the most concerning elements – material gain and humanitarian exemption: 
Our second concern involves the scope of Article 1(a) of the draft directive. In its 
current wording and as matters stand today, this measure in the French proposal 
contains no reference to the objective of financial gain. The Commission is willing to 
study this approach, in other words, not to lay down the requirement of financial gain, 
but this would have to be balanced by a carefully worded exemption clause for cases 
where illegal entry, movement and residence are subject to assistance for 
humanitarian reasons. This is the only way it will be possible to distinguish clearly 
between humanitarian assistance under international commitments, specifically 
respect for the Geneva Convention, and the trafficking of human beings which is 
punishable by law (António Vitorino, European Commissioner for Justice and Home 
Affairs, 5th European Parliament, Session of 14 February 2001). 
Even though these processes seem to be characterising non-institutional dynamics at 
an EU level, hearings and field visits still play an important role, in particular enabling 
MEPs to have direct contacts with NGOs and other leading (non-institutional) actors, 
such as in the case of the LIBE meetings of 6 May 2015, 4 June 2015, 25 June 2015, 
10 October 2016, 12 July 2017; the inter-committee meeting of 15 September 2015 
and the inter-parliamentary committee meeting of 24 January 2018; the 2015 
LIBE/BUDG committees mission to Sicily, the 2015 LIBE mission to Lampedusa and 
the 2017 LIBE mission to Italy (see the analysis of the ‘multi-level’ layer in paragraph 
6.2.). 
However, based on the analysis of relevant sources and what said by interviewees, 
one of the most important actors in informal-to-institutional dynamics – and namely 
NGOs – seems to mostly act at an EU level in a mediated way, such as through 




as in the cases above explored, rather than through direct advocacy. This reinforces 
the points of view of EUR_1 (March 2019) and EUR_2 (May 2019), among others, as 
for the knowledge-based policy-making process at an EU level, but leaving it open the 
issue of the actual impact that such knowledge eventually has on policy outputs. 
 
6.3.3. “Integration without supranationalisation48”? The complex interaction between 
EU institutions 
The interaction between different institutions at an EU level takes place within the 
space of the political debate, legislative process and, more limitedly, in the judicial 
arena, the most significant actors being the EP, the Council of the EU, the Commission 
and, to a lesser extent, the European Council and the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU). In this paragraph it is interesting to understand the main patterns of this 
interaction, not only based on what actors do, but also on the substantive content of 
the issues they bring forward. 
Starting off with the interaction between EP and Council, i.e. the co-legislators of the 
EU, as was already noticed in section 6.3.1. the very involvement of different policy 
areas with different institutional mechanisms as well as the very architecture of the EU 
policy-making process, make this relationship central. 
Practitioners tend to agree in depicting the Parliament as having a more progressive 
approach to migration and asylum, being at the same time marginalised in the decision-
making process by the Council, though (for a more critical perspective, in particular on 
the role of the Parliament, see Trauner and Ripoll Servent, 2016). ITA_2 (April 2019) 
expressed the idea that the EU did not prove to be politically courageous enough on 
migration (partly different from asylum, where a common framework exists) because 
national governments (and so the Council) did not want to, whereas the EP was always 
willing to act, but had limited power. 
On the same page is also EUR_1 (March 2019), who explained that, in his/her opinion, 
the Parliament improved Council’s approach in many occasions, caring more about 
rights. Not surprisingly, this point of view is shared also by EUR_2 (May 2019), who 
                                                          




talked extensively about the role of Parliament and its relationship with the Council, 
stating in particular that (a) the role of the Parliament has definitely grown over the last 
years, after the Lisbon Treaty; (b) it tries to negotiate and balance different interests in 
the view of a higher EU interest; (c) it acts as a constraint to the positions taken by the 
Council. 
S/he added, furthermore, some reflections on the marginalisation of the Parliament on 
certain issues, in spite of its great commitment. One example is the recast of the Dublin 
III Regulation, for which “the Parliament negotiated for 2 years, 22 meetings, approving 
a very ambitious resolution and with a very large majority, then blocked by Council, 
which did not find an agreement.” Another one is the 2016 EU-Turkey Deal, officially 
called a ‘statement’ in order not to go through parliamentary ratification (striking, in this 
case, the similarity with the case of the 2017 Italy-Libya Deal and the appeal to the 
Constitutional Court, see 5.3.3.) and as part of an overall strategy to marginalise the 
Parliament (EUR_2, May 2019). 
In such a context, besides marginalisation, the EP seems to have a very limited impact 
on Council bargaining and decision-making, as the rare cases in which MEPs tried to 
make pressure on governments were not quite successful (EUR_2, May 2019). 
A direct example of the above two aspects (progressive stance and marginalisation) 
was provided in a few words by INT_2 (April 2019): “What I feel is that in Brussels 
there was a lot of appetite to try and make the humanitarian clause compulsory – 
including the European Parliament – but it didn’t work”. And in fact, looking more 
closely at the content of anti-smuggling legislation, proposal, resolutions, etc., the 
stance and, at the same time, the limited scope of the EP agency clearly come out. 
Focusing, in particular, on the legislation on the smuggling of migrants stricto sensu, 
i.e. on the Facilitators Package49, it is useful to start by making another digression out 
of the time frame considered (again, as in the cases in the previous chapter, only in 
order to provide a more detailed empirical background and maintaining all the 
methodological cautions previously recalled). The parliamentary debate on the French 
proposal concerning the would-be Facilitators Package already offers an overview of 
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some clear tendencies, which become particularly interesting in a comparative 
perspective over the years, showing the historical evolution of the different stances 
today witnessed.  
The 2000 Ceyhun Report50 is therefore crucial, proposing a series of amendments 
where one can clearly appreciate a general attitude towards a more comprehensive 
approach to migration, solidarity principles as well as a critical reflection about the 
financial gain issue and the humanitarian exemption. Among other things, indeed, the 
report clearly states the ineffectiveness of harsher border management, the call for a 
“common immigration and asylum policy”, raising concerns about the lack of clarity 
towards the profit-driven nature of the offence and the lack of a mandatory 
humanitarian exemption. It concludes with a clear opinion that “the European Union 
must as a matter of urgency adopt a European policy on immigration promoting legal 
immigration into its territory” (European Parliament, 2000, pp. 20–23). 
The parliamentary debate preceding the vote on the French proposals and on the 
amendments of the Ceyhun Report is interesting in showing (a) the biggest concerns 
regarding the issues of the criminalisation in itself and of the possible exemptions; (b) 
the rise of a debate on Fortress Europe, including also the aspect of carriers liability 
and the lack of an overall migration and asylum regime, reflected also in the proposed 
amendments: 
I ask you, ladies and gentlemen, is it a criminal act to help a persecuted person in this 
situation? Quite frankly, I am glad that there are courageous people who help those 
who are being persecuted. For this reason, it was very important to define facilitation 
and the honest facilitator precisely. The text of the French initiative did not distinguish 
between individual and organised facilitation or between commercial and moral 
facilitation. That is why a correction was crucial. I would not like to overlook the fact 
that trading in human beings is a lucrative business for criminals. But it would be a 
fatal mistake to believe that this problem can only be solved with restrictive measures. 
Police and judicial measures must be accompanied by a common European asylum 
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named the “Report on the initiative of the French Republic with a view to the adoption of a Council 
Directive defining the facilitation of unauthorised entry, movement and residence and on the initiative of 
the French Republic with a view to the adoption of a Council Framework Decision on the strengthening 




and immigration policy (MEP Ozan Ceyhun, rapporteur, PES, 5th European 
Parliament, Session of 14 February 2001). 
I realise, however, that carriers cannot be held liable for transporting persons who 
request political asylum immediately upon arrival within the territory of a Member 
State. Carriers have neither the ability nor the authority to assess the admissibility of 
an application for asylum, and hence I understand that under no circumstances can 
they be directly or indirectly persuaded through these instruments to carry out an 
assessment of suitability. Sanctions must be proportionate and balanced and the 
punishment must be made to fit the crime (MEP Carmen Cerdeira Morterero, PES, 
5th European Parliament, Session of 14 February 2001). 
As early as in the 2000s, the Parliament was already the arena for in-depth political 
and moral debates on migration, basic liberties and human rights, as already briefly 
mentioned in section 6.3.1. and as it shall be further considered below in this section 
and in the next paragraph, understanding also how this pattern has changed over time.  
In such a context, challenges to a Party of European Socialists (PES)-led report, which 
aimed to correct the shortcomings of the French proposals, came both from the right 
and the left, for opposite reasons: 
It is important for me to emphasise straight away that the EPP is in agreement with 
the aim of the French initiative. It is vitally important to curb illegal immigration and to 
deal with the criminals who are exploiting poor people to their own advantage, both 
financially and in other ways. However, […] it seems to me difficult to try to 
decriminalise the facilitation of illegal immigration for some groups rather than others. 
The notion that those acting with humanitarian intentions should be immune from 
prosecution is very problematic and certainly subjective (MEP Timothy Kirkhope, 
EPP-ED, 5th European Parliament, Session of 14 February 2001).  
It is said that trafficking in human beings is a lucrative business, but I maintain that, 
with projects like this, it will become still more lucrative. The price will rise, and the 
Mafia will, of course, add the cost of their fines to it. […] I have to say that the 
rapporteur has done his best to temper the proposal. He has really made an effort, 
but it is nonetheless still a matter of treating the symptoms. We are not treating the 





Both the Commission proposal and the report admit that illegal entry can lead to an 
application for asylum being approved. […] The conclusion is that separating 
commercial from humanitarian facilitation serves no useful purpose because the 
policy of isolation is increasingly being promoted and aid for refugees is becoming 
more of a financial burden (MEP Ilka Schröder, Greens/EFA, 5th European 
Parliament, Session of 14 February 2001). 
Based on the above criticism, the EP eventually rejected the French proposals in the 
session of 13 February 2001, assuming since the very beginning the role of prominent 
opponent of the Facilitators Package. Such role would be kept also in the following 
years, in particular on the issues of material gain and humanitarian exemption, even if 
abandoning some of the most progressive approaches, such as the exemption for 
carriers liability for transporting asylum seekers into the EU (see Carrera et al., 2018b, 
p. 55 and, more broadly, pp. 53–58, where the most relevant acts passed by EP calling 
for a review of the criminalisation of smuggling and humanitarian exemption are briefly 
considered).  
Not surprisingly, therefore, these issues have regained an utmost importance in these 
very last years (and in particular in the time frame considered in this research), also 
due to the overall evaluation of the Facilitators Package above recalled. Following a 
question put forward by MEP Claude Moraes on behalf of LIBE committee, recalling 
that “instances of unintended consequences of the ‘Facilitators Package’ have 
occurred, affecting citizens and residents providing humanitarian assistance to 
migrants” (European Parliament, 2018d), the EP approved the non-legislative 
resolution of 5 July 2018 (Guidelines on humanitarian assistance Resolution) asking 
the Commission to issue guidelines for Member States to prevent humanitarian 
assistance from being criminalised.  
Here all the shortcomings and unintended consequences concerning humanitarian 
assistance were clearly stated and the Commission was therefore urged to take action 
in such respect (European Parliament, 2018b).  
In the parliamentary debate, though, the overall feeling was quite different, and next to 
those progressive views calling for such guidelines – namely coming from the left, 




conservative and right-wing MEPs, being the following two particularly significant as 
brought to the plenary by MEPs on behalf of their respective political groups: 
Another issue equally important, in my humble opinion, is to guarantee that, with the 
excuse of a humanitarian action, the passage of illegal migrants not be facilitated 
(MEP Frank Engel, on behalf of EPP Group, 8th European Parliament, Session of 3 
July 2018). 
Mr President, yes, people should be helped when in distress. But sometimes people 
get themselves in distress in order to be rescued. […] These people take to the sea 
on rubber boats and other unseaworthy vessels because they know they have a good 
chance of being picked up by NGO ships that are waiting close to the Libyan coast, 
and of being ferried to Europe. […] This maritime taxi service should not be able to 
operate with impunity (MEP Jussi Halla-aho, on behalf of the ECR Group, 8th 
European Parliament, Session of 3 July 2018). 
It should be therefore noted that the Parliament seems to have kept, over the years, 
this more open and human-rights-sensitive approach, in light with the morally-oriented 
debate above recalled, even if the terms of this have started to change over the last 
years, also in the light of the overall political climate (a point which was discussed also 
with ITA_2, April 2019 and EUR_2, May 2019).  
The way in which all this interacts with the Council is hard to say, the last being an 
institution more difficult to be analysed because of the lack of publicly available data 
and sources and the subsequent need of resorting to interviews to fully explore its 
internal dynamics51. Its positions may be more inferred than observed (as pointed out 
by EUR_2, May 2019, in terms of less transparency at Council level) and the law-
making process shows how the concerns and criticisms raised by the Parliament did 
not impact on the approval of the Facilitators Package, given also the fact that the act 
was approved under the consultation procedure. 
In the present time, after the changes brought by the Lisbon Treaty, the relationship 
seems to be still more favourable to the Council, which is able to halt legislative reforms 
coming from the Parliament (see again Trauner and Ripoll Servent, 2016 on the 
                                                          
51 More on this aspect and on the heuristic relevance of the internal dynamics of the Council in this policy 




advantageous situation of the Council in maintaining the status quo created before the 
communitarisation of JHA, as was already discussed in chapter 1). EUR_2 (May 2019), 
in particular, explained that there is a higher likelihood in finding an agreement and a 
compromise in the Parliament, where transversal majorities (different from those of the 
national arenas) can be built, rather than in Council: “Not being able to find a minimum 
agreement on internal solidarity, it has only done externalisation policies. Only on 
externalisation policies governments have been able to find an agreement”. S/he put 
it in terms of institutional constraints: “There is a weakness, that the Parliament is 
paying for, for how the present European system is built”. 
These points of view are generally extended by the same MEP interviewed to the 
overall activity and relationship EP/Council in the migration and asylum field (EUR_2, 
May 2019). And, in fact, EP more openness on the one side and marginalisation with 
respect to the Council in the impact on the policy-making process on the other side are 
aspects that seem to apply not only with the reforms of the FP, but also on other issues 
in the migration and asylum agenda. 
Throughout the legislature 2014-2019, in particular, the EP approved several 
significant acts in this field. Three of the most important ones can be recalled, being 
they two resolutions, particularly prominent in terms of disclosing the general approach 
to the issue, and a report on the Commission proposal for the reform of Dublin III 
Regulation, crucial for the concrete impact on the asylum system of the EU:  
1. The European Parliament resolution of 10 September 2015 on migration and 
refugees in Europe52 (2015/2833(RSP)); 
2. The European Parliament resolution of 12 April 2016 on the situation in the 
Mediterranean and the need for a holistic EU approach to migration53 
(2015/2095(INI)); 
                                                          
52 The resolution passed with 432 ayes (68%), 142 noes (23%) and 9 abstentions (7%). It should be 
noted that it proved particularly divisive for the EFDD (35.71% cohesion index) and, to a lesser extent, 
the EPP Group, with a 61.29% (data retrieved from http://votewatch.eu). 
53 The resolution passed with 459 ayes (64%), 206 noes (29%) and 52 abstentions (7%). It proved 
particularly divisive for some political groups, namely the GUE-NGL, which showed a cohesion index of 





3. The Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the 
Member State responsible for examining an application for international 
protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a 
stateless person (recast) [COM(2016)0270 - C8-0173/2016- 2016/0133(COD)]. 
The two resolutions, in particular, confirm the aforementioned aspects in terms of 
overall stance and effectiveness, with the understanding, among other things, of the 
lack of safe and legal routes and its consequence on smuggling, the importance of 
SAR, the need to revise the FP and to include exoneration for victims of smuggling as 
a safeguard for those smuggled migrants who decide to collaborate (European 
Parliament, 2016, pp. 10–21): 
[The European Parliament r]ecalls that the Member States should lay down strong 
criminal sanctions against human trafficking and smuggling, both into and across the 
EU; calls on the Member States to combat criminal networks of smugglers, but in the 
meantime not to penalise those who voluntarily help migrants on humanitarian 
grounds, including carriers, by asking the Commission to consider revising Council 
Directive 2001/51/EC; takes note of the EUNAVFOR Med operation against 
smugglers and traffickers in the Mediterranean; [r]egrets that the leaders of some 
Member States and the far-right parties are using the current situation to fuel anti-
migration sentiments while blaming the EU for the crisis, and that this is giving rise to 
growing numbers of violent actions against migrants. 
The debates preceding the adoption of the resolutions are also interesting in 
contributing to:  
1. The delineation of the different stances in the house, besides those fully in line 
with the report, i.e. mainly the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats 
(S&D), the Greens/European Free Alliance (EFA) and the Alliance of Liberals 
and Democrats for Europe (ALDE). Those of the European United Left/Nordic 
Green Left (GUE-NGL), on the one side, and of the European Conservatives 
and Reformists (ECR), on the other side, are particularly significant in criticising 
the approach for opposite reasons (cf., among others, the speeches of MEPs 
Marina Albiol Guzmán, GUE-NGL, and Jussi Halla-aho, ECR, 8th European 




2. The difficult relationship with the Council:  
[T]he European Parliament has tried to reach a unitary position for a holistic 
approach to migration, but it is also true that on the other side the complete 
powerlessness of the European Parliament emerged, with regards to the 
selfishness of Member States (MEP Ignazio Corrao, EFDD, 8th European 
Parliament, Session of 12 April 2016). 
This own initiative report is the nth call to action that we launch to Member 
States to act together for the general good of all (MEP Barbara Matera, EPP, 
8th European Parliament, Session of 12 April 2016). 
Too often we have spent hours of our time in this Parliament to discuss, debate 
and welcome with great satisfaction some choices made by the Juncker 
Commission, but then having to observe their failure, due to insensibility and 
incapacity especially of the Council (MEP Salvatore Domenico Pogliese, EPP, 
8th European Parliament, Session of 12 April 2016); 
3. The rise of a more pragmatic attitude of the Parliament, especially in a historical 
perspective: 
The text offers some general balanced guidelines, avoiding extremist pushes 
on any side, which could definitely tear apart the moderate sense of cooperation 
and compromise that this report is dripping with (MEP Barbara Matera, EPP, 
8th European Parliament, Session of 12 April 2016). 
Mr President, the shortcoming of the solutions proposed by both the 
Commission and Parliament is that they focus on the question of how we could 
make irregular immigration more regular (MEP Jussi Halla-aho, ECR, 8th 
European Parliament, Session of 12 April 2016). 
Also the case of the 10 September 2015 resolution is particularly relevant as the whole 
debate of the day before was focused on MEPs fear and scepticism towards the 
forthcoming Council of 14 September 2015, in spite of the reassurances of the 
Luxembourg presidency (being the very resolution part of the special legislative 
procedure concluded by Council Decision (EU) 2015/1523 of 14 September 2015 




of Italy and of Greece). The overall game between Parliament and Council (and 
Commission) is expressed by these words of First Vice-President Timmermans: 
I just want to use this opportunity, when three institutions are coming together to talk 
about this issue, to call upon the European Parliament to strongly support the 
Commission’s proposals today. That would be a clear signal in the preparation for the 
Council on Monday, where we know that some Member States still have a number of 
steps to take before they can agree with the Commission’s proposal. The stronger 
Parliament can be today in coming out with its position, the better we are prepared for 
the Council on Monday (Frans Timmermans, First Vice-President of the Commission, 
8th European Parliament, Session of 9 September 2015). 
Not surprisingly, the overall tone of the debate, a few days later, discussing the JHA 
Council conclusions, went in the same direction, highlighting Council’s shortcomings, 
and the challenges of this inter-institutional relationship: 
Mr President, we have to tell the truth to the public: the meeting of the ministers of the 
interior was a failure. We did not reach an agreement even though, in my opinion, it 
is in fact a topic that could be decided with a qualified majority, and I am very doubtful 
that on 22 September we are going to get a deal. In my opinion, it is an issue that has 
to be tackled at the level of Heads of State or Government and no longer on the level 
of ministers of the interior alone (MEP Guy Verhofstadt, on behalf of the ALDE Group, 
8th European Parliament, Session of 16 September 2015). 
Consistently with the general feeling of the house, the Council conclusions were further 
defined as “one of the most shameful page in the history of the European Union”, 
“outrageous” and a “disgrace”, respectively by MEPs Laura Ferrara, on behalf of the 
Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD) Group; Barbara Spinelli, on behalf 
of the GUE-NGL Group and Ska Keller, of Greens/EFA (8th European Parliament, 
Session of 16 September 2015). In this perspective, the characterisation (and self-
perception) of the house as a lieu of morally-oriented debate, focusing on basic liberties 
and human rights, appears even stronger when compared to the EU intergovernmental 
bodies, even though this has not always necessarily been translated by the EP itself 
into consistent policy outputs. 
All this was only very limitedly balanced by right-wing MEPs, sustaining the reasons of 




Those Member States who believe there is more than one solution are currently 
accused of being less European than others (MEP Timothy Kirkhope, on behalf of the 
ECR Group, 8th European Parliament, Session of 16 Spetember 2015). 
Also the Commission criticised the outcome of the Council meeting, even if trying to 
mitigate the institutional clash and showing trust towards the Council (consistently with 
its pivotal role): 
Yes, I expressed my frustration at the outcome of the recent Council but, with your 
support and the excellent work done by the Luxembourg Presidency, we will all go 
this extra mile united (Dimitris Avramopoulos, EU Commissioner for Migration, Home 
Affairs and Citizenship, 8th European Parliament, Session of 16 September 2015). 
Again on the unequal relationship with the Council and on the way in which progresses 
made in Parliament are halted there, the legislative process of the Dublin III Regulation 
recast offers some further elements of reflection. In this case, the long process of 
negotiation and agreement in the European Parliament, in spite of the higher 
polarisation of the debate and the dissatisfaction with the proposal of the Commission, 
led to a common text, which tried to ensure a balance between burden sharing and 
avoidance of secondary movements (European Parliament, 2017c). An agreement 
eventually frustrated by the incapability of the Council to find in turn a compromise 
(EUR_2, May 2019 and ITA_2, April 2019. See also European Council, 2018).  
The parliamentary debate of 15 January 2019 is particularly significant in this regard, 
since a general blame towards the Council for the asylum deadlock took place (with 
the notable exception, as in the cases previously considered, of right-wing MEPs). 
Again, the words of the Commission perhaps exemplify this criticism against the 
Council best, and somehow introduce the stance of this third, relevant actor, which will 
be further in-depth explored: 
I said this in December, and I will not stop making this point until we succeed: now is 
the time to finalise the reform of the European Union’s asylum rules, now is the time 
for the governments to take up their responsibilities in the Council and stop blaming 
the Commission. I count on this House’s continued support and before I close my 
remarks, I would like to express my gratitude to Parliament for its support during all 
these four years (EU Commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos, 8th European 




Two more examples of this institutional tension can be recalled: 
1. The already mentioned issue of the humanitarian visas, when, “[i]n September 
2017, following the deadlock in trilogue negotiations, due to the Commission 
and Council’s opposition to including provisions for a humanitarian visa, 
Parliament withdrew its amendments” (European Parliament, 2019); 
2. The signature of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration 
(GCM), where the lack of agreement in the Council and, in particular, the alleged 
incapacity of the Austrian presidency of representing the EU as a whole were 
debated (8th European Parliament, Session of 13 November 2018).  
A last issue which helps to understand the relationship between EP and Council is 
SAR policy-making, and specifically the launch of Operation Sophia, which followed 
the massive shipwreck which took place in April 2015, when almost 700 migrants lost 
their lives (Reuters, 2016). 
The operation was launched in May 2015 with the following objective: 
The Union shall conduct a military crisis management operation contributing to the 
disruption of the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks in the 
Southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED), achieved by undertaking 
systematic efforts to identify, capture and dispose of vessels and assets used or 
suspected of being used by smugglers or traffickers, in accordance with applicable 
international law, including UNCLOS and any UN Security Council Resolution (Article 
1 of Council Decision CFSP 2015/778). 
The main criticism that came out from the very beginning had to do, as previously 
mentioned, with its very nature of CSDP operation. Being established under article 
42(4) of TEU, indeed, Operation Sophia and its mandate were actually approved 
(unanimously) by the Council of the EU (upon identification of the EU strategic interests 
from the European Council, see below) and placed “outside EU rule of law and 
democratic scrutiny by the European Parliament” (Carrera and Lannoo, 2018, p. 4). 
Such an approach, which entails substantive issues in terms of privileging a military-
security based approach (see section 6.3.1.), implied SAR activities not because they 
were the main goal of the operation itself, but merely because of the existing 




Lannoo, 2018 and Rasche, 2018). This, in turn, had substantial operational 
implications: if the main objective is to save lives, then ships will be placed at the limit 
of Libyan territorial waters; if it is that of countering smuggling, they will be placed closer 
to the limit of EU waters (see the outcomes of the Italian parliamentary committee 
hearings on this point, in section 5.2.1.). The non-existent role of the EP was clear and 
important also in all the subsequent issues concerning its extension and mandate, 
which were heavily challenged and discussed by Italy (Frenzen, 2018 and Rasche, 
2018. See also section 5.2.2.), eventually solved exclusively at intergovernmental level 
(Council of the EU, 2019, among others).  
Considering the overall analysis of the two co-legislators now concluded, the roles of 
the European Commission, the European Council and the CJEU will now be analysed.  
Starting off with the Commission, it is immediately interesting to look more closely at 
the tripartite relationship with the EP and the Council, where the EC agency needs to 
balance different (and even opposite) pulls coming from the other two bodies and its 
own point of view. 
EUR_2 (May 2019), for example, talked about the way in which, throughout the eighth 
EP legislature, the EC position dramatically changed: “The Commission had started 
with a quite ambitious stance on the migratory issue and on how to deal with it, it had 
presented in 2015 a European Agenda on migration, which, albeit not perfect […], had 
this kind of sort of a holistic approach to the migratory issue”. An approach which got 
lost along the way, according to him/her: “The Commission itself, even if it was first 
courageous in 2015, then substantially bent very much to the divisions among 
governments and even its language changed, its stance changed, we saw it no longer 
defending legislative proposals coming from the Commission itself”. 
Following this perspective, it seems that in the very moment in which the policy-making 
in anti-smuggling related issues became extremely controversial and polarised at an 
EU level, the Commission tended to move towards MSs positions, rather than those of 
Parliament. 
ITA_2 (April 2019) supported this view, saying that “the Commission would even want 
to act – or at least there were some signals that it wanted to act – but then the Council 
is that really decides”. And in fact, an overview of the approach proposed by the 




migrant smuggling (the EU Action Plan) in particular – showed a more open, advanced 
stance (even though in an overall security-based framework), with an integrated 
approach to undocumented migration and smuggling which even included the issue of 
the demand side and smuggled migrants protection (see the smuggling spectrum in 
section 1.2.3.), but which was apparently eventually dropped. The following extracts 
are representative of the initial stance of the Commission on these points: 
Smuggling networks can be weakened if fewer people seek their services. Therefore, 
it is important to open more safe, legal ways into the EU. […] The EU should step up 
efforts to provide smuggled migrants, in particular vulnerable groups such as children 
and women, with assistance and protection (European Commission, 2015b, pp. 2–7). 
We all share a common objective. We all agree that the time has come to replace 
chaotic, irregular and dangerous migratory flows with organised safe and legal 
pathways to Europe. Like the European Agenda on Migration, your report rightly 
stresses the need to work on all aspects of migration […]. We cannot work on one of 
the aspects and ignore the others. We cannot pick and choose what to focus on […]. 
We also need to enhance safe and legal pathways to Europe to stop migrants from 
embarking on dangerous journeys. This is why we will put forward a horizontal 
mechanism for resettlement (Dimitris Avramopoulos, EU Commissioner for Migration, 
Home Affairs and Citizenship, 8th European Parliament, Session of 12 April 2016). 
Not surprisingly, in the first years of the eighth legislature a clear sense of cooperation 
between Commission and Parliament emerged, exemplified by the EP debate of 20 
May 2015 on the European Agenda on Migration, one of the highest point of this sort 
of political honeymoon. In this occasion, First Vice-President Timmermans strongly 
stressed the parliamentary contribution to the Agenda and majority groups showed 
unchallenged support to the Commission and criticised the selfishness of Member 
States: 
I strongly support the Commission’s proposal of last week on migration, because I 
think the Commission has assumed your responsibility, and that is not the case with 
the Council. The Commission has, in fact, taken a stance that is absolutely necessary 
because it promotes the interest of all, rather than focusing on single Member States 




Now I can say that the work of the Commission met our expectations, with forward-
looking proposals, consistent with what adopted in this House. At this time, we only 
have to monitor […] above all so that the alliance between Commission and 
Parliament not be broken (MEP Cécile Kashetu Kyenge, S&D, 8th European 
Parliament, Session of 20 May 2015). 
However, although the initial approach of the EC in those years included elements of 
openness in a holistic and integrated perspective, appreciated by the Parliament, the 
overall framework was, as mentioned, definitely a security-based and border control 
one, as other extracts of the same EU Action Plan and Commissioner Avramopoulos 
12 April 2016 speech above considered demonstrate: 
Also, efforts to crack down on migrant smuggling must be matched with strong action 
to return the migrants that have no right to stay in the EU to their home countries. An 
effective return policy is a strong deterrent, as migrants are less likely to pay a high 
price to smugglers to bring them to the EU if they know that they will be returned home 
quickly after reaching their destination. […] The Commission will develop, by 2017, a 
handbook on prevention of migrant smuggling, including, possibly, codes of conduct 
for drivers and operators of merchant and fishing vessels (European Commission, 
2015b, pp. 2–7). 
The agreement reached between the European Union and Turkey should also be 
seen in this broad context. Implementing this agreement is a challenge. We are 
working tirelessly to put in place all the legal, practical, logistical and financial 
arrangements to implement it. […] Europe has to adapt its migration policy to provide 
orderly and safe pathways to the European Union for those who need protection and 
those who can contribute with their skills and talents to the European Union’s 
economic development. We need to share responsibility, reduce irregular arrivals, 
and prevent and sanction secondary movements (Dimitris Avramopoulos, EU 
Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, 8th European Parliament, 
Session of 12 April 2016). 
It is remarkable that the EU-Turkey Deal is here brought by EU Commissioner 
Avramopoulos as part of an example of a successful holistic approach, whereas it was 
targeted as one of the strongest cases of shifting out policies, also jeopardising human 




Content-wise, in fact, the general approach of the EC appears to be stable over the 
years, alternating elements of a holistic approach, including the demand side for 
migration and smuggling, with harsh repressive and border control policies, as these 
other extracts from some parliamentary speeches of First Vice-President Timmermans 
and Commissioner Avramopoulos help to show: 
We need to build a stronger criminal justice response to stop this crime [i.e. 
smuggling], investigating and prosecuting those in charge more severely. The EU 
plan that we intend to develop to counter migrant smuggling will focus both on 
dismantling the criminal networks […], and on prevention, […]. The response to the 
migratory pressures at the borders and smuggling should include a strengthened role 
for Frontex (Dimitris Avramopoulos, EU Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs 
and Citizenship, 8th European Parliament, Session of 25 November 2014). 
Let me be clear: this [migration pressure] is not due to any ‘pull factor’. This is because 
our immediate neighbourhood is on fire. It is because we are living in a time of 
instability and Europe is seen as a refuge in times of crisis. It is time we started being 
responsible about it, recognising that we need to start acting together in Europe 
(Dimitris Avramopoulos, EU Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and 
Citizenship, 8th European Parliament, Session of 20 May 2015). 
For that reason, we need to make a clear distinction between those who deserve our 
solidarity because they flee from war and persecution, and those who might have 
genuine feelings about seeking a better future but should not abuse the asylum 
system to attain that goal. To do that, we need a combination of solidarity and 
responsibility: […] the responsibility to better guard our borders; the responsibility to 
make a swift registration of those who arrive at the borders so we can distinguish 
between those who have the right to asylum and those who do not; responsibility to 
create  list of safe third countries so that we can be swifter in returning people who 
have no right to stay; responsibility to organise the reception of refugees in a way that 
respects their human dignity (Frans Timmermans, First Vice-President of the 
Commission, 8th European Parliament, Session of 9 September 2015). 
Rather than an upside-down turn in the substantive stance of the Commission, what 
did happen appears to be the progressive decline, in a policy-making perspective, of 
the capacity of positively interacting with the more moderate – arguably the European 




was the case especially on Dublin III Regulation-related and humanitarian issues, 
where the Commission failed to stress those stances supported by the majority in EP, 
in favour of a more Council-bound position (EUR_2, May 2019), losing those elements 
part of a holistic approach, which were meant to balance (at least in the eyes of the 
majority political groups) harsher policy outputs. 
Another example referred by this MEP is the attempt of MSs, together with the 
Commission, to place mandatory controls on the safe country (which is a “very political 
concept”, s/he stressed) of origin of asylum-seekers, i.e. the ‘inadmissibility ground’, 
which, s/he explained, would have been contrary to the Geneva Convention. A request 
accepted by the Commission, which is arguably problematic in terms of balancing 
between co-legislators, considering in particular the extreme influence on legislative 
drafting that the EC holds (EUR_2, May 2019). 
However, the difference between the EP and the Commission approaches had already 
become clear in the assessment of the existing anti-smuggling frameworks conducted 
in the previous section and in the clear move towards Council’s positions in concluding 
for the lack of sufficient evidence for a reform of the Facilitators Package. Notably, in 
spite of the importance of the issue and of a clear request in this direction, the EC did 
not even issue guidelines for MSs regarding humanitarian exemption, as requested by 
the Parliament (see above), limiting itself to an ‘understanding of the concerns’: 
We do not want in any way to prosecute citizens and organisations that provide 
genuine assistance to those in it. […] The Commission understands Parliament’s 
concerns about how the EU legislative framework might impact citizens providing 
humanitarian assistance. So we take note of your request for guidelines to be issued 
on this delicate matter. […] Our objective is to create and maintain an ongoing 
dialogue and exchange with interested stakeholders. We want to gather evidence and 
foster a dialogue on the implementation of the Facilitators Package precisely to avoid 
criminalisation of humanitarian assistance (Dimitris Avramopoulos, EU Commissioner 
for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, European Parliament, 3 July 2018). 
Other significant examples, in such perspectives, are the issues of:  
1. The training of the Libyan coast guard and the overall support to Libya, which 
saw the Commission and the Council as substantially aligned, whereas it was 




solution for migration flows is certainly not dirty deals with shady regimes” (MEP 
Sophia in 't Veld, on behalf of the ALDE Group, 8th European Parliament, 
Session of 12 September 2017; see, more in general, this whole session and 
Session of 1 February 2017); 
2. The externalisation policies, again matter of inter-institutional division during the 
debates on the GCM, in particular in Session of 17 April 2018 and Session of 
13 November 2018.  
Lastly on the Commission, and keeping the focus on the Facilitators Package, a 
UNODC officer discussed about the long dialogue between his/her office and the EC 
(mainly at working level, as was already mentioned, with officers working on the issue 
in Brussels, but also with other specialists from Europol and Eurojust), especially 
aimed to change the profit element or to make “at least the humanitarian clause […] 
mandatory” in EU legislation, but without any success. So “there is a strong 
responsibility of Member States there but we also had a long dialogue with the 
European Commission”, which eventually, de facto, aligned to those policy 
preferences, and where, in his/her opinion, a decisive word came from MSs 
practitioners (INT_2, April 2019). A responsibility which EUR_2 (May 2019) considered 
as mainly political and not attributable to the DGs: even if the latter do have political 
influence (an aspect which is definitely interesting, and criticised by EUR_2, May 2019, 
when it is used to influence the legislative process on the basis of national stances), in 
this case, “on the whole, the political level got stuck on migration and asylum policies 
in these years”. 
The above examples offer a clear view of the importance of the EC in these policy 
areas and of the sometimes-contradictory role assumed, in particular, in the persisting 
inter-institutional tension between EP and Council. Moving now to the other two 
institutions recalled – European Council and CJEU – there definitely are less data to 
be analysed, even though this is far from meaning that their role is marginal (especially 
for the European Council) and some interesting issues can still be considered. 
As for the European Council, in a policy area where the intergovernmental game has 
preserved strong importance, this institution has evidently showed a clear centrality 
firstly in terms of definition of “the strategic guidelines for legislative and operational 




Functioning of the European Union, TFEU). The conclusions of the June 2014 or 
October 2017 meetings, among others (European Council, 2014 and 2017), or those 
above recalled of June 2018 (European Council, 2018) are clear examples of this, 
showing how the subsequent intergovernmental bargaining at Council of the EU level 
is informed and influenced by this.  
An even clearer role was played under Article 26(1) of Treaty on European Union 
(TEU)54, in particular related to the launch of the EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia. 
The whole political and legislative procedure above recalled, indeed, was de facto 
started by the European Council in the special meeting of 23 April 2015, right after the 
mentioned massive shipwreck, by inviting the High Representative “to immediately 
begin preparations for a possible CSDP operation” which would then become 
Operation Sophia (European Council, 2015). 
In this very occasion, just a few days after the European Council special meeting, the 
European Parliament resolution of 29 April 2015 on the latest tragedies in the 
Mediterranean and EU migration and asylum policies55 (2015/2660(RSP)) was 
approved, showing only partial satisfaction with the conclusion of the 23 April meeting 
and calling for a deeper commitment from European Council, Commission, Council 
and MSs. In the connected debates of 29 and 30 April 2015 the points of view of the 
different actors involved clearly emerged, showing, besides the mentioned critical 
stance of the vast majority of the house, providing one more example of moral debate 
on migration and human rights, also an advanced position of the Commission (later 
abandoned or, at least, mitigated, as showed throughout the chapter), in contrast with 
the defensive attitude of the European Council: 
The European Council response to the human tragedy that we have just witnessed in 
the Mediterranean was immediate, but it remains insufficient. […] I mean that the 
conclusions that we adopted at the extraordinary Council remain lower that the level 
                                                          
54 Which states: “The European Council shall identify the Union's strategic interests, determine the 
objectives of and define general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy, including for 
matters with defence implications. It shall adopt the necessary decisions.” 
55 The resolution passed with 449 ayes (67%), 130 noes (19%) and 93 abstentions (14%), with a majority 
composed of S&D, ALDE, Greens/EFA and, to a lesser extent, EPP (data retrieved from 
http://voetwatch.eu). Notably, GUE-NGL MEPs either abstained or voted against, as “this report […] 
seems to us an attempt of the majority groups to clean their image” (MEP Marina Albiol-Guzmán, GUE-




of ambition which should be ours. […] Solidarity has to be shared. We urgently have 
to deal with issues related to notion of legal immigration. If we do not open, even in 
half, the entry door, we cannot be surprised when some of the unfortunate ones of 
the whole planet break into through the window. It is necessary to open the doors in 
order to avoid that! (Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the Commission, 8th 
European Parliament, Session of 29 April 2015). 
Europe did not cause this calamity. It is caused by poverty, war, instability, failing 
states and a population boom in Africa. […] We are going after the smugglers, who 
are the real culprits – criminals, in fact – and we have already sent an important 
message about our readiness to act. […] According to many of your interventions, our 
meeting last week decided too little. Prime Minister Renzi said after the meeting, and 
I quote, ‘Europe has shown serious commitment. For the first time, there is a shared 
strategic approach’. Similarly, Joseph Muscat of Malta said, ‘There is a new sense of 
resolve. What happened last week has definitely changed the mood in the European 
Council and in Member States’. In this case, I will respect the opinions of the leaders 
in the countries most affected (Donald Tusk, President of the European Council, 8th 
European Parliament, Session of 29 April 2015). 
It appears, altogether, that the impact of the European Council on the EU policy-making 
related to undocumented migration and smuggling becomes more important on 
particularly controversial or highly prioritised issues. Otherwise, it is limited to the 
general setting of the political space where the Council of the EU will eventually move. 
Limited and ancillary evidence as to the role of the European Council in this research 
seems in line with the findings of Maricut (2016, pp. 545–546), where besides (and 
more) than in agenda-setting, the role of the European Council becomes important in 
JHA with its “ad hoc involvement in addressing ongoing crises” and its input that 
“creates tremendous political pressure on the other institutions.”  
Lastly, as for the role of the Court of Justice of the European Union, those interviewees 
that talked about it highlighted the marginal role in the policy-making concerning 
undocumented migration and smuggling. There are several cases on asylum policies 
(being two of the most interesting ones C-643/15 and C-647/15, jointly adjudicated by 
the Court, establishing the duty of solidarity between MSs in migration policies), but 
almost none specifically connected to the issues at stake and with a significant impact 




to the willingness of MSs to avoid judicial scrutiny and creating the conditions to impede 
it, such as in the EU-Turkey Deal. Interestingly, in one of the last debate of the 
legislature on migration, MEP Spinelli stated that, in her opinion, “the Council is guilty 
over negligence and the Court should take care of it” (MEP Barbara Spinelli, GUE-
NGL, 8th European Parliament, Session of 15 January 2019).  
A greater impact, in terms of judicial policy-making, would be that of the European 
Court of Human Rights (see also section 6.2.2.), such as for those cases related to the 
principle of non-refoulement and push-back in high seas like Hirsi v. Italy, but they fall 
outside the EU institutional scope. Nevertheless, they could be object of further 
research, including a fourth international level of governance, such as shall be 
discussed in the next paragraph.   
 
6.4. Policy-making dynamics at a supranational level: an analytical synopsis 
In concluding this chapter, some analytical observations can be drawn regarding the 
overall policy-making dynamics at a supranational level, in a similar way to what was 
already done in the previous chapter. This will make it possible to provide an answer 
to SQ3: what factors and dynamics are relevant to the formulation of policies against 
migrant smuggling on a supranational level? 
Applying the three-layer analytical model it was possible to disclose several elements 
that characterise the process of policy adoption in Brussels, even if this sometimes 
caused some overlaps and repetitions (e.g. the Diciotti case, among others). 
Focusing in particular on layer 2, i.e. the ‘multi-level’ dimension, the patterns of a 
twofold bottom-up perspective were presented (Caponio and Jones-Correa, 2017), 
considering the direct connections both with the local (Sicilian) and the national (Italian) 
levels. The combination of this bottom-up perspective with other top-down elements 
already assessed in previous chapters substantially contributed to the understanding 
of MLG dynamics in migration policies (Zincone and Caponio, 2006). 
The main actors that emerged were, in the case of the local arena, intermediate bodies 
(ANCI and DNA, whose activity remarkably goes beyond the national boundaries) and 




systematic way. As for the latter, their activity involved an interaction with local 
governments, law enforcement agencies and the judiciary, among others. 
Read from an EU point of view, intermediate bodies worked with several institutions 
and agencies, but a direct connection (field visits and hearings) mostly happened with 
the Parliament. The Commission and the Council appear therefore to be marginal in 
this specific dimension, on the one side for the very institutional architecture of the 
European Union, but also for a different attitude of the actors. The relationship between 
MEPs and their constituencies could be significant, if considering for example the role 
played by Sicilian (and, more generally, Italian) MEPs in the planning of field visits. 
This, in turn, leads the whole discourse back to the coexistence of institutional and 
agency explanations (Olsson, 2016) which shall be deepened in the next chapter, 
exploring layer 1 of the analytical model. 
Overall, the way in which these dynamics are able to provide evidence for the policy-
making (Baldwin-Edwards et al., 2019) is more limited if compared to other channels, 
such as the mediated connection through research and academia (see the 
‘governance’ layer). The consideration of the substantive issues addressed, that will 
be done below, shall help in the understanding, however, of the extent to which these 
processes were anyway significant in order to inform the policy adoption. 
The dynamics of connection with the national level, on the other side, showed an 
involvement of all the three main actors at an EU level (EP, Council, Commission), also 
due to the very twofold nature of the national government. Also the national parliament 
appears quite significant, within the overall framework established by the EU treaties.  
Here, besides field visits and hearings, that took place similarly as in the ground 
dimension, an important factor was the overall influence coming from the national 
debate, referred both to the Council and to Italian MEPs (on similar dynamics, cf. Frid-
Nielsen, 2018).  
In an arena where evidence of direct connections is quite limited, two interesting 
elements can nevertheless be noted: 
1. The ambiguity of the national government stance, alternating requests for a 
support of national policies (such as in the case of the 2017 Code of conduct) 




(such as in the Diciotti case). Here an important variable can be the different 
political stance of the government and of the Minister of Interior (in the first case 
Marco Minniti, in the last one Matteo Salvini), reinforcing also in an external 
dimension the argument about the persisting difference in agency of centre-left 
and centre-right in Italy on migration policies, even in presence of very similar 
outcomes (cf. Zincone, 2011); 
2. The contradiction between governmental discourse at a national level, often 
based on the ‘blame Brussels’ argument, in particular throughout the Conte 
Government, and the actual political stances assumed at EU level. 
One should consider, furthermore, the peculiar role of EU agencies and bodies 
(Europol, Eurojust, Frontex, EUNAVFOR MED) involved in the bottom-up interactions, 
in terms of principal-agent relationship (Pollack, 2017). They indeed have a clear 
operational mandate from MSs and EU institutions but, in the fulfilment of this mandate, 
they send back information and upload preferences that in turn influence the policy 
debate and making (e.g. in relation to smugglers’ characteristics and judicial 
cooperation, where requests and recommendations coming from these actors seem to 
be particularly proactive, according to the accounts of JUD_3, April 2019). 
Content-wise, the issues addressed vary substantially, going from the sharing of 
evidence coming from the ground to the advocacy in order to get more resources and 
a direct management of them or to assume stances more favourable to Italy. 
Several of the issues already considered in the multi-level dimension of the national 
level (see chapter 5) are present also here, such as smuggling characteristics, the 
relationship with other policies, SAR operations, ‘shifting south’ policies. 
Remarkably, in spite of the importance suggested by the evidence considered, the 
NGO-related debate and the closing harbours issue (including the open harbours 
campaign) seem to have less room than at a national level or within other layers and 
arenas of the supranational dimension (see below). The overall issue of the reform of 
the Dublin III Regulation appears, on the contrary, to be one of the crucial aspects 





The difficulty in finding in-depth and systematic information on these interactions – 
especially those concerning the Europeanisation arena – is in fact a clear characteristic 
of this shifting up level. As widely clarified throughout the paragraph, this is 
compensated by the role of research, experts and academia, as discussed in section 
6.3.2. 
A last remark with regards to layer 2 of the analytical model should be done on the 
potential oversimplification of a mere three-level governance analysis (see chapter 2). 
In fact, evidence clearly points in the direction of the strong importance of another level 
in shaping EU policies, i.e. the international one. For the sake of clarity and 
consistency, this was not included in the overall analysis, which insists throughout the 
entire research on the three – local, national and supranational – levels. However, 
some concise remarks can and should be done, in order to briefly explore also the 
impact of this level on the EU policy-making. 
INT_2 (April 2019), in particular, explained the strong interaction between the EU 
(especially at the working level of EC) and UNODC, which was also involved in the 
REFIT and which is trying to ensure a balance in the approach towards migrant 
smuggling, “aligning the directive at the EU level with the international framework”, 
whereas “a lot of the action taken to target or tackle the smuggling of migrants is 
actually done on grounds [and seems] to depart a little bit from the international 
framework”.  
To do so, the UN tends to implement “an activity of moral suasion, so to say, through 
our publications, when we interact in working groups”, etc., rather than in terms of 
technical assistance, as it happens in developing countries (e.g. with legislative 
drafting), since in general “in western countries […] there are other institutions, it is 
clear. Normally, in Europe, the European Union acts or in any case Member States do 
not ask, so to speak, and they neither see favourably, say, a United Nations activity in 
general” (INT_1, March 2019). 
Notwithstanding these difficulties, UNODC is considered by INT_2 (April 2019) as 
having a central role in ensuring cooperation between origin, transit and destination 
countries (the existence of the Smuggling Protocol is not sufficient in itself), through 
the intergovernmental conference, and trying to bring clarity, good practices and 




Moving to layer 3, i.e. the governance dynamics of the analytical model, the data 
presented in this chapter allowed to understand several interesting patterns in the 
process of policy adoption. 
Starting with the focus on the different policy areas (the first dimension of the layer), 
the three main actors involved are the two co-legislators (Parliament and Council) and 
the Commission, essentially on the basis of what provided for in the EU treaties. The 
main patterns highlighted in this dimension have essentially to do with the structural 
overlapping of the overall smuggling of migrants field with other policy domains, such 
as asylum, migration and criminal law. On the other side, also the approach chosen 
(mostly security-based) in turns foster the dialogue between different policy areas, as 
in the example of EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia, established under a CSDP 
framework.  
Asylum is central in this story, not only for general considerations related to the 
smuggling spectrum and to the demand side for smuggling (see section 1.2.3.), but 
also in the light of the experience of the last legislature, were this issue dominated the 
EU debate, causing also severe institutional frictions (see below). 
As anticipated, another policy domain which assumed a major role since the very 
beginning is criminal law. Over the period considered, even though no significant 
related legislation was passed, the debate around a reform of the existing instruments 
was quite crucial. It also showed an attitude to use criminal law instruments in order to 
manage migration (see the Special Issue on Crimmigration in Europe of the European 
Journal of Criminology 2017 and, in particular, van der Woude et al., 2017). 
In this perspective, it seems something very similar to what already witnessed at a 
national level but with a remarkable difference: at an EU level the dialogue and 
overlapping between policy areas – both wanted and unwanted, including also the 
deliberate ‘misuse’ of policy instruments – entails also substantial institutional and 
procedural consequences, in terms of the actors involved and the legislative, or non-
legislative, procedures to be followed (see the inter-institutional dynamics in section 
6.3.3. and those that shall be discussed below). 
In this overall framework, no significant example of arena linkages from the side of the 
EP emerged, essentially in line with the view of a more ‘responsible’ and cooperative 




2017 and Trauner and Ripoll Servent, 2016), in spite of the big differences and 
dissatisfaction showed from the EP towards the positions of the Council, especially on 
the asylum agenda (see above). 
Besides different institutional and procedural arrangements, the current situation also 
leads to different degrees of guarantees and protection, considering in particular the 
exclusion of judicial review and the leading role of the Council especially in Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and CSDP (cf. Carrera and Lannoo, 2018 on 
Operation Sophia. See also Guiraudon, 2018 and Herlin-Karnell, 2017). 
All of this gives a certain centrality to the European External Action Service (EEAS) in 
anti-smuggling policy-making, alongside DG HOME, whereas other DGs, agencies 
and bodies remained more marginal in the overall process. 
Commission and Parliament are the leading actors, from the institutional point of view, 
also in the second dimension of the governance layer, i.e. that of informal-to-
institutional dynamics. The role of Council appears more difficult to be assessed (as in 
the case of shifting up dynamics above explored), mainly for institutional reasons, 
connected to the intergovernmental nature of the body. This reinforces the need for 
the development of a research line related to the preference formation also in the 
Council (Bonjour et al., 2018), with a specific focus on the potential influence of non-
institutional actors in it. Experts and NGOs are the main actors from the society point 
of view, instead. 
The main pattern observed in this dimension, where information exchange and transfer 
into institutions is very extensive and inclusive (cf. the methodological notes in Carrera 
et al., 2016 and 2018b, among others), has to do with the mediated nature of this 
process. Rather than a direct involvement of societal actors in the policy-making, the 
cases observed showed a strong connection through the research and hearing work, 
conducted by the different EU bodies, namely Commission and Parliament, mostly. 
The leading role of researchers and academics is peculiar and potentially very 
important for evidence-based policies (cf. Baldwin-Edwards et al., 2019). 
The relevant and interesting case of the reform of Facilitators Package and the way in 
which civil society interacted with EC and EP about this clearly showed, on the one 
side, the challenges connected to the stance of the Commission, particularly in terms 




Carrera et al., 2018b). On the other side, it offers a very interesting reflection as to the 
different degree of success that non-institutional dynamics can have, considering the 
different outcome of the REFIT and of the Fit for purpose processes. This last aspect 
shall be further considered when dealing with the substantive policy contents at the 
end of this paragraph. 
Lastly, the dimension of interaction between different institutions, where EP, Council 
and Commission were mostly concerned, even though also the European Council and 
the CJEU have been important actors. 
The interaction between these actors is one of the most considered dynamics at an 
EU level (see Trauner and Ripoll Servent, 2017), and in this perspective findings 
related to this aspect clearly fall within this debate. 
The overall complexity of the existing interactions, not only between the two co-
legislators, but also including the Commission and other actors, to a lesser extent, is 
mainly due to the very institutional structure of the EU, and of the AFSJ in particular. 
In the analysis of that, the following aspects, in particular, emerged: 
1. The role of the European Parliament appears somehow ambivalent and variable 
over time. Within the overall debate regarding its role in the post-Lisbon AFSJ, 
in anti-smuggling policies the Parliament seems to be at the same time a more 
‘responsible’ actor, in terms of willingness to achieve a concrete result in the 
negotiations with Council (in line with Frid-Nielsen, 2018; Ripoll Servent, 2017 
and Trauner and Ripoll Servent, 2016). This is particularly true for the majority 
groups of the house such as EPP, S&D, which are “more willing to shift 
preferences into the security-focused mainstream” (Frid-Nielsen, 2018, p. 358) 
and also ALDE to a lesser extent. The case of S&D is remarkable, if compared 
for example with the stance assumed in the Ceyhun Report of 2000, namely on 
issues such as the financial or other material benefit or the carriers liability 
regime. However, the Parliament is still capable of playing an important role in 
counterbalancing the Council, such as in those cases related to the 
humanitarian exemption, the humanitarian visas or the overall Dublin 
Regulation III reform, in line with the perspectives of Huber (2015);  
2. The role of the Council is much more difficult to be assessed, lacking access to 




interviewees. One of the aspects that would be more interesting to explore 
would be, in fact, the preference formation within the Council itself, also in 
relation to the shifting up and informal-to-institutional dynamics. Nevertheless, 
the analysis conducted still points in the direction of a leading role in smuggling-
related policies of the Council and its national-based, intergovernmental 
dynamics. This has to do with the institutional (lato sensu) dynamics, such as 
for the consensus-based logic, even in a domain where qualified majority vote 
(QMV) apply (Roos, 2017, pp. 424–427), or the relative advantage in terms of 
maintenance of the status quo in a situation of deadlock (Trauner and Ripoll 
Servent, 2016. See also Olsson, 2016 and Pollack, 2009 on path dependency), 
such as for the Dublin III Regulation missed reform; 
3. National logics apply, even if in a more limited way, also in the agency of MEPs, 
especially in terms of loyalty to the national party (Frid-Nielsen, 2018) and 
relationship with the constituency; 
4. The Commission has a pivotal role, not only as legislative process initiator, but 
also in the facilitation of a dialogue between the two co-legislators. Remarkably, 
its role has appeared variable over the years and, as in the case of the 
Parliament, it appears today more security-oriented than at the time of approval 
of the FP. Over the last legislature, it showed to be rather stable content-wise, 
suggesting a comprehensive approach to migration and smuggling and 
incorporating also several elements of the smuggling spectrum (see section 
1.2.3.), but always within a very security-based general framework. In an 
alternating approach, the Commission was sometimes closer to the EP and 
sometimes to Council; but showing a tendency to reduce progressive stances, 
also in light of the changing dynamics, even more securitising, within the Council 
(cf. Huber, 2015; Maricut, 2016 and Ripoll Servent, 2017);  
5. Besides the specific role of MEPs, the parliamentary arena is a crucial 
institutional space for a supranational political debate. Also in comparison to the 
national parliament dimension, it can be firstly observed how the debates 
appear to be less extreme (especially in terms of rise of far-right arguments) 
and polarised than at a national level. This can be explained not only in terms 




national and European parliamentary arenas, in the overall political debate (in 
this perspective, the stance of EUR_2, May 2019, is very interesting and clear, 
about the lack of media coverage and public opinion interest towards what 
happens in the EP). Secondly, the European parliamentary arena is the place 
where the EU moral debate takes place, on very relevant and divisive issues 
that, besides the actual legislation to be passed, have to do with the very nature 
of the EU and the self-perception of it (in particular of MEPs, cf. the cited 
debates) as a moral power (see, more broadly, the concept of ‘normative ethics 
of the EU’ in Manners, 2008). The existence of room for such moral and 
fundamental arguments is remarkable if compared not only to other EU 
institutions, but also to the debate taking place in the Italian parliament, also 
besides the less polarised characterisation of them above recalled. However, 
morally-oriented debates are not always consistent with the actual policy 
outputs, considering also the more ‘responsible’ attitude of the Parliament, more 
incline to find an agreement with the Council; 
6. The CJEU, even if very rarely involved in the overall governance of this policy 
field, can be very important in order to limit the securitisation of the anti-
smuggling framework, likewise courts at a national level (cf. Herlin-Karnell, 
2017); 
7. International organisations can have an interesting role in establishing 
privileged relationships with some institutions and trying to foster the debate, as 
well as bureaucrats can do, especially within the Commission staff, again in 
continuity with what seen at national level.  
Lastly, on the policy content, the whole layer is very rich of different debates and policy-
making processes, that involve a number of policy areas and actors, in a widely 
security-based approach. One can observe, in this regard, that the idea of a 
“comprehensive” or “holistic” approach to migration and smuggling, which is the basis 
of the most important EU documents in this field, is to be meant, always, within such a 
security-based approach. There is a language issue from this point of view, which 
involves also the concept of SAR, of humanitarian help and many others. This is in turn 




not always coincident with the substantive aspects of policies approved and on how 
they are perceived on the ground (cf. Cusumano, 2019). 
The main issues addressed have to do with: (a) the criminal law approach to smuggling 
(in particular the FP, also in comparison with the UN Smuggling Protocol) and 
smugglers’ characteristics; (b) SAR policies and the role of NGOs and of the EU; (c) 
quite limitedly, also the demand side for smuggling, both from the perspective of 
economic migrants and asylum seekers (asylum policies are by far the most 
extensively considered in the EU migration debate); (d) externalisation and ‘shifting 
south’ policies.  
Over the considered period, the most significant policies related to the anti-smuggling 
framework lato sensu were actually adopted within the SAR and externalisation 
domains (Operation Sophia and the EU-Turkey Statement, respectively). Notably, both 
of them without a legislative procedure, but within the CFSP/CSDP area, i.e. by the 
Council acting alone. On other relevant policy proposals, instead, deadlocks in Council 
and/or the lack of an inter-institutional agreement led to the preservation of the status 
quo, such as in the case of the Dublin III Regulation reform (see Guiraudon, 2018 and 
Trauner and Ripoll Servent, 2016). 
As for the non-institutional dynamics, lastly, they mostly had to do with the reform of 
the Facilitators Package, and in particular the aspects of material gain and 
humanitarian exemption. The overall failure of this reform process is significant in 
terms of the limited impact of the civil society, researchers, NGOs on the overall policy-
making process in this field. 











Table 6.2. – Policy-making dynamics at a supranational level (layers 2 and 3) 
 Main actors 
Main substantive 
issues involved or 
addressed 









(ANCI, DNA)  






Relationship with other 
policies 
Migrant reception  
Direct fund management 
by local authorities 
Requests from the ground, 
information upload, field visits 
Secondary importance 
compared to studies 
Arguable actual impact 
Non-systematic 
















Libya agreements  
Dublin III relocation 
Anti-smuggling 
operations 
Direct connection (field visits, 
hearings) 
Influence of the national debate  
Ambiguity: support request for 
national policies vs. use of 
national policies to make 
pressure on the EU (depending 
on the political stance) 
Contradiction between 
discourse at a national level 












SAR (NGOs and 
Operation Sophia in 
particular) 
‘Shifting south’ approach  
Differences with UN 
Smuggling Protocol 
Criminal law approach 
Anti-smuggling as 
migration management 
Demand side: safe 
routes and asylum 
shopping 
Structural overlapping 
(institutional and procedural 
consequences, arena linkages 
in the EP, judicial review and 
different guarantees) 
Overlapping for approach 
chosen 
Primary role of Council 
Misuse of policy instruments 




















and material benefit) 
Horizontal information upload 
(extensive and inclusive) 
Limited translation into policy 
goals 
Centrality and inconsistency 
EC (also changing over time) 
Role of researchers, 


























framework, leading to a 
very strong moral 
debate, involving also 
the EC 
FP: discussion on 
humanitarian exemption, 
abandoned the issues of 
material gain and 
carriers liability in EP 
SAR and the different 




Central role of Council and 
intergovernmental deadlocks 
More limited role of EP, 
ambivalent and changing over 
time (divisive, more 
responsibility, still 
counterbalancing the Council) 
Pivot role EC (sometimes 
closer to EP sometimes to 
Council; stable content-wise, 
but less dialogue with majority 
MEPs)  
CJEU as judiciary at a national 
level can be important to limit 
securitisation (very little so far) 
International organisations 
establish privileged relationship 
with some institutions  
Parliamentary arena as a 
crucial political space also for 
moral debate 
Role of bureaucrats 
Prevailing of national logics 
over EU ones (not only in 
Council) 





Chapter 7  
Wrapping up: multi-level agency and institutional constraints in 




This chapter builds upon the data presented and the analysis conducted throughout 
the study, with a view to offering new angles and a comprehensive perspective on the 
issues considered.  
To do so, it will firstly address in paragraph 7.2. the institution/agency dimension (layer 
1) of the analytical model (see paragraph 2.3.). This analysis will show how the three 
levels interact with one another and how and why agency moves within and across 
them, shaped by institutional dynamics. In so doing, some reference shall also be done 
to the extent to which the multifaceted nature of migrant smuggling is taken into 
consideration throughout the policy-making process by each actor, building a 
connection with the smuggling spectrum elaborated in section 1.2.3. and highlighting, 
where possible, the specific dimension/continuum of the spectrum which is mostly 
considered by actors. 
Secondly, to reinforce the heuristic relevance of the model and to provide substantive 
examples of the complexity of the policy-making process, paragraph 7.3. will focus on 
one specific policy, i.e. the ‘facilitation offence’ or, in other terms, the criminal law anti-
smuggling framework (provided for by article 12 Consolidated Immigration Act, TUI, 
and by the Facilitators Package, FP. See chapter 3), that appeared to be relevant 
throughout the research. In so doing, the way in which institutional constraints and 
agency move vertically across levels and horizontally within levels will be assessed in 
their entirety, in a process which has proven to be very complex and sensitive. 
A final comment in this introductory part should be dedicated to the purely analytical 
nature of this chapter, which entails a continuous reference to data and analysis 
conducted in the previous ones. Once again, repetitions and overlaps are not 




reference shall be done to those chapters and paragraphs of the research where the 
issue is more thoroughly addressed (and where sources are cited explicitly).  
 
7.2. Between institutions and agency: how and why actors move within and 
across levels  
The heuristic relevance of the analytical model presented in paragraph 2.3. lies in the 
combination of a new institutionalist and of a multi-level governance (MLG) 
perspectives, enabling a one-dimensional analysis to shift into a three-dimensional 
one. This is a key aspect, considering that the whole complexity of the policy-making 
process related to anti-smuggling policies lato sensu can be properly understood only 
considering the multi-dimension nature of agency and institutional constraints. Going 
even further, it is interesting to notice how in certain situations the agency of an actor 
within one level becomes an institutional constraint for another actor on another level 
(see paragraph 2.3.). And yet, this structural variable embedded at other levels, which 
cannot be entirely modified as such, can be adapted (or even not applied, such as in 
the case of norms), in a continuous process of reshaping and relayering, whose 
understanding is crucial in order to make sense of the whole policy adoption in this 
area. 
The analysis conducted in the previous chapters highlighted the importance of several 
actors, each of them embedded in one specific governance level (with a few 
exceptions, that shall be discussed), and yet able to move across also other levels. 
The very way in which actors move within and across levels, influenced by institutions 
and making sense of the complexity nature of migrant smuggling, shall now be 
discussed, separately addressing each of the actors previously emerged, answering 
both ‘what’ and ‘why’ questions (Awesti, 2007; Caponio and Jones-Correa, 2017 and 
March and Olsen, 1989 and 2006). 
Starting with the EU level56, the first actor that can be considered is the European 
Commission (EC, the Commission). This is indeed a key actor of the EU policy-making, 
                                                          
56 In this wrapping up chapter, as well as in the Conclusions, it seems appropriate to address the different 
governance levels starting with the EU. This has essentially to do with the ultimate nature of this 
research, falling within the EU studies (see chapters 1 and 2). The bottom-up approach, which was used 
throughout the study, allowed for the consideration (also) of the impact of lower governance levels on 




de facto leading the legislative initiative in the Area of Freedom, Security and Jusitce 
(AFSJ) after the reforms brought by the Lisbon Treaty (Maricut, 2016).  
The first aspect emerged concerning EC agency has to do exactly with the way in 
which it exercised such power over the years. It could be observed, over the period 
considered, that an initial approach was adopted which appeared quite comprehensive 
and ambitious, in particular through the European Agenda on Migration, the EU Action 
Plan against migrant smuggling and the Dublin III Regulation recast proposal (see 
paragraph 6.3.), also reacting to a particular moment in the history of the EU, with the 
beginning of the so-called ‘refugee crisis’. In that moment, within the overall institutional 
framework established, the Commission seemed to be very proactive and fully using 
its role according to the overall perception of the “appropriate actions in terms of 
relations between roles and situations [based on an understanding of] what the 
situation is, what role is being fulfilled, and what the obligation of that role in that 
situation is” (March and Olsen, 1989, p. 160). 
In this very moment, the highest point of institutional cooperation with the European 
Parliament (EP, the Parliament) – or, better, with the parliamentary majority – was 
reached (see paragraph 6.3.). However, from 2017 onwards, a progressive shift from 
original preferences to stances more oriented towards the Council of the EU (the 
Council) could be observed: this appeared to be the result, in an institutionally stable 
environment, of the need to keep the Council ‘on board’ in the legislative reforms, 
bargaining with the overall more restrictive and securitising positions expressed there 
(see section 6.3.3.), still without substantially compromising the relationship with the 
Parliament57. This rationality-bound move, acknowledged by some of the actors 
involved, was also determined by the pivotal role of the Commission within the post-
Lisbon Treaty AFSJ governance system (see Huber, 2015; Maricut, 2016 and Ripoll 
Servent, 2017), in turn reinforcing the idea of a continuative interaction between 
institution and agency (Olsson, 2016).  
                                                          
governance levels. Such approach, however, can now make room for an overall understanding of the 
multi-level agency and institutional dynamics from an EU point of view, consistently with the research 
question and the theoretical lenses chosen. 
57 However, it should be also recalled that the comprehensive and innovative aspects of the initial EU 




The second aspect of Commission’s agency concerns evidence-based policies. Here 
a contradiction seems to exist between the overall process of collection of evidence in 
order to inform policies (appropriate behaviour in light of the institutional rules) and the 
very limited use that is made of such evidence. This last aspect can be read through 
the pursuit of a conducive policy-making process, considering also the preferences of 
the Council and of part of the EP and, arguably, also of the very Commission. In such 
respect, the inconsistency between evidence collected and policy outcomes in the 
REFIT process for the Facilitators Package is emblematic (see section 6.3.2.). The 
words of Baldwin-Edwards et al. (2019, p.10) probably best describe the political 
implications of the use that is made of evidence in policy-making, particularly in this 
field:  
Policymaking is, as Sutcliffe and Court suggest, ‘neither objective nor neutral; it is an 
inherently political process’ (2005, iii). Although this has implications for EBP 
[evidence-based policy] across all policy domains, the politics of policymaking is 
perhaps nowhere more evident than in the area of migration and asylum. 
The Commission acts also at national level, mostly through top-down dynamics. Even 
if institutional constraints limit its action (see the example of the infringement 
procedures in chapter 6), there is still room for a direct influence on the national policy-
making in terms of soft power, related to (a) the encouragement to broader approach 
in migration policies (EUR_1, March 2019); (b) the endorsement of specific policies, in 
order to strengthen their perception also by national public opinion (see paragraph 
5.2.). 
Lastly, it should be noted how the overall approach of the Commission to migrant 
smuggling lato sensu is consistent over time with a comprehensive understanding (in 
particular acknowledging the demand side for smuggling), even though within a stable 
security-based framework (see paragraph 6.3.). 
Moving to the European Parliament, its agency in the policy-making process is twofold. 
On the one side, it acts as arena of political and moral debate, consistently with the 
institutional framework of the EU. Here, the collective agency of the Parliament (as the 
result of the individual agency, mostly but not exclusively, of the different Members of 
the European Parliament, MEPs) is mostly value-based and shapes the overall debate 




where the smuggling of migrants – and, more broadly, the entire migration issue – is 
framed in the most comprehensive way, considering and embracing the multifaceted 
nature of smuggling, smugglers and smuggled migrants. This becomes clear both in 
the parliamentary debate and in the resolutions approved, even if a tendency to a more 
security-based (and hence less comprehensive) approach seems to have increased 
throughout the last legislature (see paragraph 6.3.).  
The comprehensive approach is even more significant when read in comparison with 
the Italian parliament (see paragraph 5.3. and the section on national parliament 
below) where such a wide understanding of smuggling and undocumented migration 
seems much more limited. Lastly on this, a connection between the smuggling 
spectrum and the political spectrum could also be observed, where right-wing parties 
tend to adhere to the right area of the smuggling spectrum, whereas the left-wing ones 
tend to adopt a broader and more comprehensive approach, in particular related to the 
victimisation of migrants and the demand side for smuggling (see paragraph 6.3.).  
On the other side, the EP has also a very important role in the legislative process, as 
co-legislator. However, such a role is less powerful than the one of the Council, which 
acts as a de facto veto player (Trauner and Ripoll Servent, 2016 and Tsebelis, 1995, 
see also below), essentially on the basis of path dependency dynamics that facilitate 
the maintenance of the status quo in the lack of an agreement for policy change (see 
also Bonjour et al., 2018, p. 416; Olsson, 2016; Pollack, 2009). In such capacity, the 
EP shows traces of consensualism as it seems keener to find an agreement in a 
mediation between different national interests and political preferences (cf. Frid-
Nielsen, 2018), and appears to be less securitising than the Council in its approach 
against smuggling, albeit more than it used to be in the past. The data considered 
allows for a reconciliation of the diverging perspectives on the role of the EP in the 
AFSJ after the Lisbon Treaty (Maricut, 2016 and Ripoll Servent, 2017), considering 
how, in spite of a more goal-oriented attitude of the majority political groups aimed at 
finding an agreement with Council, bills adopted by this house offer some important – 
albeit limited – elements of de-securitisation, if compared to the restrictive stances 
prevailing in Council (see chapter 6 and, in particular section 6.3.3.). In this game, the 
Parliament appears to be guided by a plurality of logics, and a more in-depth approach 




at least two different variables, i.e. the political group and the nationality, taking into 
account also the role of constituencies and their relationship with MEPs (cf. also Frid-
Nielsen, 2018).  
The European Parliament also moves across the levels: 
1. Collecting information for evidence-based policies, even though this is not 
always a completely satisfactory process in terms of upload into legislative bills. 
In this process, MEPs’ constituency appears relevant, in particular in case of 
field missions (see the review of the Facilitators Package and the field missions 
in chapter 6); 
2. Through a two-way influence between MEPs and national governments, 
though the institutional background determine a stronger influence from 
government to MEPs rather than the opposite (cf. again the study of Frid-
Nielsen, 2018).  
The other co-legislator, i.e. the Council of the EU, is the key actor of the legislative 
process, de facto being a veto player (mostly for national interest reasons), through 
two main dynamics:  
1. Deadlocks in decision-making, in spite of the qualified majority vote (QMV), 
being still a consensus-based decision-making in light of institutional non-formal 
agreements and where the “shadow of vote” (Golub, 1999, cited in Roos, 2017, 
p. 426) is not sufficient in order to overcome divisions in such a sensitive policy 
arena (cf. the Dublin III Regulation recast deadlock); 
2. Using other (non-)legislative tools (see the concept of ‘new governance’ in 
Cardwell, 2018 and also Capano and Lippi, 2017 for the logics used in the 
choice of policy instruments), such as the Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP)-based Operation Sophia or, on other sides, the EU-Turkey Statement, 
marginalising the EP and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU. 
See Carrera and Lannoo, 2018 and Guiraudon, 2018).   
These findings are in line with the approach of Ripoll Servent (2017), who extensively 
considered the privileged role of the Council, in so disclosing also some elements of 
path dependency within the AFSJ policy-making (Bonjour et al., 2018, p. 416; Olsson, 




as a privileged actor, in particular when the goal is that of preserving the status quo, 
making the most of its room for agency in different policy areas (and of the even 
paradoxical ‘inaction agency’), mostly based on constraints determined by the 
institutional framework and on the rational used that is made of them. However, the 
knowledge about the actual policy-making process within Council in this specific policy 
domain needs to be strongly extended and deepened.  
As for the substantive component, the Council shows a strongly security-based 
approach to smuggling, essentially falling within the extreme right part of the smuggling 
spectrum: this aspect is even more clear if compared to the approach of the Parliament 
(see above). 
Moving to Council’s agency across levels, this is very limited. The actual impact of the 
Council mostly consists in an indirect influence on the national level in terms of missed 
reforms (see section 6.2.2.), to be mostly read in terms of unintended consequences 
(Pollack 2009. Cf. Bonjour and Vink, 2013) and in turn enabling the ‘blame Brussels’ 
or ‘excuse shopping’ dynamics extensively considered in the previous chapters. 
Focusing then on the European Council, this research indicates that it mainly acts in 
the anti-smuggling domain as crisis manager, gaining a prominent role through the use 
of (non-)legislative acts and with its capacity of exercising strong political pressure 
(Maricut, 2016). This is in line with the approach of Guiraudon (2018) and resulted 
particularly clear in the case of the 2015 shipwreck and the subsequent launch of 
Operation Sophia (see chapter 6). Goal-oriented rationality seems to drive its agency, 
in which institutional constraints exist mainly in terms of the relatively more marginal 
role assigned to it in comparison with the pre-Lisbon situation (see Maricut, 2016). 
Likewise, these constraints limit European Council’s action also at the Italian level, 
where there is still room, though, for some forms of soft power in terms of endorsement 
of specific policies, such as in the case of the 2017 Malta Declaration (see section 
6.2.2.). The European Council is active at national level also indirectly, by influencing 
parliamentary and, more widely, political debates, as emerged throughout the analysis 
of parliamentary proceedings in chapter 5. As for its understanding of migrant 
smuggling, this appears to be in line with the Council of the EU above explored. 
The impact of the agency of other EU bodies, such as the CJEU, is even more limited. 




supranational action and in the one related to the national level, where only limited 
evidence of its activity was reported. EU agencies, considered as a whole, are a very 
interesting example of political agency unfolded across the three different levels, 
mostly in terms of information sharing (also horizontal one), with a view to bettering the 
coordination of existing policies and practices, as well as to providing elements for 
evidence-based policy-making. Within the overall EU analysis, also the role of EU civil 
servants emerged as potentially interesting, in particular in the mostly technical work 
conducted with other levels (see also the situation of national civil servants below as 
well as section 5.2.2. and chapter 6). The role of these three actors could be deepened 
in future research, which would clearly need a different framework from the one used 
in the present one, considering in particular the extent of their room for manoeuvre, 
which seems limited on paper but is still intuitively of some potential interest.  
Moving to actors mostly situated at the Italian national level, the first one to consider is 
the national government. This is the key actor of the legislative process, mainly 
because of the executivisation of policies in this domain (for a broader understanding, 
see Capano and Giuliani, 2003; Capano, Howlett and Ramesh, 2015; Rasch and 
Tsebelis, 2013 and Zucchini, 2013). In this sense, the government does not seem to 
face particularly severe constraints, besides the overall framework of EU, international 
and constitutional obligations. Even the role of the parliament as a counterbalance 
seems to have been decreasing, with an increasing legislation by decree and use of 
confidence vote (see in this perspective the historical analysis conducted in chapter 5. 
See also Musella, 2014).  
This actor has proven to be stable over the years in terms of an overall security-based 
approach in the policy outcomes, because of a rational-choice-bound agency, which 
includes also an understanding of the cost of changes (see section 5.3.3. and Olsson, 
2016; Pollack, 2009 and Zincone and Caponio, 2006 on aspects of path dependency). 
The closing harbours policy is one very clear example of this continuity, where also a 
form of selective evidence-based policy arose, i.e. only specific aspects coming from 
the ground, mostly the more security-oriented ones, were taken into consideration in 
the policy formulation (see sections 5.2.1. and 5.3.3. and paragraph 5.4.  See also 




As for the internal dynamics, the leading role of the Ministry of Interior is essentially 
unchallenged, with the notable examples of Marco Minniti and Matteo Salvini as 
absolute leaders of the anti-smuggling agenda in their respective governments. This 
even caused, in particular during the Conte Government, some tensions between 
different ministries. 
Government’s agency moves across the three different levels of governance 
concerned, mostly following the same rationality-bound dynamics. On the one side, 
the government interacts with the local level, reshaping policies based on the influence 
coming from the ground. This happens in terms of (a) effects of NGOs activity (see the 
closing harbours policy) and (b) effects of judicial proceedings (see the Diciotti case): 
both of them can be read in terms of unintended consequences (Pollack, 2009).  
On the other side, the relationship with the EU is structurally influenced by the twofold 
nature of the government in this arena, as national government in itself and member 
of the Council. Government EU-agency mainly takes three forms:  
1. ‘Excuse shopping’, within the overall ‘blame Brussels’ argument, i.e. 
strategically using existing institutional constraints (or alleged/perceived ones) 
to justify shortcomings or contested decisions in policy formulation and 
implementation at national level (see the overall issue of the Dublin III 
Regulation reform);  
2. The use of national policies as leverage for negotiations at EU level (which can 
be considered as a case of multi-level arena linkage, see Héritier and Moury, 
2012), such as in the Diciotti case;  
3. The call for EU support to national policies, which, when granted by EU 
institutions, is essentially political, because of the limitations of the institutional 
framework and of the political costs of the operation (see the case of the 2017 
Code of conduct). Furthermore, the government, as was explored above, has a 
two-way influence with MEPs, with a prominent role as influencer, again in light 
of the institutional framework. 
In terms of smuggling perception, the Italian government maintains a security-based 
perspective and tends to focus on aspects connected to the very negative connotation 




The second leading actor is the national parliament, which in the cases considered 
seems to be relevant as an arena for political debate, where the differences across the 
political spectrum become evident and acquire a specific importance (see Giuliani, 
2008 and Zincone, 2011 on the apparent contradiction between 
continuity/consensualism and the divisive nature of the migration domain). The 
parliament clearly has an important role also in the legislative process, but appears to 
be more limited than the one of the government, in particular specifically insofar as 
smuggling – within the overall migration policies – is concerned, mostly because of the 
executivisation of policies taking place in this area (see above and paragraph 5.3.).  
Moving across levels, the parliament shows a relationship with the ground marked by 
selective evidence-based policies, similarly to what was considered with regards to 
government’s agency. This affects not only the policy outcomes but also the very 
parliamentary debates, as emerged in those related to the NGO activity in search and 
rescue (SAR, see chapter 5). Even though some biases exist also at parliamentary 
committee levels in terms of what evidence to consider (see section 5.2.1. and 
paragraph 5.4.), the critical juncture appears to be in the transmission belt from 
committees to plenary, where several pieces of information are dropped and only the 
more ‘functional’ ones in terms of policy preferences are kept, in line with a mostly 
rationality-bound approach, in particular from the majority political groups (see again 
the SAR-related NGO activity or the smuggling characteristics in the Anti-Mafia 
Committee Report in section 5.2.1.). More broadly on the characteristics of the 
parliament’s agency, what said above referring to the European Parliament holds true. 
The observed coexistence of different logics in such a complex collective actors would 
suggest the need to unpack the analysis, considering the different agency in this policy 
domain according to the political group and to the different institutional roles within the 
house (such as in the case of the presidency of parliamentary committees).  
As in the EP, also for the national parliament a connection between smuggling 
spectrum and political spectrum can be observed. However, in this case there seems 
to exist a less comprehensive understanding of the issue, also from progressive 
political groups (such as the Democratic Party, PD), with the mere exception of those 
political groups affiliated (or in line) with the GUE-NGL at a European level. Differently 




confrontational attitude, where the decisive factors seem to be the different relationship 
with the government in terms of loyalty and responsibility (compared to the tripartite 
dynamics EP-Council-Commission), as well as the accountability and the public 
opinion’s perception (see paragraph 5.3.).  
Finally, it should be noted that the parliament limitedly acts also at EU level, providing 
in turn information and opinions for evidence-based and informed policy adoption in an 
ancillary way. 
Another important actor, explored in different parts of this research, are intermediate 
bodies (i.e. the National Anti-Mafia and Anti-terrorism Prosecutor’s Office, DNA, and 
the Association of the Italian Municipalities, ANCI). They move across the three levels, 
mostly in a bottom-up perspective, with a view to (a) building relationships between 
other actors tasked with implementation and policy-making; (b) uploading information 
from the ground to the national and EU level and lobbying. In so doing, they tend to 
have a comprehensive approach to smuggling, embracing the spectrum in its fullness, 
also understanding (especially in the case of DNA) the multifaceted nature of 
smugglers and smuggling segments, within the same migration movement, as well as 
aspect connected to the victimisation of migrants and the diverse perceptions of 
smugglers (see section 5.2.1. and the smuggling spectrum in section 1.2.3.). 
Institutional aspects limit their substantive role in policy-making, but they are still able 
to exercise it (moved by a more appropriateness-bound logic) through political 
pressure, in so disclosing a peculiar element of their agency in anti-smuggling policy-
making. Such influence can be even bigger, in particular in the case of ANCI, when the 
interaction takes place with bureaucratic actors, far from the political scene stricto 
sensu (see the perspective of ITA_1, March 2019, in chapter 5). 
The role of national civil servants – which, as in the case of European ones, could be 
further explored in new research – is very much connected to this last point. According 
to the available evidence, they are able to use, also at a national level, a certain degree 
of discretion, with the possibility to work keeping a low profile and de-politicising issues 
(see again the point of view of ITA_1, March 2019, in chapter 5). 
Considering actors at a local level, it is important to highlight, first of all, how the general 




458. Here the main actors and their main agency characteristics will therefore be briefly 
recalled, in particular in relation to other levels, whereas for a more detailed description 
of agency and institutions in Sicily, one should refer to chapter 4. The Prefettura is the 
key actor within the reception system and bears the biggest responsibilities when 
migrant disembarkations take place. Likewise law enforcement and border guard 
agencies, the evidence in this research related to its role indicates a limited 
implementation discretion at a local level, being all of them governmental actors 
strongly hierarchised (cf. Fabini, 2017). They tend to follow an appropriateness-based 
logic and seem not to have a broad understanding of migrant smuggling (see in 
particular the point of view of some law enforcement officers in section 4.2.2., falling 
on the right side of the smuggling spectrum). Lastly, these institutions are particularly 
important in providing information to EU/national levels for evidence-based policies, in 
particular through hearings and field visits. More in-depth (possibly comparative) 
studies, also able to disclose the evolution and changes over time and space, would 
make it possible to fully appreciate the room for discretional agency of the Prefetture 
and of law enforcement and border guard agencies, specifically in anti-smuggling 
practices. Also, another aspect which would be interesting to further explore has to do 
with the internal relationship of these bodies with the Ministry of Interior, in particular 
in terms of potential shifting up processes.  
The agency of municipalities is limited by the institutional framework, also considering 
the shift towards a more Rome-led management through the Prefettura takeover. Still, 
these actors are able to exert a strong symbolic power and political pressure, which 
often go beyond the role formally assigned to local government (as in the case of 
closing harbours policies, among others), depending on their stance. However, the 
degree of success of this type of agency in influencing policy-making is arguable. They 
also try to gain power and influence at EU and national levels, mainly through ANCI, 
which is crucial in the upload of policy preferences and requests. Still, the actual impact 
that this process can have is more limited in the case of very sensitive and politically 
salient issues (see section 5.2.1.). In the cases considered, municipalities tend to 
behave on the basis of a combined logic, where elements of appropriateness 
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connected to their role are mixed with a strong rationality approach, aimed at the 
protection of rights and values (again depending on the political stance of the actors). 
Limited available evidence seems also to point in the direction of a wide approach to 
smuggling, understanding the different elements that shape the phenomenon. 
Two last actors need to be addressed separately, since they are not embedded in any 
specific tier, but they encompass the whole multi-level system. 
Firstly, the Italian judiciary. At national level, findings suggest that the Constitutional 
Court can play an important role in tempering the harsher effects of national policies 
(Zincone, 2011, see also section 5.3.3.). However, the institutional framework seems 
of crucial importance in this perspective, considering the specific and very strict 
procedures needed in order to access the Court. Also the Court of Cassation is 
embedded at a national level, but the approach followed in this research has taken into 
account case law entirely as coming from the ground, considering the possible final 
stage of the Court of Cassation as the last step of a process mostly embedded at a 
local level (see chapter 4). More broadly, judges can have a clear impact on policy-
making in this domain (see Bonjour et al., 2018, pp. 415–416), applying discretion in 
the interpretation of the norms and originating direct and indirect bottom-up processes 
(see Anaya, 2014 and Marmo, 2007), also in terms of unwanted consequences. In this 
perspective, agency dynamics can be very broad, and to be mostly read in term of 
appropriateness, whereas limits come mainly from the very norms – substantive and 
procedural ones – to be applied. The same holds true also for prosecutors, as the 
various evidence considered confirm. However, in this latter case, two elements allow 
for a wider scope of agency, and namely (a) the fact that prosecutors can start 
investigations freely, on the basis of any type of information discretionally deemed 
relevant by the prosecutor him/herself; (b) the tendency of prosecutors to act also 
outside the judicial arena stricto sensu, participating in the public debate, either with 
interview or the information publicly shared in parliamentary committees (see the case 
of Prosecutor Zuccaro). This allows prosecutors to move also outside the institutional 
constraints of their role and any connected logic of appropriateness, following a goal-
oriented approach through information and preference upload. Overall, the judiciary 
shows a comprehensive understanding of smuggling, as in the case of DNA, 




the evidence coming from specific smuggling events considered in the judicial activity. 
Prosecutors, however, appear to adhere to a more restrictive approach, especially in 
those cases considering the potential connection with smuggling activities of NGOs. 
The second actor which is located at and move across the three different levels is 
NGOs. They exercise wide discretion and substantive influence on policies at a local 
level, from overstay in reception centres to actions of civil disobedience (see chapter 
4), being able to move without any major institutional constraints. They also tend to 
resist, to different extents, processes of limitation and/or co-optation in their work, 
which are those very elements that could in fact constitute the most relevant external 
constraints to their action (see the 2017 Code of conduct or the closing harbours 
policy), so originating also indirect effects on policies through unwanted consequences 
(Pollack, 2009). They also provide information to EU/Italian levels for evidence-based 
policies, either directly or indirectly, but with a relatively limited degree of success in 
terms of policy outputs (such as in the hearings in parliamentary committees or the 
involvement in the process of evaluation of the Facilitators Package). NGOs take also 
part in advocacy processes both at a local (more successful) and at a national level. 
Their actions seem to be oriented by a combined logic, where appropriateness 
elements connected to their role are merged with very rational and strategic decisions 
aimed at the protection of the values at the core of their organisations. Lastly, NGOs 
appear to have a comprehensive approach to smuggling, that incorporates different 
elements of the smuggling spectrum, with particular emphasis on the victimisation of 
migrants (see chapter 4). 
All these different actors and their main agency patterns are synthetically reported in 
Table 7.1.  
A last remark should be made, however, regarding the institutional constraints that can 
somehow limit or shape agency. Indeed, besides the specific examples provided for 
the different actors, there are other broader constraints coming from the very existence 
of a (multi-level) institutional environment, applicable to and affecting all the different 
actors and should therefore be recalled. They mainly are: international obligations, the 
constitutional framework, the task allocation among different actors and the material 
resources (see chapter 3) and it is crucial that an overall understanding of the policy-




Table 7.1. – Institutional constraints, agency and smuggling perception across the 
governance levels  
Actor Levels 
Agency & logics Smuggling 
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Source: Elaborated by the author 
Notes: The level in which actors are mainly embedded is in bold. Arrows highlight the main 
direction of multi-level dynamics. The position of the actor on the smuggling spectrum is 
referred to with L, CL, C, CR, R, progressively indicating the space from the left to the centre 
to right of the spectrum (see the smuggling spectrum in section 1.2.3.) 
 
7.3. Policy focus: the ‘facilitation offence’  
The analysis conducted throughout the research showed that certain issues pose 
substantive problems to policy-makers and to those tasked with the implementation on 
the ground. Among them, one of the domains of biggest concern for different reasons 
at different levels was connected to the criminal law framework, i.e. to the so-called 
‘facilitation offence’ (see chapter 3). Actors on the ground repeatedly highlighted critical 
issues connected with this provision, whereas policy-makers at the Italian and EU 
levels extensively discussed about different policy options to change the existing 




this policy – crucial element of the whole anti-smuggling framework – shall be taken as 
an example of how the different actors above recalled move across levels, exercising 
influence on the overall policy adoption process.  
In this perspective, this paragraph, rather than offering new data, evidence and 
cases59, aims to suggest a different, policy-based perspective, which will allow to make 
the most of the analytical model, disclosing the different agency, multi-level and 
governance dynamics, taking this very policy as a significant example. 
Chapter 3 (and, to a lesser and different extent, also chapter 1) offered a description 
of the existing anti-smuggling criminal law framework, essentially based on the EU 
Facilitators Package and on the Italian article 12 TUI. Such framework clearly is the 
basis of this policy focus, since it represents the applicable legislation for actors tasked 
with implementation as well as the norms to be assessed by policy-makers in view of 
a possible substantial change of this very framework. 
Namely starting with the local level, the analysis conducted in chapter 4 showed that 
the application of article 12 TUI posed some challenges, depending on the perspective 
of the different actors (see chapter 4 for sources and references) and on the way in 
which they were able to exert agency within the different institutional frameworks : 
1. Members of the judiciary had to deal, in particular, with aspects related to (a) 
the establishment of the Italian jurisdiction at high seas, (b) cases of ‘alleged’ or 
‘forced’ smugglers, in order to establish whether and to what extent the 
‘exoneration clause for distress’ could be applied and (c) those cases involving 
NGOs in SAR operations, in particular with reference to the possible 
infringement of article 12 TUI in certain circumstances. Within the judiciary, the 
agency of prosecutors and judges showed some differences in particular in 
relation to points (b) and (c): judges tended to be more cautious than 
prosecutors in the application of the framework, granting the ‘exoneration clause 
for distress’ (even if with the mentioned overturning in the Court of Cassation) 
and dismissing the cases against NGOs (even upon direct requests of the 
prosecutors, after extensive investigations). These differences have been 
                                                          
59 For this very reason, as already explained in the introduction to this chapter, there will clearly be 




explained, besides the judicial analysis, in terms of different institutional 
constraints and of a more appropriateness-oriented attitude of judges; 
2. NGOs were actually very important actors in terms of concrete practices 
implemented, with their SAR operations in the Mediterranean Sea that had a 
very important impact on the application of the penal framework, not only for 
said investigations, but also in relation with their involvement in the very 
application of the criminal law (such as agreeing on the presence of law 
enforcement on board). This was based on the little institutional constraints 
faced by NGOs in setting their actions; 
3. Lawyers were also very important, in particular addressing the issue of the 
‘alleged’ or ‘forced’ smugglers, not only in court but also in the public debate, 
suggesting the inadequacy of the existing penal framework, exerting agency 
also outside the institutional arena dedicated to their action.  
Besides the direct effect in terms of implementation and on the application of laws (see 
the aspects of judicial policy-making, again in chapter 4), this situation produced 
significant effects also in the relationship with the other levels and for the effects it 
brought. 
The connection with the national level happened mainly through two institutional 
channels: this aspect reinforces the assumptions about the importance of the 
institutional setting in shaping the different behaviours and forms of agency (see March 
and Olsen, 2011). 
The first institutional channel is the DNA, which, as intermediate body, allowed for an 
institutional space where the judiciary could upload information, challenges and 
preferences, with a view not only to ensuring a stronger horizontal coordination but 
also to reach legislators. The main issues that were transferred to decision-makers at 
national level in this specific regard had to do with the different natures of people 
charged with the ‘facilitation offence’, with some sort of distinction between smugglers 
and facilitators, in line also with the smuggling spectrum approach of this research and 
broadly recalling also the issue of ‘alleged’ or ‘forced’ smugglers. This aspect was 
connected with the broader debate on the financial or material benefit as a (non-




The second institutional channel are the parliamentary committees, where the main 
actors addressing these aspects were prosecutors and NGOs, often heard as experts 
and focusing on the potential relationship between NGOs and smuggling networks and 
on the very nature of NGO-led SAR operations. The entire issue here was connected, 
at least in part, with the humanitarian exemption concerns (see sections 5.2.1. and 
5.3.3.). The debate in this arena was really long and extensive, but prosecutors 
substantially failed to bring conclusive evidence related to any widespread illegal 
activity of NGOs (see section 5.2.1.). However, for the very characteristic of this 
institutional arena, the lack of evidence –  which would have become, and actually 
became, crucial in a judicial arena – could be somehow neglected.  
Both of these institutional upload arenas were directly connected with (or, in the case 
of committees, were even part of) the parliament. This is remarkable as it allowed 
Members of Parliament (MPs) to gain direct evidence about existing issues in this 
specific policy sector. Still, the debate in parliament, analysed in chapter 5, showed 
how the primary focus in criminal law anti-smuggling policies was on (a) NGOs and 
their potential connection with smugglers and/or liability for the ‘facilitation offence’ 
(even in absence of any conclusive evidence, as above recalled) and (b) a one-way 
perception of smugglers as evil criminals, essentially falling at the right extreme of the 
smuggling spectrum (see section 1.2.3.), with only few exceptions. 
This can be understood on the basis of the selective evidence-based policy-making 
(see paragraphs 5.4. and 6.4. as well as above. See also Baldwin-Edwards et al., 
2019), where a rationality approach, responding to the fulfilment of a political agenda, 
overcomes the pursuit of policies responding to the actual needs (in this specific case, 
evidence calling for more restrictive and securitising approaches have shown a 
stronger capacity of inspiring policies). But also inter-institutional dynamics between 
the parliament and the government can contribute to explaining the missing aspects of 
this information upload: the government, still clearly connected to parliamentary 
committees by an indirect relationship, is the leading actor of the legislative process 
and mainly responds to rational choice approaches, with a substantial degree of 
continuity over the years (see chapter 5 and paragraph 7.2.). On the one side, 
therefore, the main legislative actor is less exposed to direct connection with those 




different logics, where the priority is not necessarily to ensure that information and 
preferences coming from the actors tasked with the implementation of existing 
measures be taken into account. 
But this process is further complicated by a parallel process which happened at EU 
level, where the general framework of article 12 TUI approach is set (namely in the 
Facilitators Package, see chapter 3). In spite of the room for manoeuvre left to MSs 
insofar as the aspects considered above were concerned (see European Parliament 
2016, 50–54 and chapter 3), missed reforms of the FP had indeed a clear impact on 
the Italian situation, as we shall see below. 
The potential review of the Facilitators Package was based on a number of 
interactions, again coming from the ground and where evidence arising from the 
Sicilian case was of crucial importance. The above-explored issues concerning the 
implementation of the criminal law framework in one of the most important smuggling 
arenas could move from the Sicilian to the EU level through three institutional arenas. 
Firstly, the DNA, which allowed to upload some of the main smuggling agency patterns, 
in the perspective of judges and prosecutors, into the EU arena, mainly in connection 
with EU agencies (see section 6.2.1.). Secondly, the arena of informal-to-institutional 
dynamics, where in particular research and studies could inform policy-makers of the 
points of view not only of the members of the judiciary, but also of NGOs operating on 
the ground, in broader connection also with civil society and experts. Here the main 
elements considered had to do with the financial or material benefit and with the 
humanitarian exemption (see section 6.3.2.). Thirdly, also parliamentary hearings and 
field missions were crucial in uploading information, mainly from prosecutors and 
NGOs, in particular related to ‘alleged’ smugglers, humanitarian exemption and 
smuggling patterns (see sections 6.2.1. and 6.2.2.). 
If the DNA was essentially connected with EU agencies in general, research and 
informal arena had a direct relationship both with the EP and the Commission, whereas 
EP hearings and field visits were clearly directly related to the Parliament itself. 
The legislative process at EU level to reform the FP, however, never started, and there 
was no room even for minor improvements. The Commission, indeed, concluded quite 
contradictorily for the lack of any conclusive evidence for a revision of the FP, arguably 




on these issues coming from the ground, such as financial or material benefit and 
humanitarian exemption (INT_1, March 2019; INT_2, April 2019). These conclusions 
are not confirmed by any hard evidence coming from the Council, but it appears 
significant that, on the contrary, the other co-legislator repeatedly called upon the 
Commission for some interventions on the issue on humanitarian exemption60 (at least 
in the form of soft law guidelines) but without any success (see section 6.3.3.). This 
can be explained, in turn, with the veto player nature of the Council in AFSJ, aimed at 
maintaining a status quo grounded in a pre-Lisbon policy-making (see Maricut, 2016 
and Ripoll Servent, 2017. See also Bonjour et al., 2018; Olsson, 2016 and Pollack, 
2009 on path dependency in new institutionalist approaches). 
Coming full circle, dynamics taking place between the Italian and the EU level also 
mattered. If, on the one side, the missed reform had an impact on the Italian policy-
making, even though room for agency still existed (see above and chapter 3), such 
relationship mattered also in the opposite direction. In particular, this was the case (a) 
because of the involvement of MPs in the hearings and field visits of EP, (b) for the 
very role of the national government within Council, as well as (c) for the request of 
legitimising support brought forward by the Italian government to the Commission (and 
granted by the latter) concerning the 2017 Code of conduct (see sections 5.2.2. and 
6.2.2.). 
It should be noted that, as an external actor, also international organisations 
contributed to this final result, in particular through an engagement with the 
Commission (see paragraph 6.4.). 
This three-layered policy-making process related to the possible reform of the existing 
criminal law framework to counter the smuggling of migrants led to the following policy 
outputs (see chapter 3): 
1. At a national level, there was no reform of article 12 TUI, where any potential 
challenge connected to the lack of differentiation between smugglers and 
facilitators, the financial or material gain as well as the humanitarian exemption 
was not addressed. On the contrary, three non-legislative tools (with all the 
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implication in terms of inter-institutional agency, see paragraph 5.4.) were 
developed, going exactly in the opposite direction: the 2017 Code of conduct, 
aimed at constraining the agency of NGOs; the 2018 closing harbours policy for 
NGO vessels; the 2019 directives of the Ministry of Interior, again aimed at 
forbidding the docking/entry into territorial seas of NGOs, being these last two 
essentially connecting the NGO activities with the violation of norms on the 
‘facilitation of illegal immigration’ (cf. Carrera et al., 2018b; Cusumano, 2019; 
Cusumano and Gombeer, 2018 and Morcone, 2019); 
2. At an EU level, in a specular way, there was no reform of the FP, nor any direct 
intervention limited at least to provide some guarantees to humanitarian actors. 
On the contrary, the only active intervention, even if not in terms of act but rather 
in terms of public declaration, was the support to the 2017 Code of conduct. 
In such a context, where (a) several critical aspects were highlighted on the ground, 
(b) most of them were brought to the attention of policy-makers, (c) part of them were 
also extensively discussed at national level, the final policy output both at national and 
EU level seems at odd with the whole process, reinforcing the assumptions of the 
“failing forward” argument (Scipioni, 2018b; see also Caponio and Cappiali, 2018 and 
section 1.3.1.). It is not surprising, therefore, how the final outcome based on the 
situation and on the decisions take at different levels eventually led to: 
1. The persisting uncertain situation of ‘alleged’ or ‘forced’ smugglers (see chapter 
4); 
2. The persisting uncertain situation of NGOs operating in the Mediterranean Sea 
(see chapter 5). 
The failure to address those aspects – financial or other material benefit and 
humanitarian exemption – that would be crucial to provide a meaningful answer in the 
light of the criticisms emerged, seems to reinforce (a) the idea of the anti-smuggling 
framework as a tool to manage migration, rather than fighting against smuggling 
(SIC_1, September 2018; SIC_2, October 2018; INT_2, April 2019 among others) and 
(b) the overall tendency to police humanitarianism (see Carrera et al., 2018a and 
Cusumano and Gombeer, 2018 among others). It should be noted, lastly, that the 
inclusion of the financial or other material benefit as constitutive element of the offence 




Italy (see UNODC, 2017, p. 41). Arguably, it is not necessarily able to solve concerns 
related to ‘alleged’ or ‘forced’ smugglers (in those cases in which they actually receive 
some form of discount on the price of the crossing). However, in conjunction of the 
‘exoneration clause for distress’ and with the humanitarian exemption constitutes one 
of the tools to address the ‘grey area’ of smuggling. Furthermore, the overall debate 
over the material benefit could nevertheless inform a reform of article 12 TUI, providing 
for meaningful, different degrees of responsibility for facilitators and smugglers (SIC_3, 
October 2018; JUD_3, April 2019; ITA_2, April 2019. See also Escobar Veas, 2018). 
In concluding this chapter, Figure 7.1. tries to sum up all these arguments and to 





















                                                          
61 In spite of how complex it may look, this process is still oversimplified, insofar as it assumes a T0 and 
a T1, without considering as every intermediate step, especially in terms of policy outputs, had side 
effects back onto other actors (e.g. the 2017 Code of conduct had an impact on the agency of NGOs on 
the ground, which adapted to the new situation through new forms of agency – as reported by JUD_3, 




Figure 7.1. – Across-the-level agency dynamics in the review of the ‘facilitation offence’ 
 
Source: Elaborated by the author 
Abbreviations used exclusively in this figure: (E)PC = (European) parliamentary committees; 





At the end of a journey made of continuous shifts and movements across the anti-
smuggling governance levels, the time has come to draw some conclusions, briefly 
recalling the path travelled and answering the research question (RQ). On such bases, 
also an understanding of the way forward and of the potential avenues opened by this 
research shall be offered. 
After doing so, there will be still some room for a short narrative update, shedding light 
on the main events happened in the period between the end of the data collection and 
the completion of the writing phase. 
Some reflections will also be shared, concerning on the one side one key analytical 
tool of this research, i.e. the smuggling spectrum, and, on the other side, the research 
in itself, considering their implications besides academia and, more broadly, what 
means to research on migration issues in Europe at the end of the 2010s. 
 
Answering the research question 
This research aimed to offer an up-to-date, in-depth understanding of an often 
overlooked component of the migration framework in the EU – i.e., smuggling-related 
policy-making – making use of an innovative analytical model, based on the conceptual 
combination of existing approaches. 
To do so, Part 1 of the study was dedicated to a complex process of establishment of 
an operational definition, based on the definition of a smuggling spectrum, and to the 
identification and formulation of the research problem and connected questions. In 
order to answer these questions, the combination of new institutionalist and multi-level 
governance (MLG) approaches was sought, through the delineation of a 3-layer 
analytical model, able to disclose the across-the-level interaction of actors involved in 
the anti-smuggling policy-making (and implementation) in Europe, focusing on the 
specific cases of Italy and Sicily. This research tried to contribute to the EU studies and 
to the overall knowledge of the migration field by (a) focusing on a phenomenon – 
migrant smuggling – which, in spite of a growing attention by scholars, appears to be 
still overall understudied; (b) choosing to focus on a specific aspect of it, i.e. the policy-




limitedly explored; and (c) suggesting a way of looking at it by combining an 
institution/agency approach with the understanding of the ultimate multi-level nature of 
the process. 
Part 2, based on the application of the analytical model onto the Italian/Sicilian case, 
made it possible to disclose the characteristics of the implementation and making 
processes of those policies aimed at targeting the smuggling of migrants at a local, 
national and supranational level, in chapters 4, 5 and 6 respectively. Chapter 7 
eventually wrapped up all these different components and highlighted the patterns in 
the across-the-level interactions of the involved actors. 
Bringing together all the aspects discussed throughout the research, and in the 
previous chapter in particular, these final remarks enable to answer the main research 
question that has informed this study, i.e. what are the patterns of the smuggling-
related policy-making across different levels of EU governance and which institutional 
and agency dynamics can explain them? 
On the basis of the multiple perspectives adopted to study the policy-making related 
to migrant smuggling within the EU, focusing on the Italian/Sicilian case in the period 
2014-2019, and in particular (a) on agency and bottom-up processes at the 
implementation level, (b) MLG dynamics at national level, (c) MLG dynamics at EU 
level, (d) across-the-level agency and institutions analysis, the following answer can 
be provided:  
The analysis of the Italian/Sicilian case indicates that policy-making in 
the anti-migrant smuggling domain in the EU is strongly executive-
centred and involves a plurality of institutional actors, embedded at an 
EU, national and local level, who tend to share, to different extents, a 
progressively securitising approach. The complexity of the governance 
systems allows for pass-the-buck dynamics, in particular between the 
Italian and EU levels. Furthermore, notwithstanding the significance of 
dynamics taking place on the ground in a policy-making perspective, 
processes of information and preference upload prove to be difficult and 
dependent on the specific stance of the concerned information. Lastly, 




adoption, mostly through their practices (and even in unwanted 
manners) rather than by processes of advocacy.  
The complexity of the answer to the research question, albeit unavoidable given the 
complexity of the question itself, necessarily calls for some deeper explanations of its 
different components, which shall be provided below. 
1. The analysis of the Italian/Sicilian case indicates that policy-making in the anti-
migrant smuggling domain in the EU is strongly executive-centred and involves 
a plurality of institutional actors, embedded at an EU, national and local level, 
who tend to share, to different extents, a progressively securitising approach. 
The national government and the Council of the EU (the Council) lead the policy-
making process, showing a certain continuity in the overall approach, even between 
governments of different colour (Zincone, 2011), as well as in the choice of policy tools 
(see Capano and Lippi, 2017): there is a progressive shift towards ‘new governance’ 
tools, which create even more room for manoeuvre for governments, in the framework 
of a rational-oriented approach (Guiraudon, 2018 and Olsson, 2016. See also 
Cardwell, 2018). Veto-player dynamics, within path dependency frameworks, also 
apply (Pollack, 2009. See also Maricut, 2016; Ripoll Servent, 2017 and Tsebelis, 
1995). At a supranational level, this reaffirms the importance of intergovernmental 
dynamics, to the detriment of supranational ones (Maricut, 2016). 
The other side of this process entails a progressive marginalisation of parliaments, 
which tend to respond to different logics of agency and to ensure a stronger connection 
with actors on the ground (crucial in the overall policy-making, see below), but are de 
facto relegated into arenas of political debate where the overall discourse is framed. In 
this perspective, the Italian parliament appears to be more confrontational and the 
issue is more divisive (see Giuliani, 2008 and Zincone, 2011), whereas the debate in 
the European Parliament (EP) seems to be more morally oriented. Yet, the actual 
degree of influence on substantive policies appears to be limited, excluding those 
processes, in particular at EU level, where Members of the European Parliament 
(MEPs) reshape and reshuffle their preferences, agreeing to a more Council-oriented 
position (cf. Huber, 2015).  
Also the European Commission (EC, the Commission) plays a crucial role, as it tips 




securitising and holistic approaches, the Commission showed a progressive shift 
towards the Council in the legislative process, in some sort of subordination, even if 
apparently contradicted by the debates in the parliamentary arena (cf. Scipioni, 2018b 
and, in a wider perspective, Zaun, 2017b). 
Lastly on this point, all policy-makers appear to share a security- and criminal law-
based approach, even if to a very different extent, where prevention and demand side 
policies are marginal. The overall policy-making and implementation in this field 
seems, thus, only very limitedly informed by the multifaceted nature of smuggling and 
by the existence of the smuggling spectrum, as defined in section 1.2.3. In this 
perspective, policy-makers also tend to use the deep complexity of this policy areas to 
partly disguise this approach and make it more ‘acceptable’ (see, for example, the 
paradoxical convergence between “the humanitarianization of migration and border 
management” and its securitisation in the Mediterranean Sea in Cuttitta, 2018, p. 636). 
Independently on the political stance, this approach seems to be more accentuated in 
the national government and in the Council (cf. Guiraudon, 2018).   
2. The complexity of the governance systems allows for pass-the-buck 
dynamics, in particular between the Italian and EU levels. This second aspect has 
to do with the way in which policy failures or, more broadly, problems and shortcomings 
can actually be attributed – rightly or wrongly – to other governance layers or actors. 
Besides horizontal dynamics (e.g. between EP and Council/European Council, see 
chapter 6), the most interesting pattern involves the changing role and perception of 
the EU as a whole from the national level. Leaving behind the 1990s and 2000s 
dynamics, where EU policies and policy approaches de facto revolutionised the Italian 
migration and smuggling policy (see Abbondanza, 2017; Castelli Gattinara, 2017 and 
Finotelli and Sciortino, 2009), the recent situation exposes a clear contradiction. On 
the one side, national policy-makers do not use the room for manoeuvre they actually 
have to intervene on anti-smuggling policies, within the overall framework set at an EU 
level (see above), as well as failing to contribute to this policy changes in the 
supranational arena itself (mainly within Council). On the other side, though, missed 
reforms (or alleged ones) are used as scapegoat to justify shortcomings in the 
implementation of smuggling-related policies, through those dynamics defined as 




3. Furthermore, notwithstanding the significance of dynamics taking place on 
the ground in a policy-making perspective, processes of information and 
preference upload prove to be difficult and dependent on the specific stance of 
the concerned information. The third point highlights the importance of the ground 
level, in particular insofar as the agency of a plurality of actors at this level affects the 
existing framework, through the exercise of discretion and through an impact on the 
policy-making process, which can be either direct (local policy-making) or indirect 
(bottom-up dynamics, see chapter 4). In particular, among the different actors, the role 
of the judiciary is crucial, considering both prosecutors and judges (see above. Cf. also 
Anaya, 2014 and Marmo, 2007). 
However, the upload of information and preferences from the ground proves 
particularly difficult, both in relation to the national and EU levels. In this perspective, 
the concept of ‘selective evidence-based policies’ was introduced, considering how 
information and preferences coming from the ground are more likely to be incorporated 
in the policy adoption process if they fall within a security-based logic (cf. Guiraudon, 
2018, among others), covering only a very limited part of the smuggling spectrum. A 
critical aspect of this is the understanding of the point at which these upload processes 
stop. In this respect, it should be noted that available evidence shows that, at least in 
the case of national parliament, EP and Commission, information and preferences 
reach a preliminary stage of the decision-making. Such process, therefore, rather than 
being blocked by the lack of appropriate communication channels (which exist and are 
particularly important, such as intermediate bodies, parliamentary committees and 
expert research), appears to be affected by institutional dynamics at the level of 
decision-makers (see paragraph 7.2.). Issues, indeed, tend to be also institutionally 
divisive, as actors respond to different logics and different perspectives: the executive-
centred nature of the policy-making in this domain seems to heavily affect the process 
of information and preference upload and its incorporation into policies. However, the 
degree to what this actually happens is difficult to establish, given the black box related 
to the information upload and to the actual decision-making, which characterises the 
national government and the Council. 
4. Lastly, non-institutional actors significantly contribute to the process of policy 




than by processes of advocacy. This last element has to do, mainly, with the role of 
NGOs, especially those involved in search and rescue (SAR) operations in the 
Mediterranean Sea (even though other non-institutional actors are also involved). Their 
impact on policy-making dynamics is very deep and strong, mostly in terms of 
(unintended or at least secondary) consequences arising from their practices. The 
2017 Code of conduct or the closing harbours policy are clear examples of that. 
 
The way forward 
As an interpretive case study in a policy domain still to be explored, in particular with 
reference to the policy formulation and adoption dynamics, this research has sought 
to provide some first systematic insights into the patterns of policy-making within the 
EU, through the understanding of rather significant case(s), i.e. Italy and Sicily.  
The approach proposed, based on the smuggling spectrum and on the 3-layer 
analytical model, might offer, in this perspective, interesting potentialities in order to 
look at similar dynamics in other European countries. The most important contribution 
that this research can offer to the overall scholarship in this field, besides the in-depth 
understanding of the specific Italian/Sicilian case, probably lies in the definition of a 
model to look at the interaction between institutions and political agency across 
different governance levels. 
Besides that, the analysis conducted and the conclusions here presented also suggest 
further specific research avenues that would significantly improve the knowledge and 
understanding of the way in which policies aimed at countering migrant smuggling are 
shaped. Among them, three are particularly worth recalling:  
1. The impact and influence of a fourth governance layer, i.e. the international 
framework/international organisations (see paragraph 6.4.);  
2. The understanding of the role of national and EU bureaucracy and civil servants 
as de facto game changers, as they are able to ensure continuity in time and 
between governance levels, also through their capacity of moving more freely 
and discreetly in a policy domain so divisive and contentious (see paragraphs 




3. The unpacking of the black boxes of Council and government, both in terms of 
policy adoption and in terms of connection with the ground and processing of 
information and preference coming from this level (also through the work of the 
intermediate bodies), as well as from non-institutional actors (see paragraphs 
5.3., 6.3., 7.2. and 7.3.). 
Comparative studies or other case studies focused on other countries and dynamics, 
as well as future research on the above issues, shall allow researchers to build upon 
the findings of this work and to contribute to a deeper understanding of the patterns 
and the logics that govern the elaboration of policies against the smuggling of migrants 
within the EU. 
Hopefully, this study may also provide an empirical contribution, based on the 
extensive information and analyses concerning the policy-making dynamics in a quite 
unexplored field. In so doing, it has tried to offer some material and food for thoughts 
and reflection also for those actively engaged in attempts to influence the policy-
making process and, potentially, changing the existing policies. 
The extent to which an empirical contribution actually exists is not for the author to say: 
practitioners engaged in policy-making, implementation and advocacy would rather be 
the ones to assess that. In very broad terms, it can however be observed that some of 
the aspects that have emerged are quite intuitive – such as the centrality of the 
government and the Ministry of Interior – and in such perspective this could be seen 
as reinventing the wheel. On the other hand, however, other dynamics that were 
analysed are far less evident or considered in existing studies: among them, the role 
of bureaucracy, that of intermediate bodies and of the judiciary, the selective 
information upload and evidence-based policy-making, the ‘blame Brussels’/’excuse 
shopping’ games or the complex interactions between different policy areas.  
Hence, even though some further research is definitely necessary, the hope of the 
author is that the analysis emerged in this research can already offer some interesting 
reflections for the general public and in an advocacy and policy advisory perspective, 
in terms of production and implementation of migration policies and for potential 





A narrative update 
As explained in the first lines of these conclusions, another important aspect to 
consider in these last pages is a brief narrative update, focusing on the significant 
events which took place in the period between the end of data collection (April 2019) 
and the conclusion of the writing phase (September 2019). A few lines were further 
added at the end of this section in February 2020, in the occasion of the finalisation of 
the thesis with some small changes and clarifications based on the comments of the 
external reviewers appointed by the University of Bologna. This last addition briefly 
covers the period September 2019 – February 2020.  
In such a topical field, meaningful events take place almost on a daily basis and these 
last months have offered several new examples of dynamics similar to those that had 
already emerged in the analysis conducted, in particular with regards to SAR 
operations. A new directive was issued on 15 May 2019 by Minister Salvini and in the 
following weeks the confrontational nature of the interaction between NGOs and the 
Ministry of Interior dramatically increased, in turn further polarising the public debate. 
This included a new decree-law (the ‘Security Decree-bis’, i.e. Decree-Law n. 53/2019, 
converted with Law n. 77/2019), which exacerbated the rationale of the Security 
Decree, but also new judicial proceedings, the seizure and release of NGO boats, new 
bans for NGOs to access the territorial sea issued again by the Minister of Interior, and 
even the intervention of an administrative court to suspend the enforceability of the 
Security Decree-bis and allowing the entrance of an NGO boat into the Italian waters. 
In May, meanwhile, the main still ongoing judicial proceeding of Prosecutor Zuccaro 
related to NGO-led SAR operations, was dismissed.  
Furthermore, the case of the halt to the docking of the coast guard Gregoretti ship also 
took place. It closely resembled the Diciotti case, but, on this occasion, Minister Salvini 
seemed to want to avoid bringing the case to its extreme consequences. 
These events offer several examples, also in these last months, of dynamics that were 
extensively analysed throughout the research, including institutional clashes between 
the Ministry of Interior and other ministries and law enforcement and border guards 
and the always controversial – at least for policy-makers – role of NGOs.  
Finally, throughout the month of August a governmental crisis was opened by Minister 




September, with the formation of a new government led again by President Conte, but 
supported by a different majority, bringing together the Five Star Movement and the 
Democratic Party (PD) and opening the doors of the Ministry of Interior for Luciana 
Lamorgese, former Prefetto in Venice and Milan and former chief of staff of then 
Ministers of Interior Angelino Alfano and Marco Minniti, in a PD-led government. The 
political agency on undocumented migration and smuggling of the new Minister and of 
the new government will be of utmost interest, also in order to assess the degree of 
continuity and to highlight and analyse potential differences in the approach and in the 
policy outputs and outcomes.   
The events that took place between the end of the writing phase, in September 2019, 
and the month of February 2020, when this thesis came to its final version, are 
significant in this perspective. Continuity has indeed been shown with regards to 
shifting out policies (renewal of the 2017 Italy-Libya Deal) and with the failure to 
abrogate the Security Decrees (which have not even been amended, so far, though 
the new government committed to it). Significant changes were brought, instead, by 
the Malta Declaration on SAR and relocation of September 2019, where Italy played a 
central role and achieved an important success at an EU level. Equally remarkable has 
been the start of two other judicial proceedings against former Minister Salvini, one for 
the Gregoretti case mentioned above and one for another similar case involving the 
NGO vessel Open Arms. The political scenario concerning the authorisation of his 
indictments appears now to be different: the new parliamentary majority seems inclined 
to authorise the indictments, and so is the Lega Nord (at least in the Gregoretti case, 
having voted in favour in an intermediate stage in committee), in a strategic attempt to 
politically capitalise on an alleged judicial persecution against Matteo Salvini. Lastly, 
new attention to Operation Sophia and a re-deployment of naval assets has arisen due 
to the ongoing Libyan conflict, even if SAR aspects have appeared to be marginal in 
the policy debate and negotiations between EU governments.    
 
Researching on migration governance in troubled times 
Moving towards the conclusive remarks, two reflections are worth sharing. The first 
one has to do with one of the key analytical elements of this study, i.e. the smuggling 




Notwithstanding its potential analytical value and its importance, which the reader 
might have appreciated throughout the research, it appears striking how little empirical 
relevance it has assumed in the agency of a wide majority of policy-makers and 
practitioners. Even if with some exceptions, most of them have seemed to fail catching 
the overall complexity of the phenomenon of the smuggling of migrants, its multifaceted 
nature and the impossibility of a one-size-fits-all response. And, even when this 
complexity was caught, the policy outcomes have rarely been consistent with such an 
awareness. These aspects were partly recalled throughout the research, especially in 
chapter 7, but what can be added here is how all this has substantial – and sometimes 
very serious or even dramatic – consequences for the recipients of these policies. 
Occasional facilitators may be mixed with organised, “ruthless” (in the very words of 
the European Commission) smugglers; smuggled migrants are rarely perceived – and 
treated – as victims; humanitarian actors are targeted as accomplices of smuggling 
networks. These are but a few concrete examples of the direct and indirect 
consequences arising from the lack of policies informed by that complexity expressed 
in the smuggling spectrum. 
And this very awareness somehow leads to the second consideration, which has to do 
with the overall meaning of this research and to what researching into migration entails, 
especially in this historical moment. The methodological rigour and accuracy, as well 
as the technical arguments embedded in the analysis of policy-making dynamics, 
cannot make one forget about the concrete impact and empirical consequences of 
these policies and of these processes. This element has been very present under 
different points of view: from the difficulty which was experienced at times in addressing 
very sensitive issues with some of the interviewees, to the delicate process of 
unbiasedly reconstructing and connecting data out of the political debate, to the very 
awareness that besides policies, processes and institutions there are real people, who 
face the consequences, sometimes even in dramatic terms, of the policies adopted. 
And this last element of awareness, in particular, though not always easy to manage, 
has accompanied the author throughout the entire research. 
 





Appendix 1  
List of main legislative acts, treaties, international conventions 
and their respective abbreviations 
 
European Union 
Directive 2001/55/EC on the temporary protection in the event of a mass influx 
(Temporary Protection Directive) 
Council Directive 2002/90/EC of 28 November 2002 defining the facilitation of 
unauthorised entry, transit and residence and Council Framework Decision of 28 
November 2002 on the strengthening of the penal framework to prevent the 
facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence (2002/946/JHA) 
(Facilitators Package) 
Council Decision of 24 July 2006 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European 
Community, of the Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and 
Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational 
Organised Crime concerning the provisions of the Protocol, in so far as the 
provisions of this Protocol fall within the scope of Articles 179 and 181a of the 
Treaty establishing the European Community (2006/616/EC) 
Council Decision of 24 July 2006 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European 
Community, of the Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and 
Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational 
Organised Crime concerning the provisions of the Protocol, in so far as the 
provisions of the Protocol fall within the scope of Part III, Title IV of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community (2006/617/EC) 
Directive 2009/50/EC on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country 
nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment (Blue Card Directive) 





Directive 2011/95/EU (recast) for the definition of refugee status and beneficiaries of 
subsidiary protection (Qualification Directive) 
Regulation (EU) 603/2013 (recast) for the establishment of the Eurodac system 
(Eurodac Regulation) 
Regulation (EU) 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 
2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State 
responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one 
of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (Dublin III 
Regulation) 
Directive 2013/32/EU (recast) for the procedures for granting and withdrawing refugee 
status and subsidiary protection (Asylum Procedures Directive) 
Directive 2013/33/EU (recast) on the reception of asylum seekers (Reception 
Conditions Directive) 
Directive 2014/36/EU on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country 
nationals for the purpose of employment as seasonal workers 
Council Decision (EU) 2015/1523 establishing provisional measures in the area of 
international protection for the benefit of Italy and of Greece 
Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 establishing provisional measures in the area of 
international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece 
Regulation (EU) 2016/1624, replacing Frontex with the European Border and Coast 
Guard Agency (EBCGA) 
Directive (EU) 2016/801 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country 
nationals for the purposes of research, studies, training, voluntary service, pupil 
exchange schemes or educational projects and au pairing 
Council Decision (EU) 2016/1754 amending Decision (EU) 2015/1601 establishing 








Law n. 943/1986 
Decree-Law n. 416/1989, converted with Law n. 39/1990 (Martelli Law) 
Decree-Law n. 451/1995, converted with Law n. 563/1995 
Law n. 40/1998 (Turco-Napolitano Law) 
Legislative Decree n. 286/1998 (Consolidated Immigration Act, TUI) 
Law n. 189/2002 (Bossi-Fini Law) 
Law n. 125/2008 and Law n. 94/2009 (Security Package) 
Decree-Law n. 13/2017, converted with Law n. 46/2017 (Minniti-Orlando Decree) 
Law n. 47/2017 (Zampa Law) 
Decree-Law n. 84/2018, converted with Law n. 98/2018 
Decree-Law n. 113/2018, converted with Law n. 132/2018 (Security Decree) 
 
Treaties and international conventions 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols 
thereto (UNTOC) 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women 
and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime (Trafficking Protocol) 
Protocol against the smuggling of migrants by land, sea and air, supplementing the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Smuggling 
Protocol) 
Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties 
establishing the European Communities and certain related acts (Amsterdam 
Treaty) 
Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing 




Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty, TEU) 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
The 18 March 2016 EU-Turkey Statement (EU-Turkey Statement, Deal, Agreement) 
The 2 February 2017 Memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the fields of 
development, the fight against illegal immigration, human trafficking and fuel 
smuggling and on reinforcing the security of borders between the State of Libya 
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Position/institutional affiliation Date and type of interview 
1 SIC_1 Lawyer, Messina 26 September 2018, phone 
2 JUD_1 Judge, Messina 28 September 2018, in person 
3 LAW_1 High-rank Law Enforcement Officer, 
Messina 
1 October 2018, in person 
4 LAW_2 High-rank Law Enforcement Officer, 
Messina 
1 October 2018, in person 
5 NGO_1 NGO Officer, Eastern Sicily  4 October 2018, Skype 
6 SIC_2 Former Deputy Mayor for Migration 
Policies, Messina 
6 October 2018, phone 
7 NGO_2 NGO Officer, Eastern Sicily 10 October 2018, Skype 
8 JUD_2 Judge, Messina 17 October 2018, informal 
conversation, in person  
9 SIC_3 Lawyer, Catania and Ragusa 17 October 2018, phone 
10 SIC_4 Former Deputy Mayor for Migration 
Policies, Palermo 
19 October 2018, phone 
11 NGO_3 NGO Officer, Sicily 22 October 2018, Skype 
12 NGO_4 NGO Project Manager, Sicily 23 October 2018, Skype 
13 LAW_3 High-rank Law Enforcement Officer, 
Palermo 
15 November 2018, phone 
14 INT_1 UNODC, Officer 15 March 2019, Skype 
15 EUR_1  Governmental officer acting at EU 
level 
27 March 2019, phone 
16 ITA_1 ANCI, Officer 29 March 2019, phone 
17 JUD_3 National Deputy Anti-Mafia 
Prosecutor 
17 April 2019, in person 
18 ITA_2 Ministry of Interior, Department for 
Civic Liberties and Immigration, 
Former top-level Officer 




19 INT_2 UNODC, Officer 25 April 2019, Skype 
20 EUR_2 Italian MEP 2 May 2019, Skype 
21 ITA_3 Ministry of Justice, Department for 
Justice Affairs, Directorate-General 
Criminal Justice, Judge in charge 
14 May 2019, informal 
conversation, phone 
22 NGO_5 NGO Officer, Mediterranean Sea 22 May 2019, Skype 
23 EUR_3 European Commission, DG HOME, 
Officer 
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Dutch summary – Nederlandstalige samenvatting 
 
Aandacht voor en zorgen om migratie zijn in het laatste decennium gegroeid, zowel in 
politieke debatten, publieke opinie, wetenschappelijk onderzoek, als in praktijkgerichte 
werkvelden rondom migratie. Vooral Europese landen rondom de Middellandse zee, 
waaronder Italië, hebben hier vanaf 2013 en 2014 mee te maken gekregen. 
Migratiestromen uit Noord-Afrika en het Midden-Oosten namen toen – in ieder geval 
voor een aantal jaren – sterk toe in omvang.  
Deze toename in migratie en de aandacht ervoor heeft nationale en Europese 
debatten gepolariseerd. Xenofobische discoursen sloegen meer aan bij het publiek en 
extreemrechtse politieke partijen hebben – veelal met succes – geprobeerd angst en 
zorgen over migratie te benutten voor hun eigen politieke doeleinden. In deze context 
is het cruciaal geworden om diepgaand gefocust onderzoek te doen naar specifieke 
aspecten van het migratieproces naar Europa. Dit is niet alleen belangrijk voor de 
ontwikkeling van academisch onderzoek naar migratie, maar ook om publieke en 
politieke debatten rondom migratie van feiten en bewijzen te voorzien. 
Aspecten die gelinkt zijn aan het smokkelen van migranten zijn centraal komen te 
staan in dit verhaal. Daar zijn twee belangrijke redenen voor. Aan de ene kant blijkt dat 
veel vormen van migratie naar Europa over de Middellandse Zee in verschillende mate 
betrokkenheid van smokkelaars vereisen. Dit wordt uitgebreider besproken in 
hoofdstuk 1. Aan de andere kant focust het publieke debat steeds meer op 
smokkelaars. Dit impliceert echter niet dat er een oprechte en diepliggende zorg over 
het smokkelen zelf bestaat. Gedurende dit onderzoek zal het duidelijk worden hoe 
vaak het narratief over smokkelen gebruikt is om voorkeuren voor restrictief 
migratiebeleid te verhullen.   
Het staat echter vast dat smokkelprocessen en narratieven gerelateerd aan 
migrantensmokkel cruciaal zijn om patronen van migratie naar Europa over de 
Middellandse Zee beter te begrijpen.  
Dit onderzoek vertrekt dan ook vanuit deze stelling en behandelt het huidige 
academische debat rondom migrantensmokkel op de Middellandse Zee routes, met 




voorziet van overwegingen vanuit een beleidsperspectief. Om dat te doen, focust dit 
onderzoek naar anti-smokkel beleid op een casestudie, namelijk Italië, met een 
gelinkte sub-case: Sicilië. Het onderzoek analyseert de kenmerken van politieke 
agency in het maken en implementeren van beleid dat verband houdt met 
migrantensmokkel. Het focust op dergelijk beleid op en tussen verschillende 
bestuurslagen: dat van de EU, de nationale en de lokale overheid, in de periode 2014-
2019.  
Dit onderzoek is belangrijk en actueel omdat het focust op een kwestie die onderbelicht 
is in academische en grijze literatuur. Het belang van dit onderzoek schuilt echter met 
name in het begrijpen van migratiebeheer (migration governance) op EU-niveau, zowel 
theoretisch als empirisch. Verder biedt de gekozen aanpak belangrijke elementen van 
innovatie, doordat deze specifiek focust op het proces van beleidsvorming, gebaseerd 
op een denkwijze die voortkomt uit de zogenoemde new institutionalist analysis.  
De studie bestaat uit twee hoofdonderdelen: Deel 1 (hoofdstuk 1-3), dat alle 
verschillende theoretische, analytische en methodologische aspecten beschouwt die 
relevant zijn in het ontwerpen van onderzoek naar migrantensmokkel; Deel 2 
(hoofdstuk 4-7), waarin de aanpakken en modellen die in de eerste drie hoofdstukken 
besproken worden, toegepast worden op de casus.  
Meer specifiek: Hoofdstuk 1 biedt een diepgaande kijk op het concept 
‘migrantensmokkel’. Het pakt de verschillende componenten van het concept uit en 
stelt een nieuwe aanpak voor die de behoefte aan erkenning van de empirische 
complexiteit van dit concept verzoent met de behoefte aan een operationele en 
analytisch werkbare definitie ervan. In dit hoofdstuk worden de verschillende 
kenmerken van smokkelen, smokkelaars en gesmokkelde migranten beschouwd, 
samen met de verschillende manieren waarop academische en grijze literatuur deze 
termen aanhaalt. Deze beschouwing leidt tot de formulering van de operationele 
definitie van smokkelen – the smuggling spectrum (het smokkelspectrum) – en het 
onderzoeksprobleem. Met name het smuggling spectrum is een complex terrein waar 
het fenomeen smokkelen beschouwd wordt door zes verschillende lagen die wijzen op 





Hoofdstuk 2 werkt deze aspecten verder uit en beschrijft de theoretische leidraad naar 
het onderzoeksprobleem. Hier wordt in het bijzonder onderzocht hoe deze 
interpretatieve casestudy – die binnen het brede veld van EU-studies valt – nieuwe 
institutionele en multi-level governance benaderingen combineert. Op die manier 
scherpt het het onderzoeksprobleem aan tot een specifieke onderzoeksvraag en drie 
gelinkte deelvragen: een voor elk bestuursniveau. De onderzoeksvraag richt zich op 
hoe en waarom agency – beïnvloed door institutionele beperkingen – zich binnen en 
over bestuursniveaus beweegt bij het formuleren van beleid dat bedoeld is om het 
smokkelen van migranten in de EU, Italië en Sicilië tegen te gaan. Gebaseerd op dit 
proces wordt er een drieledig (institutie/agency, verticale en horizontale dynamieken) 
analytisch model voorgesteld dat de hierboven genoemde conceptuele combinatie en 
zijn concrete toepassing op de specifieke casus mogelijk maakt. De methodologische 
aspecten van het onderzoek – waaronder het tijdsbestek, de casusselectie en de 
specifieke kenmerken van de casus en sub-casus, de bronnenselectie en hun 
heuristische relevantie – worden hier ook aangehaald. Verschillende data worden 
overwogen en geanalyseerd. De data omvatten onder andere: 23 semigestructureerde 
diepte-interviews, gerealiseerd met relevante actoren op verschillende 
bestuursniveaus; parlementaire notulen van 1998 tot 2019; gerechtelijke notulen; en 
documenten van onder andere de Europese Commissie, het Europese Parlement, de 
Raad van de Europese Unie, nationale ministeries, Europol, Eurojust, UNODC, 
UNHCR en ngo’s.  
Hoofdstuk 3 bespreekt kort de relevante achtergrond van het wetgevende raamwerk 
dat hier van toepassing is, op een EU-, nationaal- en lokaal niveau, en bespreekt de 
formele verdeling van verschillende bevoegdheden over deze bestuursniveaus.  
Deel 2 volgt een bottom-up aanpak: Hoofdstuk 4 focust op aspecten van implementatie 
op lokaal niveau – in Sicilië – en gebruikt hier vooral de eerste laag van het analytische 
model voor. Ten eerste laat het hoofdstuk een analyse zien van hoe agency het 
mogelijk maakt om af te wijken van de letter of norms. Ten tweede volgt er een 
bespreking van hoe en in welke mate dit bijdraagt aan het maken van beleid, zowel 
direct (op lokaal niveau) of door het bedoeld of onbedoeld shifting up processes. Dit 




bemiddelende instanties (intermediate bodies, instituties tussen verschillende 
bestuurslagen in).  
Hoofdstuk 5 en 6 hebben een vergelijkbare structuur, maar nu gebaseerd op laag 2 en 
laag 3 van het analytische model, en beschouwen de dynamiek van beleidsvorming 
op respectievelijk het Italiaanse- en het EU-niveau.  
De analyse van het nationale niveau verkent beleidsvorming in relatie tot 
migrantensmokkel, in het licht van verticale en horizontale dynamieken. Verticale 
dynamieken zijn gebaseerd op de invloed van lokale en EU-niveaus, waar de 
bemiddelende instanties weer een belangrijke rol spelen, naast parlementaire 
commissies en ongewenste effecten die hun oorsprong hebben op EU-niveau. 
Horizontale dynamieken beschouwen de manier waarop verschillende 
beleidsterreinen en verschillende institutionele en non-institutionele actoren op het 
nationale niveau op elkaar inwerken in de uitwerking van smokkel gerelateerd beleid. 
Hierin zijn het veiligheid-gebaseerd raamwerk, de ongewenste gevolgen veroorzaakt 
door ngo’s en de uitvoering van beleid allemaal aspecten die primaire relevantie 
krijgen. 
Op EU-niveau bevestigen verticale dynamieken het belang van bemiddelende 
instanties en parlementaire commissies, in aanvulling op veldbezoeken. Horizontale 
interacties daarentegen helpen de relevantie van andere beleidsdomeinen buiten de 
Ruimte van Vrijheid, Veiligheid en Recht en de institutionele consequenties daarvan 
naar voren te brengen. Op het horizontale niveau wordt ook de interactie tussen 
supranationale en intergouvernementele actoren en de belangrijke (maar 
tegengestelde) rol van onderzoek aangekaart.  
Hoofdstuk 7 rondt de analyse in de andere hoofdstukken van deel 2 af: het maakt het 
3-ledige analytische model weer tot een eenheid en beschouwt de manier waarop 
politieke agency zich over verschillende bestuursniveaus beweegt. Daarbij wordt een 
specifieke focus op een beleid beschouwd, om het complexe samenspel tussen 
agency en instituties, ingebed in verschillende bestuursniveau, te verduidelijken en te 
onderstrepen.  
Tot slot wordt er in de conclusie volledig antwoord op de onderzoeksvraag gegeven 
en worden een aantal narratieve updates en algemene overdenkingen over deze 




voortgebouwd op de analyse en de manier waarop elke actor zich binnen en tussen 
verschillende bestuursniveaus beweegt – en daarbij beïnvloed en beperkt wordt door 
institutionele restricties – wordt geëvalueerd. Daarmee wordt uitgelegd (a) welke 
actoren het anti-smokkel beleidsvormingsproces leiden in de EU, Italië en Sicilië en 
waarom dat zo is; (b) wat hun kijk op mensensmokkel is; (c) welke dynamieken de 
relaties tussen hen karakteriseren, (d) hoeveel ruimte er is voor processen van 
informatieoverdracht; (e) in welke mate non-institutionele actoren bijdragen aan het 
proces van het aannemen van beleid. Deze conclusies zorgen voor diepgaand begrip 
van de specifieke Italië/Sicilië casus. Dit is significant aangezien dit de eerste 
systematische inzichten zijn in een beleidsdomein dat reeds verkend moet worden. 
Verder maakt de conceptuele combinatie in dit onderzoek de weg vrij voor nieuwe 
onderzoeksrichtingen in EU-studies: het geeft een definitie van een model dat bedoeld 
is om te kijken naar vergelijkbare beleidsvormingsprocessen in andere werkvelden of 
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